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An  authorisation  system  determines  who  is  authorised  to  do what  i.e. it assigns privileges to 
users and provides  a  decision  on whether someone is allowed to perform a requested action on a 
resource. A traditional authorisation decision system, which is simply called authorisation system or 
system in the rest of the thesis, provides the decision based on a policy which is usually written by 
the system administrator. Such a traditional authorisation system is not sufficient to protect privacy 
of personal data, since users (the data subjects) are usually given a take it or leave it choice to 
accept the controlling organisation’s policy. Privacy is the ability of the owners or subjects of 
personal data to control the flow of data about themselves, according to their own preferences. 
This thesis describes the design of an authorisation system that will provide privacy for personal 
data by including sticky authorisation policies from the issuers and data subjects, to supplement the 
authorisation policy of the controlling organisation. As personal data moves from controlling 
system to controlling system, the sticky policies travel with the data. 
A number of data protection laws and regulations have been formulated to protect the privacy of 
individuals. The rights and prohibitions provided by the law need to be enforced by the 
authorisation system. Hence, the designed authorisation system also includes the authorisation 
rules from the legislation. This thesis describes the conversion of rules from the EU Data Protection 
Directive into machine executable rules. Due to the nature of the legislative rules, not all of them 
could be converted into deterministic machine executable rules, as in several cases human 
intervention or human judgement is required. This is catered for by allowing the machine rules to 
be configurable. 
Since the system includes independent policies from various authorities (law, issuer, data subject 
and controller) conflicts may arise among the decisions provided by them. Consequently, this thesis 
describes a dynamic, automated conflict resolution mechanism. Different conflict resolution 
algorithms are chosen based on the request contexts.  
As the EU Data Protection Directive allows processing of personal data based on contracts, we 
designed and implemented a component, Contract Validation Service (ConVS) that can validate an 
XML based digital contract to allow processing of personal data based on a contract.  
The authorisation system has been implemented as a web service and the performance of the 
system is measured, by first deploying it in a single computer and then in a cloud server. Finally the 
validity of the design and implementation are tested against a number of use cases based on 
scenarios involving accessing medical data in a health service provider’s system and accessing 
personal data such as CVs and degree certificates in an employment service provider’s system. The 
machine computed authorisation decisions are compared to the theoretical decisions to ensure 
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With the advancement of modern technologies, data have become digital, and we have gained 
the flexibility of accessing data or resources electronically. The Internet is gaining more and more 
dominance in every aspect of our lives. Communication, learning new things, satisfying daily 
necessities such as shopping, paying bills or searching for information is just a mouse click away. 
Presenting oneself in the job market worldwide, promoting a business and even maintaining a 
social life has become very flexible. However, the blessings of the free flow of information are not 
free from unwanted consequences such as identity theft and threats to privacy.  
Many web sites today collect PII (Personal Identity Information) such as names and addresses 
from users through online registration, surveys, user profiles, and order fulfillment processes etc. 
Also, different personal data such as educational records, health data, credit card information and 
so on are collected by many organisations in order to provide consumers with services. An 
example of such a service is an online job agency where people post their CVs to hunt for jobs 
worldwide. Once released, users lose control of their personal data. Personal data like CVs, which 
contain sensitive information, may invite not only job offers but also identity theft. Theft of 
personal identity information has serious consequences ranging from significant financial loss to 
becoming a suspect in a crime which was committed with a stolen identity. Innocent people have 
been arrested due to a crime committed by an identity thief (Penycate 2001). In the UK, the 
number of identity theft was an alarming 20% higher in the first quarter of 2010 compared with 
the same period in 2009. About 27,000 victims were recorded by the Credit Industry Fraud 
Avoidance System (CIFAS) members during the first 3 months of 2010 (CIFAS report 2010). Loss of 
personal data from reputable organisations such as HSBC bank (BBC news 2009), Zurich 
Insurance (BBC news 2010), Sony Play Station (BBC news 2011), the University of Nottingham 
(Times Higher Education news 2014) or HotelHippo.com (BBC news 2014) has been reported. As a 
consequence, concerns for the privacy of electronic personal data are increasing day by day 
(IBTImes report 2011, NBC news 2008, Voice of America news 2009). This necessitates the need 
for more technical control over the personal data which is collected or stored online to enable 
users to gain more confidence and trust when submitting their personal data. Technical controls 
will help to protect personal data from being misused as well as helping to enforce data 
protection laws.  
1.1.1 Personal data 
According to the Data Protection Act 1998 (Data protection act 1998) information can be 




personal data if any of the following conditions is true 
1. If the information (in conjunction with other information) can identify a living individual.  
2. The information relates to an identifiable living individual.  
3. The information is obviously about a particular individual; e.g. medical record, criminal 
record. 
4. The information is linked to an individual.  
5. The information informs or influences actions or decisions affecting an identifiable 
individual. 
6. The information has biographical significance in relation to the individual. 
7. The information focuses on the individual as its central theme.  
8. The information has impact (or potential to impact) on an individual. 
1.1.2 Privacy 
Privacy is a fundamental human right which was first defined as “the right to be left alone” by the 
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren (Lengwiler 2004). Some 
other views of privacy are – the protection of an individual’s independence, integrity, dignity, 
secrecy, anonymity, solitude, protection against intrusion into an individual’s personal life or 
affairs (Allmer 2011).  
Professor Roger Clarke (Clarke 2006) has defined the different dimensions of privacy as follows –  
 Privacy of person, which is also referred to as 'bodily privacy', is concerned with the 
integrity of an individual's body such as blood transfusion without consent, compulsory 
provision of samples of body fluids and body tissue and so on.  
 Privacy of personal behaviour relates to all aspects of behaviour such as sexual 
preferences and habits, political activities and religious practices. 
 Privacy of personal communications relates to privacy of communications using various 
media without being monitored. This is sometimes referred to as 'interception privacy'  
 Privacy of personal data is also referred to as 'data privacy' and 'information privacy', 
relates to controlling whether or how personal data can be gathered, stored, processed 
or selectively disclosed. European Union Data Protection Directive (EU DPD) (Directive 
95/46/EC 1995) has specified the criteria for privacy protection of personal data which 
include: notifying the data subject of the processing of data, transparent processing, 
limiting disclosure of personal data and many more (discussed in details in Chapter 4).  
The aspect of privacy that is of particular interest of computer science society is information 
privacy (Preibusch 2013). Information privacy ensures the control that the data subject has over 
information about him/herself (Tavani 2007). The online information privacy is defined by 
Malhotra et al. as the privacy related to the collection of the user’s personal information by 
websites, others’ access to the user’s personal information, the user’s control over the collected 
information, and the user’s awareness of how the collected information is used (Malhotra, Sung 
and Agarwal 2004). 
1.1.3 Privacy breach payoff 
“Privacy breach payoff” shows the negative consequences that can be occurred due to the lack 
of or poor privacy protection (Cavoukian 2009). For example – 
 Harm to the person whose data are used or disclosed inappropriately. 
 Damage to an organisation’s reputation. 




 Financial loss.  
 Loss of business due to negative publicity. 
 Violation of privacy laws. 
 Destruction of confidence and trust in the industry. 
1.1.4 Privacy and security of data  
The primary purpose of information security is to provide the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data (Andress 2011). Confidentiality is the ability to protect access to data from 
unauthorised persons, integrity refers to the ability to protect data from being changed in an 
unauthorised manner and availability is the ability to access data whenever needed. The concept 
of privacy is related to confidentiality but they are not the same (Andress 2011, Borking 2011). 
Privacy is not simply limited to controlling the disclosure of data, but also requires notifying the 
data subject about the processing of his/her data, minimising the disclosure, controlling the 
purpose of use, and limiting the period of storing the data, ensuring that the data subject 
consents to the processing of the data. The difference between privacy and the different aspects 
of information security has been specified by Borking (Borking 2011) as shown in Table 1.1. The 
coloured cells represent the criteria of privacy that are (either strongly or slightly) related to the 
corresponding security concerns. As can be seen, privacy covers many more concerns than all 
those of traditional information security. 
 
Table 1.1: Difference between information security and privacy (Borking 2011) 
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1.1.5 Access control components and generic access control model  
Access control is a process of determining whether a request to access a resource object by a 
subject should be granted or denied. It should ensure that a user can only access the resources 
s/he is authorised to (di Vimercati, Samarati and Jajodia 2005). Access (Action) defines the 
operation (e.g. read/ write/ delete/ copy etc.) to be performed on an object. A subject (e.g. user, 
system or process) is an active component of an access control model that requests access to an 
object and an object (e.g. file, data base, program, system component) is the resource that is 
being protected by the access control system. A Subject sends requests to an access control 
system specifying an action to perform on an object and the access control system can grant or 
deny the request based on whether certain policy constraints have been satisfied.  
The access control mechanism constrains the interactions between users and the protected 




resources (Crampton and Morisset 2012). ISO/IEC 10181- 3:1996 has defined a generic Access 
Control Framework (ACF) as shown in Figure 1.1 (ISO 1996). It consists of four components: 
Initiators (subjects), Targets (resource objects), Access Control Enforcement Functions (AEFs) 
and Access Control Decision Functions (ADFs). Initiators submit access requests (also known as 
user requests). An access request specifies the operation to be performed on the Target. The AEF 
transforms the request into one or more decision requests (also known as authorisation queries) 
and sends these to the ADF. The ADF decides whether a decision request should be granted or 
denied based on some policies and sends the decision back to the AEF.  
 
Figure 1-1. Access Control Framework (ACF) from standard ISO/IEC 10181-3 
1.1.6 Privacy policy and access control policy 
In a policy based authorisation system actions on a resource are controlled by policies; access 
control policies and privacy policies both protect access to data. An access control policy can 
relate to any data and any resource in general and typically an organisation’s administrator 
determines the authorisation policy (Crampton and Morisset 2012). However, a privacy policy only 
relates to personal data and needs to include the preferences of the data subject regarding who 
can access the personal data for which purposes. A privacy policy is similar to other access control 
policies but it needs some other features such as purpose of use, retention period and certain 
types of obligation such as notifying the data subject and keeping an audit trail, and deleting the 
data after a certain amount of time. 
1.2 Research Questions to Answer  
The aim of this research is to design and implement a policy-based authorisation infrastructure to 
meet the requirements for privacy protection of personal data. 
The following list provides the questions that this research attempts to answer- 
1. What are the requirements for the protection of privacy of personal data? 
2. Is a traditional authorisation system sufficient to provide the privacy requirements? 
3. Can we provide privacy protection with a policy based authorisation system? 




4. Can we design a policy based authorisation system for wide scale distributed use where 
more than one policy language may be simultaneously involved? 
5. If a number of policies from different authorities are involved, how can we handle 
conflicts among the decisions of the policies? 
6. Can we extract access control rules from the data protection legislation so that these 
legislative rules are automatically enforced by the policy based system? 
7. As the EU DPD allows processing of personal data based on contracts, how can we 
present and validate digital contracts and how can we validate contract based access to 
personal data?  
 
The following research method has been adopted in this thesis- 
1. Analysis of prior published work on privacy protection of personal data. 
2. Identifying the requirements for a system protecting privacy based on the previously 
published works and legislative documents.  
3. Hypothesize a model for providing privacy in an authorisation system to satisfy the 
requirements. 
4. Analysis of prior research related to the functionality of each component of the model 
and designing the new required components. 
5. Designing a framework for distributed enforcement of the privacy policies, taking into 
account the requirements of multiple policies and multiple policy languages.  
6. Designing a component that can validate a digital contract.  
7. Designing a dynamic conflict resolution strategy that can choose a conflict resolution 
algorithm based on the request context. 
8. Designing a methodology to obtain and implement access control rules from the data 
protection legislation. 
9. Designing a model to obtain policies from end users who have no knowledge of writing 
access control or privacy policies. 
10. Validation and evaluation of the implemented model. 
1.3 Research Contributions  
The main contributions of this research are summarised below- 
1. Designed a Privacy Protecting Advanced Authorisation System, P-PAAS, which supports 
multiple policies from multiple authorities in different policy languages. The conceptual 
design of the system is provided in Chapter 3, and the implementation is described in 
Chapter 5. 
2. Designed a dynamic conflict resolution strategy that can choose a conflict resolution 
algorithm based on the request context. The conceptual design is described in Chapter 3 
and the implementation in Chapter 5. The design is an enhancement of the method 
proposed by Mohan et al. (Mohan and Blough 2010) in order to make it suitable for 
privacy protecting scenarios that incorporate independent policies from multiple 
authorities.  
3. Designed and implemented a new component, Contract Validation Service (ConVS), that 
can validate a digital contract to allow processing of personal data based on a contract. 
The conceptual design of the component is discussed in chapter 3 and the 
implementation of the component is described in chapter 5. 




4. Proposed and developed a methodology to obtain automated access control rules from 
legislation, and map these into two different policy languages. The methodology is 
provided in detail in Chapter 4.  
5. Validated the system based on use case scenarios and conducted performance tests of 
the system. The validation and performance tests of the system are presented in Chapter 
5.  
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows- 
Chapter 2 presents the previous research related to the authorisation models, privacy 
protecting authorisation systems, obligation enforcement tactics, conflict resolution 
strategies, privacy protection for the data in the cloud and the works related to obtaining 
authorisation rules from legislation.  
Chapter 3 provides the conceptual design of the overall system and the various components 
of the system. 
Chapter 4 presents a methodology to obtain the authorisation rules from the European 
Union Data Protection Directive (EU DPD) (Directive 95/46/EC 1995).  
Chapter 5 presents the implementation, validation and testing of the P-PAAS system.  The 
Legal access control and conflict resolution rules are presented, along with validation tests of 
the Legal rules and of the system when it includes policies from various authorities. 
Performance tests of the system are reported when it is installed in a single machine and in a 
cloud server.  
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  
 
The following papers have been published with the research described in this thesis. 
 Kaniz Fatema, David Chadwick, “Resolving Policy Conflicts - Integrating Policies from 
Multiple Authors”. In CAiSE 2014 International Workshops, Thessaloniki, Greece, June 16-20, 
2014.  
This paper shows that the static conflict resolution strategy of XACML is not always sufficient 
to satisfy the policy needs of an organisation where multiple parties provide their own 
individual policies. Different conflict resolution strategies are often required for different 
situations. Thus combining one or more sets of policies into a single XACML ‘super policy’ that 
is evaluated by a single policy decision point (PDP), cannot always provide the correct 
authorisation decision, due to the static conflict resolution algorithms that have to be built in. 
Therefore a dynamic conflict resolution strategy is proposed that chooses different conflict 
resolution algorithms based on the authorisation request context. The proposed system 
receives individual and independent policies, as well as conflict resolution rules, from different 
policy authors, but instead of combining these into one super policy with static conflict 
resolution rules, each policy is evaluated separately and the conflicts among their 
authorisation decisions are dynamically resolved using the conflict resolution algorithm that 
best matches the authorisation decision request. It further combines the obligations of 
independent policies returning similar decisions which XACML cannot do while keeping each 
author’s policy intact. The contents of this paper are presented in Chapter 3. 
 Kaniz Fatema, David Chadwick, Brendan Van Alsenoy, “Extracting access control and 




conflict resolution policies from European data protection law.” IFIP/PrimeLife 
International Summer School. Trento, Italy: Springer, September 5-9, 2011. 59-72. 
This paper presents the conversion process of the EU DPD into machine executable rules and 
is presented in Chapter 4. The procedure for obtaining machine executable rules from the EU 
Data Protection Law presented in this paper is modified in Chapter 4 to provide grammar for 
presenting the rules and getting executable rules automatically. One of the co-authors, 
Brendan Van Alsenoy, is a lawyer and an expert on the European data protection law. He 
contributed to the analysis of the Legal rules which is an essential step in the conversion of 
them into machine executable rules.  
 Kaniz Fatema, David Chadwick, Stijn Lievens, “A Multi Privacy Policy Enforcement 
System”. In Privacy and Identity 2010, IFIP AICT 352, 2011, pp. 297–310. 
This paper presents the requirements that a privacy protecting authorisation system should 
meet, and how our proposed system could be used for protecting the privacy of personal 
data. It also provides a use case scenario of protecting access to personal data with our 
system and the contents are presented in Chapter 3. One of the co-authors, Stijn Lievens, 
implemented the idea presented and contributed to writing the implementation section.  
 David Chadwick, Kaniz Fatema, “A Privacy Preserving Authorisation System for the 
Cloud”, J.C.S.S Cloud Computing 2011 Special Issue, Received 15 December 2010, Revised 
20 May 2011, Accepted 8 December 2011. Available online 29 December 2011. 
This paper presents the applicability of our authorisation system in cloud computing. The 
policy based authorisation infrastructure can be run by a cloud provider as a service for its 
users. It will protect the privacy of users’ data by allowing the users to set their own privacy 
policies, and then enforcing them so that no unauthorised access is allowed to their data. The 
performance figures are presented which show that the system performs well and that each 
additional PDP only imposes a small overhead. Chapter 5 contains the results of the 
performance tests that were run using our system in the cloud.  
 David Chadwick, Kaniz Fatema, “Distributed Privacy Policy Enforcement by using Sticky 
Policies”, W3C workshop on Privacy and data usage control, 4-5 October, 2010, 
Cambridge, MA. 
This paper presents the details of our sticky policy enforcement mechanism which contains 
information on how policies can be stored and attached with the data and how the sticky 
policy can be passed to another system for ensuring its distributed enforcement. The contents 
of the paper are available in Chapter 3.  
 David Chadwick, Kaniz Fatema. "An Advanced Policy Based Authorisation Infrastructure". 
Proc DIM'09, November 13, 2009, Chicago, Illinois, USA. ACM. 
This paper presents the idea of an advanced authorisation system that can use multiple PDPs 
capable of evaluating multiple policy languages. A component, master PDP, is designed to 
combine the decisions of multiple PDPs and resolve their conflicts. The basic idea presented in 
this paper has later been modified to ensure its applicability for the purpose of privacy 










This chapter provides an extensive review of the relevant literature. While designing a privacy 
protecting authorisation system the existing models and standards of authorisation systems 
are reviewed. Furthermore, the requirements for privacy protection are identified and whether 
traditional authorisation models are sufficient to satisfy them are justified. The previous works 
related to the design of privacy protecting authorisation systems are studied to ascertain how 
others have added privacy protection and also to identify what is missing and how to provide 
solutions to that. Since enforcing obligations is one of the important requirements for privacy 
protecting systems a review of the prior research relevant to that is performed. Our designed 
authorisation system integrates independent policies from a number of authorities; hence a 
mechanism is needed for resolving conflicts among the decisions returned by the various 
policies of different authorities. Therefore, the previous research related to conflict resolution 
strategies is studied as well as the research on privacy protection in the cloud. Our designed 
system includes authorisation rules from the EU DPD (Directive 95/46/EC 1995), so 
consequently, works related to obtaining authorisation rules from legislation have been 
reviewed.  
2.2 Authorisation Models 
Authentication and authorisation are two terms (with different meanings) very frequently 
used in the field of information security. Authentication is a way of identifying an entity and is a 
process by which it is possible to determine whether someone/something is genuine. In 
contrast, authorisation is a process of determining whether the person/entity has the right to 
do something.  
 
An authorisation system1 determines whether a subject (a person or process) has the right to 
perform an action on an object (resource). Access control systems are categorised into 
mandatory access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC) based on the entity 
that enforces the access control. Based on the methods used for implementing access control 
the authorisation systems can be categorised as identity, role, attribute, or token based and so 
on. Systems that provide protection to resources based on policies are much more flexible 
than those offering protection based on lists of authorised users and various policy languages 
are also introduced regarding this. In a traditional policy based access control system requests 
                                                 
1 The terms access control system and authorisation system have been used as alternative terms in this thesis. 




to access the secured resources are granted based on policies mainly set by the administrator 
based on the organisation’s rules. It is up to the administrator to determine, who is authorised 
to access the secured data, and up to what level, by using an authorisation policy. In this 
section, the authorisation models from the literature are presented. 
2.2.1 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is implemented as a multi-level access control system based 
on a hierarchical classification of levels and its policy is defined only by the system 
administrator. Each resource and subject in the system is classified as a member of one of 
those levels. One example of the MAC model is the Bell-LaPadula (Bell and La Padula 1976) 
confidentiality model, which concentrates on the confidentiality of data. In this multilevel-
security model a subject can read an object only if his classification level is greater than or 
equal to that of the object. The Biba integrity model (Biba 1977) is another example of the MAC 
model that concentrates on the integrity of data. It allows the subject to read data of higher 
classification levels and write data to lower classification levels which hinders the 
confidentiality as it allows the information to flow at different classification levels.  
This model does not provide fine grained access control to allow subjects to access resources 
based on complex conditions. For example, it is not possible to allow a person to access a 
resource based on the consent of the data subject or only for a legitimate purpose. 
2.2.2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
Contrasted to MAC, in DAC the owner of an object defines who is allowed to access his/her 
resources and the creator of an object is the owner by default. This model can be implemented 
by access control lists, access control matrices or capability certificates (see the next section), 
and allows the flexibility of defining access control policies by the owner. Nevertheless, as the 
policies are coming from and being maintained by the owners of various objects, not by a 
centralised administrator like MAC, the overall security policy of the system is hard to verify 
(e.g., what objects a specific subject is allowed to access) (Mohan 2011). Furthermore, it is 
more prone to misconfiguration of policies as they are specified by the resource owners.  
2.2.3 Identity based access control  
In an identity based system the access rights are based on the identity of the subject and can 
be implemented using an access control matrix, access control lists or capabilities (Sandhu and 
Samarati 1994).  
In an access control matrix the access rights are presented in a matrix where the rows 
represent the subjects and the columns represent the objects. Each cell of the matrix presents 
the operations a subject can perform on an object.  
Access control lists (ACLs) are typically defined for each object and specify the list of subjects 
who can access it. The problem of using ACLs is that it is hard to determine for a specific 
subject what resources s/he is allowed to access. If a user leaves the system all the ACLs 
allowing his/her access need to be identified and modified which makes the system less 
flexible to use.  




Capabilities are the subject centric view of the access control matrix. Each subject is given lists 
of access rights for a set of objects in the form of a capability certificates. In order to access a 
resource the subject presents his/her capability certificates to prove him/herself entitled. The 
problem of using capabilities is that it is hard to verify who are allowed to access a resource as 
it requires checking the capability certificates of all subjects. 
2.2.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model 
The RBAC has become the prominent model for authorisation due to the advantages it offers 
reducing the complexity of security administration. Unlike identity based systems adding or 
removing users is much easier in this model. The formal model of RBAC (also known as Role 
Based Security) was introduced by Ferraiolo and Kuhn (Ferraiolo and Kuhn 1992) and a 
framework was proposed by Sandhu et al. (Sandhu, et al. 1996). Later they were both 
integrated to form a unified standard (Sandhu, Ferraiolo and Kuhn 2000). 
 
The main concept of RBAC is that permissions are associated with roles and users get 
permissions based on the roles assigned to them. Different roles are defined according to the 
activities and structure of an organisation and the administrator of the organisation assigns 
appropriate permissions according to the role. For example, a student may not have 
permission to see a confidential database, a lecturer may have permission to read the 
confidential database but not to change it, whereas an administrator may have permission to 
both read and change it. When the security requirement changes, only the permissions 
assigned to roles are changed and it does not require changing of permissions for every user 
separately. When a user is assigned a role they get all the permissions assigned to that role. 
According to the ANSI standard (ANSI 2004) the Core-RBAC model is described next. 
 
Figure 2-1. Core-RBAC 
The Core-RBAC model (Figure 2-1) is described by the elements – users, roles, operations, 
objects and sessions. Users are assigned roles in a many-to-many relationship; roles are 
assigned permissions in a many-to-many relationship where permission is an approval to 
perform an operation on one or more objects. A user may have many roles assigned to him/her 
and can activate a subset of the roles for a session. Each session is assigned to only one user 




while one user can have many sessions. Before exercising the permissions assigned to a role 
held by a user the user must activate the role. In this model users are not only human beings 
but can also be other entities like machines, networks and intelligent autonomous agents. 
 
The hierarchical RBAC model introduces a new component Role Hierarchy (RH) which is a 
natural means of structuring roles to reflect an organisation’s lines of authority and 
responsibility. A role r1 inherits the role r2 if all the permissions of r2 are also permissions of r1. 
In other words the roles in an upper level of a role hierarchy inherit the permissions assigned 
to the roles in a lower level. For example, the lecturer role inherits the permissions assigned to 
a student role but not vice-versa.  
2.2.5 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) model  
The Attribute Based Access Control Model (ISO 1996, Yuan and Tong 2005, Wang, Wijesekera 
and Jajodia 2004) is an extension of the RBAC Model where permissions are given based on 
the attributes possessed by the user and attributes are not limited to organisational roles, they 
can be anything such as degree, qualification, name, age and of course roles. Attributes 
(usually assigned by Attribute Authorities (AAs)), are assigned to users and permissions are 
assigned to attributes and thus users get permissions based on the attributes they possess. 
Attributes can be assigned to the subject, object, action and environment. The ABAC model is 
more flexible and manageable than traditional identity based access control models where 
access to objects is restricted by the identities of subjects; and consequently is being widely 
used by many real life access control systems such as on-line shopping with credit cards. This 
model offers the flexibility of using various attributes and is especially useful for presenting 
the EU DPD rules in the form of machine executable rules by the use of number of attributes. 
Therefore, we have used this access control model for our work presented in this thesis. 
2.2.6 Role based Trust management (RT) framework 
The RT (Li, Mitchell and Winsborough 2002, Li and Mitchell 2003) framework offers to combine 
the strength of RBAC and TM (trust management). From RBAC it takes the concept of role, 
session and selective role activation and from TM the idea of a credential for managing 
distributed authority. RT defines a language for representing policies and credentials for 
controlling access in decentralised collaborative systems where protected resources and the 
requesting subjects belong to different security domains controlled by different authorities. 
The most basic language in the RT family of TM languages is RT0 which consists of two basic 
constructs: entities and role names. The principals/ entities are uniquely identified individuals, 
processes, public keys etc. and role names are string identifiers. A role in RT is presented by an 
entity followed by a role name, separated by a dot, e.g., A.r which indicates that the role A.r is 
defined by entity A and only A can issue policy defining the role A.r and its members.  
There are various kinds of credentials in RT0, each corresponding to a different way of defining 
role membership (Li, Winsborough and Mitchell 2001). 
RT0, only allows a simple form of role name and does not take any parameters. RT has 
introduced some policy concepts such as parameterised roles, intersections of roles, role-
product operators, manifold roles, and delegation of role activations. RT1 extends RT0 to allow 
parameterised roles and RT2 extends RT1 to allow grouping of logically related objects. RTT 
provides manifold roles and role-product operators to express thresholds, i.e. the agreement 




of a certain number of entities out of a set of entities and separation of duty policies. RTD 
provides delegation of role activations. The RT model provides advantages of 
- a declarative, logic based semantic foundation,  
- support for distributed chain discovery and vocabulary agreement, 
- strongly-typed credentials and policies, 
- flexible delegation structures, 
- expressive support for Separation-of-Duty (SoD) policies. 
Whilst this model considers the combination of RBAC and Trust management, it is not suitable 
for our purpose since the Legal rules are not based only on roles, therefore they cannot be 
converted into enforceable RT rules. 
Many of the concepts of RT are incorporated into our model and into the PERMIS 
implementation. Similar to RT, we have the concept of credentials and a Credential Validation 
Service with rules to say who is trusted to issue which credentials. We also support 
parameterised roles, since roles comprise a type and value (where value is the parameter in RT 
notation). Whilst PERMIS also supports Separation of Duties (Chadwick, et al. 2007) and 
delegation of authority (Chadwick, et al. 2009) these are not the features that we make use of 
in this thesis. 
2.2.7 OAuth authorisation model 
OAuth (OAuth 2012) provides a way to publish and access protected data without requiring 
sharing credentials. Suppose that a user has some protected data in a service provider; with 
the OAuth protocol the consumer can gain access to the resources from the service provider, 
without requiring the user to disclose his/her service provider credentials to the consumer.  
For example, if a user has some photos in a website (photo.net) OAuth allows them to permit 
the other site (print.com) to access the private data (photos) on behalf of the user without 
entering his/her username or password. 
OAuth defines four roles: Resource owner is the entity that grants access to a protected 
resource, resource server accepts and responds to the requests to access protected resources 
using access tokens, client is an application that requests to access protected resources on 
behalf of the resource owner and authorisation server issues access tokens to the client after 
successfully authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorisation.  
OAuth uses Tokens (a string denoting a specific scope, lifetime and other access attributes) 
instead of users’ credentials for requesting access to the protected resources. The following 
two types of token are used - 
Refresh Token: The Refresh Token is a string representing the authorisation granted to the 
client by the resource owner and is used only to get a new Access Token when the current 
access token expires or becomes invalid.  
Access Token: Only the Access Token can be used by the consumer to access the protected 
resources on behalf of the user. Access Tokens may have a limited lifetime. With this token the 
consumers can be authorised to have limited access to the protected resources. The user has 
the right to revoke the Access Token.  
 





Figure 2-2. Protocol flow of OAuth 
 
OAuth allows accessing protected resources on behalf of the resource owner without sharing 
the credentials. The protocol flow of OAuth involves the following steps:  
1. The client requests for authorisation from the resource owner directly or via the 
authorisation server. 
2. The client receives an authorisation grant credential. 
3. The client requests an access token from the authorisation server and presents the 
authorisation grant credential obtained in step 2. 
4. The authorisation server authenticates the client and validates the presented 
authorisation grant credential and if valid issues an access token. 
5. The client presents the access token to the resource server and requests to access the 
protected resource. 
6. The resource server serves the requests of accessing protected resource if the access 
token is valid. 
This is one of the latest authorisation models which provides a way of authorising or 
delegating a third party to access a protected resource on behalf of the user without 
revealing the username and password. As noted previously delegation of authority is 
already implemented in PERMIS (Chadwick, et al. 2008) but it is not something we need 
for enforcing access control rules from the EU DPD.  
 




2.2.8 Usage Control (UCON) model 
The core of Usage Control (UCON) (Park and Sandhu 2004) family model is the UCONABC model 
which integrates Authentication (A), oBligation (B) and Conditions (C). The UCON models 
consist of eight core components: subjects, subject attributes, objects, object attributes, 
rights, authorisations, obligations, and conditions, as shown in Figure 2-3. A brief description of 
the components is provided below.  
 
Figure 2-3. UCONABC model components 
 
In the UCON model a subject entity possesses certain rights on objects and is defined by 
subject attributes which represent the properties of that. Examples of subject attributes 
include identities, roles, memberships, security clearances and many more. Attributes can be 
of two kinds: an immutable attribute can only be changed by the administrative actions 
whereas a mutable attribute can be modified as a side effect of subjects’ access to objects. In 
this model subjects can be of three types: consumer subjects (CS) who exercise rights to 
access objects, e.g. e-book reader; provider subjects (PS) who provide objects and holds 
certain rights on it, e.g. e-book author; identifee subjects (IS) who are identified in digital 
objects that hold their privacy sensitive data, e.g., a patient in a health care system.  
 
An object is similarly defined by object attributes that can be used for access decisions. 
Examples of object attributes can be security labels, ownerships and so on. An object in this 
model is derivative if it is created in consequence of obtaining or exercising rights on an 
original object. For example, playing MP3 music files can create usage log information.  
 
The privilege a subject can have on an object is defined by right. It consists of a set of usage 
functions defining subjects’ access to objects. Rights can be of three types: consumer rights 
(CR), provider rights (PR) and identifee rights (IR). Usage decision function (see Figure 2-3) 
determines the rights based on subject and object attributes, authorisations, obligations and 
conditions.  




Authorisations provide usage decisions evaluating subject and object attributes, requested 
rights and authorisation rules. Authorisation can be of two kinds: a pre-authorisation (preA) is 
performed before a requested right is exercised, and an on-going-authorisation (onA) is 
performed while the right is exercised which can be either continuously or periodically.  
 
Obligations are functional predicates that verify the mandatory requirements a subject has to 
perform before or during a usage exercise. Obligations can be either pre-obligations (preB) or 
on-going-obligations (onB). A preB checks whether certain activities have been fulfilled or not; 
for example, checking a user has agreed to provide usage log information before listening to a 
music file. An onB has to be satisfied continuously or periodically while the allowed rights are 
exercised. An example of onB can be a user may have to keep watching certain advertisements 
while he is logged in.  
Conditions are environmental or system-oriented decision factors which return Boolean values 
to indicate whether the relevant requirements are satisfied or not. It does not include subject 
or object attributes and its variables are not mutable.  
The core UCONABC model is classified based on the three criteria: i) decision factors that consist 
of authorisations, obligations, and conditions, ii) continuity of decision being either pre or on-
going with respect to the access in question, and ii) mutability that can allow updates on 
subject or object attributes at different times.  
Whilst this is a nice conceptual model it is not free from limitations. It neither supports multiple 
policy languages, nor does it cater for passing resources and policies among multiple parties 
which our system does with sticky policies. Furthermore, our system has a rich dynamic 
conflict resolution strategy allowing multiple parties to provide their own independent conflict 
resolution policies which make the system suitable for operating in a dynamically multi-
authority environment and this feature is lacking in the UCON model. Furthermore, proper 
formulation of this model does not exist in the literature in any policy specification standard 
(Um-e-Ghazia, et al. 2012) and there is no public implementation of the model available to use. 
Long after our work was published, Ghazia et al. (Um-e-Ghazia, et al. 2012) suggested 
interpretation of the UCON model in XACML. However, the full realisation of the UCON model 
in XACML or in any policy language is still lacking.  
2.2.9 XACMLv2 reference model  
XACMLv2, the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language, is an XML based OASIS 
(Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) standard language 
for expressing authorisation policies and a standard format for expressing queries over these 
policies. The XACML specifications were developed through a collaborative effort of OASIS 
members including IBM, Sun Micro systems and Entrust. XACML is the model that we use in 
our research, and PERMIS was enhanced to conform to the XACML model by the research in 
this thesis. 
According to the OASIS XACML TC (Godik, et al. 2002) the data flow of the XACML reference 
model is described here.  





Figure 2-4. Data flow diagram of XACML 
 
The data flow of the XACML model follows the steps described below  
1. PAPs (Policy administration points) write policies and policy sets defining access 
rules for a specific target and make them available to the PDP.  
2. The access requester (person/web service/ anything that needs access to the 
secured resource) sends a request for accessing the secured resource to the PEP 
(Policy Enforcement Point). 
3. The PEP sends the access request and optionally the attributes of the subjects, 
resource, action and environment to the context handler in its native request 
format. 
4. The context handler constructs an XACML request context and sends that to the 
PDP (Policy Decision Point). 
5. The PDP requests any additional attributes of subject, resource, action and 
environment from the context handler. 
6. On receiving the request from the PDP, the context handler requests the attributes 
from a PIP (Policy information point). 
7. The PIP obtains the requested attributes. 
8. The PIP returns the requested attributes to the context handler. 




9. Optionally, the context handler includes the resource in the context. 
10. The context handler sends the requested attributes and (optionally) the resource 
to the PDP. The PDP evaluates the policies and makes an authorisation decision 
based on the policies and attributes. 
11. The PDP returns the response context including the authorisation decision to the 
context handler. 
12. The context handler translates the response context to the native response format 
of the PEP and returns it to the PEP. 
13. The PEP fulfills the obligations which are the operations specified in a policy or 
policy set that should be performed by the PEP in conjunction with the 
enforcement of an authorisation decision.  
14. (Not shown) The PEP either permits or denies access to the resource depending on 
the authorisation decision it obtains. 
2.2.9.1 XACML policies and access request 
XACML policies are constructed with the components: PolicySet (PS), Policy (P), Rule (R), 
Target (t), Policy Combining Algorithm (PCA) and Rule Combining Algorithm (RCA).  
Target (t) is composed of four types of attributes: Subjects(S), Resources (Rs), Actions (A) and 
Environments (En).  
Rule is defined as a tuple, r= (id, t, e, c), where id is a rule-id, t is a rule target, e Є {Permit, Deny} 
is an Effect and c is a Condition which is an optional element and is evaluated to a Boolean 
value. 
Policy is defined as a tuple, p = (id, t, R, RCA, O), where id is a policy id, t is a policy target,   R = 
{r1, r2,…….,rn} is the set of rules and RCA is the Rule combining Algorithm and O is an optional 
set of obligations.  
PolicySet is defined as tuple PS = (id, t, P, PAC, O), where id is the PolicySet id, t is the PolicySet 
target, P= {p1,p2,…….,pn} is the set of policies, PCA is the Policy combining Algorithm and O is 
an optional set of obligations.  
An access request in XACMLv2 is defined as a set of attributes, Rq = (s, rs, a, en), where s is a 
set of subject attributes, rs is a set of resource attributes, a is a set of action attributes and en 
is a set of environment or context attributes. Each attribute set describes the corresponding 
object. The request means that the subject described by ‘s’ is requesting to do action 
described by ‘a’ on resource described by ‘rs’ in the presence of the context described by ‘en’.  
2.2.9.2 Evaluation of a request  
The set of attribute names and values that Subject, Resource, Action and Environment elements 
of an XACML request contains are used in taking an authorisation decision. While evaluating a 
Policy, these attribute names and values of each category (i.e. Subject, Resource, Action and 
Environment) presented in the request context are compared with those presented in the 
Policy according to some criteria defined in the Policy (which are briefly presented next).  
 




A Target (in a PolicySet, Policy or Rule) identifies whether the parent element  is applicable to a 
given request. Boolean functions compare the attribute names and values found in a request 
with those included in the Target. If all the evaluation criteria of the Boolean functions of a 
Target are met, the Target element is evaluated as Match and its associated PolicySet, Policy, or 
Rule applies to the request. If any one of the elements specified in the Target is Indeterminate, 
the Target is evaluated as Indeterminate. Otherwise, it is evaluated as NoMatch.  
 
If the Target of a Rule is evaluated as Match then the Conditions (if any) are checked. The 
strategy of Rule value evaluation is presented in Table 2.1. The Policy evaluation strategy 
presented in Table 2.2 and the PolicySet evaluation strategy presented in Table 2.3 are used to 
evaluate a Policy and a PolicySet respectively. The Policy and PolicySet evaluation also depends 
on the Rule and Policy Combining Algorithm which are explained next.  
Table 2.1: XACML Rule evaluation 
Target Condition Rule value 
Match True Effect (i.e. Permit / Deny) 
Match False NotApplicable 
Match Indeterminate Indeterminate 
NoMatch ---------- NotApplicable 
Indeterminate ---------- Indeterminate 
  
Table 2.2: XACML Policy evaluation 
Target Rule value Policy value 
Match At least one rule value is 
Permit/Deny/Indeterminate 
Effect (i.e. Permit / Deny/ 
Indeterminate) depending on 
Rule Combining Algorithm 
Match All rule values are 
NotApplicable 
NotApplicable 
NoMatch ---------- NotApplicable 
Indeterminate ---------- Indeterminate 
 
Table 2.3: XACML PolicySet evaluation 
Target Policy value PolicySet value 
Match At least one Policy value is 
Permit/Deny/Indeterminate 
Effect (i.e. Permit / Deny/ 
Indeterminate) depending on 
Policy Combining Algorithm 
Match All policy values are 
NotApplicable 
NotApplicable 
NoMatch ---------- NotApplicable 
Indeterminate ---------- Indeterminate 




2.2.9.3 Rule/policy combining algorithm of XACML  
The standard Policy Combining Algorithms of XACML v2 (XACMLv2 2005) and v3 (XACMLv3 
2013) are defined as: 
• Deny-overrides (Ordered and Unordered in v3), 
• Permit-overrides (Ordered and Unordered in v3), 
• First-applicable and 
• Only-one-applicable. 
In the case of the Deny-overrides algorithm, if a single Policy element evaluates to Deny, then, 
regardless of the evaluation result of the other Policy elements, the combined result is Deny. 
For the Ordered Deny-Overrides the behaviour of the algorithm is the same except that the 
order in which the collection of Policies is evaluated will match the order as listed in the 
PolicySet.  
Similarly, in the case of the Permit-overrides algorithm, if a single Permit result is encountered, 
regardless of the evaluation result of the other Policy elements, the combined result is Permit 
and for the Ordered Permit-overrides the behaviour of the algorithm is the same except that 
the order in which the collection of Policies is evaluated will match the order as listed in the 
PolicySet.  
In the case of the “First-applicable” combining algorithm, the first decision encountered by the 
Policy element in the list becomes the final decision accompanied by its Obligations (if any).  
The "Only-one-applicable" combining algorithm ensures that only one Policy is applicable by 
virtue of its Target. The result of the combining algorithm is the result of evaluating the single 
applicable Policy. If more than one Policy is applicable, then the result is Indeterminate.  
In the XACML v3 some other combining algorithms are also defined, such as Deny-unless-
permit (which returns Deny only if no Permit result is encountered, Indeterminate or 
NotApplicable will never be a result), Permit-unless-deny (which returns Permit only if no Deny 
result is encountered, Indeterminate or NotApplicable will never be a result) 
2.2.9.4 Evaluation of obligations in XACML model  
In XACMLv2 a Policy or PolicySet may contain one or more Obligations. In XACML v3 a Rule, 
Policy or PolicySet may contain one or more obligation expressions which are evaluated to 
Obligations when such a Rule, Policy or PolicySet is evaluated. In both XACMLv2 and XACMLv3 
an Obligation is passed to the next level of evaluation only if the effects of the Rule (for v3), 
Policy or PolicySet set being evaluated match the values of the FulfillOn attribute of the 
Obligation. An Obligation will not be returned to the PEP if the Rule (for v3), Policy or PolicySet 
from which it is drawn is not evaluated. On the other hand, XACML does not guarantee to 
evaluate all the Policies. For example, if the Policy Combining Algorithm is Permit-overrides the 
execution of Policies will return as soon as it gets a Permit decision without executing the rest 
of the Policies. The Obligations along with the path of returning having the same effect will be 
returned with the decision. If there is any other Policy among the unexecuted Policies that 
return an Obligation will not be returned to the final decision. Suppose that, there are two 
Policies: one from the controller saying to Permit access with an Obligation to log the event 
and another one from the data subject saying to Permit access with an Obligation to e-mail the 




author, and they are combined with the “Permit-overrides” combining algorithm. Due to the 
Policy evaluation strategy of the XACML PDP, either one of the Policies will be executed and 
the Obligation with that Policy will be returned depending on the order they are written in the 
PolicySet. Li et al. (Li, Wang, et al. 2009) have also addressed this limitation with XACML 
Obligations. 
2.2.9.5 Limitations of XACML model  
The XACML model is being widely used as an authorisation model but it is not a complete 
model for all kinds of authorisation. The model has the following limitations.  
 
1. The XACMLv2 standard proposes a functional component called the Policy Administration 
Point (PAP) which is responsible for creating the policies and making them available to the PDP  
through some back channel prior to the PDP making its decisions. The back channel could be, 
for example, an API to an integrated database, or a communications link to an external 
repository. However, using a back channel and previously prepared policies is too static for 
some use cases. Consider the privacy protection of personal data, where a user’s privacy policy 
is stuck to her personal identifying information (PII) Mont et al. (Mont, Pearson and Bramhall 
2003 A). In this case the policy needs to be passed dynamically along with the decision request 
to the PDP. The data subject may not have or should not necessarily need access to the PAP 
for writing that policy for his/her private data. However, the SAML profile of XACML allows 
passing XACML policies dynamically to the PDP. Later, in Chapter 5, our authorisation server 
will use this protocol to dynamically add policies to the PDP, and we proposed (and got 
accepted) an enhancement to the SAML-XACML profile to allow policies in any language to be 
passed.  
 
2. It assumes that all the PDP policies are written in the same language (XACML). It does not 
provide a way of integrating policies written in different languages. In reality many other policy 
languages are also available such as PERMIS (Chadwick, et al. 2008), P3P (W3C 2002), Keynote 
(Blaze, Feigenbaum and Ioannidis 1999) etc. Our advanced authorisation model is proposed 
which allows PDPs that support different policy languages to be integrated together. 
 
3. The obligations are presented as attribute assignments and in XACMLv2 must be evaluated 
simultaneously with the user’s action. Nevertheless in reality there are some obligations that 
should be implemented before the user is given access and some that should be implemented 
after and finally some that should be implemented along with the user’s actions. In our design, 
the “before” obligations are evaluated by the P-PAAS server before the user is granted access.  
(Note, these different types of obligations are now supported in XACMLv3 enhancements).  
 
4. The combining algorithms are such that they do not evaluate all the nodes in a tree. For 
example, the deny-(/permit) overrides return a decision as soon as it gets a Deny or Permit 
decision without executing the rest of the rules/policies. Consequently the obligations 
attached with the rest of the policies are also ignored. More details are provided in Section 
3.4.3.2.  
 
5. XACML provides no support for the use of credentials. Indeed credentials are never 




mentioned in the XACML standard, even though remote users must present credentials in 
order to gain access to a resource. Our design incorporates credentials into the model so that 
they are evaluated as part of the process of granting the user access to a resource. 
2.2.10 Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standards 
(PERMIS) 
PERMIS (Chadwick, et al. 2008) is an authorisation system that provides access control 
decisions. It also has some other functionalities, for example, it provides a way of managing 
privileges during the process of taking access control decisions, it has a credential validation 
system which verifies users’ credentials, and it supports delegation of authority which allows 
delegations of credentials between users. PERMIS uses the Hierarchical RBAC (or ABAC) 
model, in which roles are used to model organisational roles and the roles or attributes may be 
organised in a partial hierarchy where a superior role inherits all the privileges allocated to its 
subordinate roles.  
2.2.10.1 Access control elements of PERMIS policy 
Each PERMIS policy is identified by a unique Object Identifier (OID). The SubjectPolicy element 
specifies the subject domains. Only the users from the specified subject domains can be 
authorised to access resources covered by the policy. The TargetPolicy element of a PERMIS 
policy identifies the resource domains that the policy will protect. Target domains can be 
defined as either LDAP resources or resources formatted as HTTP-like URLs. The ActionPolicy 
element determines the actions recognised by the policy. It is also possible to restrict the 
target domains on which an action can be applied by including references to 
TargetDomainSpec elements inside the Action element. The TargetAccessPolicy consists of a 
list of Target Access Rules (TAR) and defines the access control rules. A TAR is represented as a 
TargetAccess element in the PERMIS policy and it contains TargetList, RoleList and optional 
conditions and Obligations. The TargetList specifies the actions allowed on a specified target. 
The RoleList element of a TAR limits the applicability of the TAR by specifying the roles a 
subject should have in order to be granted the specified permission. It is possible to limit the 
applicability of the TAR further by attaching a condition to the TAR which may contain a 
number of Boolean operations (AND, OR, NOT). Some other elements of a PERMIS policy 
include: the RoleHierarchyPolicy element, which specifies the hierarchy among roles, the 
SOAPolicy element, that defines which Source Of Authorities (SOA)s are trusted to issue roles 
to subjects, and the RoleAssignmentPolicy element, which specifies the rules for what roles 
can be allocated to which subjects by which SOAs. 
2.2.10.2 Decision making in PERMIS 
The PERMIS Java API receives a request through four different parameters: 
- Subject: contains the valid roles of the subject  
- Action: contains the requested action 
- Target: contains the request target resource 
- Environment: contains the environmental variables that are available during decision making 
 
The first stage of decision making in PERMIS checks whether 
- None of the given Subject, Action and Target is missing. If one of them is missing, an 





thrown “[Indeterminate. Subject|Action|Target] is missing”.  
- The Subject is valid. If it is not, an exception is thrown “[Indeterminate. Unrecognised Subject 
Object]”. 
- The Target belongs to the target domain of the policy. If it does not, an exception, “[Not 
Applicable, TargetOutOfDomainException]” is generated.  
- The Action is specified in the policy (by name and parameters) and whether the requested 
Target belongs to the target domain associated with the action. If any of these is not satisfied, 
an exception, “[NotApplicable-ActionNotInPolicyException]” is thrown. 
 
When a request passes the first stage of decision making, it processes each TAR. The 
evaluation of a TAR works as follows: 
- First, it is determined whether the requested action matches one of the allowed actions for 
the TAR. If it is not a FALSE is returned. 
- Next, it is determined whether the requested target belongs to the domain of the TAR. If it is 
not a FALSE is returned. 
- Next, it is determined whether the TAR’s roles are subordinate to the subject’s roles. If they 
are not a FALSE is returned (because the subject’s roles are not sufficient). 
- Once it has been established that the action and target match and that the subject’s roles are 
sufficient, the condition, if any, is evaluated. If the TAR does not have a condition, a TRUE is 
returned. If the TAR has a condition, the condition is evaluated as follows: 
 If the TAR’s condition evaluates to TRUE, then TRUE is returned. 
 If the TAR’s condition evaluates to FALSE, then FALSE is returned. 
 If there is a problem evaluating the TAR’s condition, an indeterminate exception is 
thrown. 
2.2.10.3 Blacklist and Whitelist policy and their decision combination 
A PERMIS PDP typically executes faster than an XACML PDP with an equivalent set of rules, 
since its policies are monotonic. Therefore, when a TRUE response is found no further rules are 
processed. However, having rules that only grant access makes the writing of some policies 
very inefficient e.g. everyone except X is granted access. Therefore, PERMIS also provides a 
Blacklist/Whitelist PDP combination. A Whitelist PDP contains the monotonic list of granted 
permissions.  A Blacklist PDP contains the monotonic list of denied permissions. The same list 
of permissions can have two opposite meanings (granted or denied) by changing the PDP that 
interpreters it (from whitelist to blacklist, or vice versa).  
Table 2.4: Example of PERMIS Blacklist and Whitelist policies 
TargetAccessPolicy example of a Whitelist Policy. 
< X.509 PMI RBAC Policy OID=" WhitelistPolicy" > 







<Target><TargetDomain ID ="Library"/ > 
<AllowedAction ID =" access "/ ></Target> 
TargetAccessPolicy example of a Blacklist Policy. 
< X.509 PMI RBAC Policy OID=" BlacklistPolicy" 
DenyBased=" true "> 







<Target><TargetDomain ID ="Laboratory"/> 






. . … 
 
<DeniedAction ID ="access "/></Target> 
</TargetList> 
</TargetAccess> 
. . . 
 
The Whitelist policy PDP returns a Grant only if an access is specifically granted by the policy, 
otherwise it returns a Deny. This kind of decision mechanism is suitable for an organisation 
that requires all kinds of access to be denied by default unless specifically granted. By setting a 
special parameter “Enable Not Applicable” the default Deny decision can be stopped. In this 
case if all the TARs evaluate to false, instead of a Deny the Whitelist policy PDP will return a 
NotApplicable decision.  
The Blacklist policy PDP behaves in the opposite way to the Whitelist Policy PDP. It returns a 
Deny if a TAR evaluates to true and returns a Grant if all the TARs evaluate to false. This is 
suitable for a security set up which defines the situations or conditions on which access should 
be denied and it allows access if all of these denying conditions are false. If the Blacklist policy 
PDP is configured with the “Enable Not Applicable” parameter it does not return a Grant when 
all the TARs evaluate to false, rather it returns NotApplicable. In PERMIS the Blacklist PDP is 
evaluated first and then the Whitelist PDP. How the decisions of Blacklist and Whitelist PDPs 
are combined is given in Table 2.5. 
The Whitelist policy presented in Table 2.4 says, "All students can access the Library" and the 
Blacklist policy says, “All students cannot access the Laboratory”. In this situation if a staff 
tries to access the Library, the Blacklist PDP will return either a NotApplicable or Grant and the 
Whitelist policy will reply either a NotApplicable or Deny depending whether the “Enable Not 
Applicable” option is set or not. According to Table 2.5 the final decision will be either 
NotApplicable or Deny. If on the other hand staff is defined as a superior role to student, then 
staff can enter the library and the final decision will be Grant. If a student tries to access the 
Library the Blacklist PDP will return a NotApplicable or Grant (depending on the “Enable Not 
Applicable” option is set or not) and the Whitelist PDP will reply a Grant and the final decision 
will be Grant. If a student tries to access the Laboratory, according to Table 2.5, the Blacklist 
PDP will return a Deny and this will become the final decision without calling the Whitelist PDP. 
Table 2.5: Black List and White List PDP result combination for PERMIS 
Black List PDP Response White List PDP Response Returned Result 
Deny Not called Deny 
Indeterminate Not called Indeterminate 
Grant/Not Applicable Grant Grant 
Grant/Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Grant/Not Applicable Indeterminate Indeterminate 
Not Applicable Deny Not Applicable 
Grant Deny Deny 
 
 




2.2.10.4 Conflict resolution in PERMIS 
PERMIS does not explicitly support conflict resolution rules since it operates with the implicit 
rule of  
1. “all actions are denied except those specifically allowed” (for a Whitelist PDP policy only). 
This is equivalent to a permit-overrides conflict resolution rule of XACML and  
2. “all actions are allowed except those specifically denied” (for a Blacklist PDP policy only). 
This is equivalent to a deny-overrides conflict resolution rule of XACML.  
2.2.10.5 Limitations of PERMIS 
1. It does not allow any arbitrary attribute to be specified for resources and subjects in 
condition statements (IF clauses). Only the resource type and role are supported. Other 
resource/subject attributes have to be evaluated as environmental attributes in condition 
statements. 
2. It does not have explicit conflict resolution rules as implicit ones are built in.  
2.2.10.6 Advantages of PERMIS 
1. Since it does not mix a grant and a deny rules together, its rules are monotonic. Thus when 
the first rule denies (for a blacklist PDP) or grants (for a whitelist PDP) access, processing can 
stop and a definitive reply can be given. This means it performs much faster than an equivalent 
XACML PDP (Chadwick, Su and Laborde 2008) 
2. The monotonic nature of the policy rules enables administrators to inspect policies and 
understand which subjects are being granted access to which resources much more easily. This 
can be almost impossible to do with complex XACML policies where rules can contradict one 
another. 
2.3 Privacy Requirements and Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies 
While designing a privacy protecting authorisation system it is important to gain a clear 
understanding of the privacy requirements. In this section the requirements for a system 
providing privacy protection have been presented. Furthermore, a thorough comparative 
study of the privacy enhancing technologies has been performed to identify the strength and 
weakness of them in meeting the requirements.  
2.3.1 Requirements for a system providing privacy protection 
Privacy protection of personal data is an important Legal requirement for organisations 
handling electronic private data. Many organisations need to collect personal data for 
business, promotional, research and operational purposes. These organisations need to ensure 
the privacy of these data, as now a day people are more concerned about the privacy of their 
personal data. Many laws exist to support the protection of personal data (Fischer-Hubner 
2001). OECD (OECD 1980) first introduced the guidelines for the protection of privacy of 
computerised data. The EU and UK data protection acts (Directive 95/46/EC 1995, Data 
protection act 1998) specifies the requirements for privacy protection, which are as follows: 
1. Purpose specification: While collecting personal data the purposes for which the data are 




being collected should be stated. Once collected they should be associated with the personal 
data to ensure that they are only used for those purposes.  
2. Consent specification: There should be a mechanism for obtaining and associating consent 
with the personal data so that the consents can be checked while taking an authorisation 
decision for accessing the personal data.  
3. Limited collection: Minimum data should be collected for a defined purpose. 
4. Limited use and limited disclosure: Only the requests that are consistent with the purposes 
and consents associated with the personal data should be allowed.  
5. Limited retention: When collecting personal data the data subject should be able to state 
how long the data will be kept, and the data should be removed after that.  
6. Accuracy: The collected data should be stored accurately.  
7. Safety: The collected personal data should be kept safely so that no leakage can occur.  
8. Openness: The subject of personal data should be able to view the data about him/herself.  
9. Compliance: It should be possible to verify the compliance of the privacy protection offered 
by the enterprise with the rules of law.  
10. User's control: The user should have control over the information he/she provides such as 
the ability to request an update or blocking of processing or erasing the data.  
11. Enforcing privacy obligation: Privacy obligations should be enforced such as notifying the 
data subject when his/her data are accessed. 
12. Privileged access: The EU DPD has defined privileged access to personal data by certain 
parties for some purposes, e.g. Medical Professionals can access medical data and so on.  
13. Transferring data: The EU DPD has defined certain restrictions on the cross border flow of 
personal data. An authorisation system should be able to address that issue. 
14. Contract based access to personal data: The EU DPD has defined certain access rights 
based on the contract, and an authorisation system needs to deal with that condition.  
 
Other than the above requirements we consider that some additional requirements would 
help to protect privacy, which are as follows:  
 
15. Simple user interaction: A system will be useless if the users cannot use it comfortably. The 
privacy preservation mechanism should provide the users with easy tools so that the 
interactions remain very simple.  
16. Multiple policy language support: When a data subject (or an issuer) of any personal data 
provides a policy written in one policy language and later the data, along with the policy are 
transferred to another controller’s system, the full enforcement of the policy to protect access 
to that personal data will only be possible if the receiving system also supports the compatible 
policy language. If the received policy language is not supported by the receiving system then 
the receiving system has two options- it can either translate the policy into the language it 
understands or discard it. Translation of a policy from one language to another is a very 
daunting task and even if the policy can be converted the meaning of it can change due to 
conversion as the features of different policy languages are not always the same. In a 
distributed environment we cannot expect that all policies will be written using one policy 
language when so many are available and there is no ubiquitously accepted standard for 
privacy policy languages. Consequently we need an authorisation infrastructure that is capable 
of evaluating multiple policies written in multiple languages. 




17. Distributed enforcement: The policies that are being used to protect a personal data item 
should also be used when the data are moved to another system.  
18. Inclusion of policies from law with the highest priority: Law enforcement would be much 
easier if the authorisation system could include the authorisation policies from the law with 
the highest priority so that the rights provided by the law can always be executed.  
2.3.2 Review of privacy enhancing technology 
The UK Information Commissioner’s office has defined Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) as 
technologies that protect or enhance an individual’s privacy under the Data Protection Act 
1998 (Data protection act 1998). Previous research on privacy enhancing technology related to 
access control is reviewed here.  
2.3.2.1 Privacy research of IBM  
IBM has performed research on privacy protection of customers’ data collected by enterprises 
(Karjoth, Schunter and Waidner 2002, Karjoth, Schunter and Waidner 2003, Karjoth and 
Schunter 2002, Nelson, McCullough and Bliss 2005, Schunter and Berghe 2006). The authors 
have mainly tried to ensure that the privacy that is promised to the customer while collecting 
data is actually implemented. They have used the sticky policy paradigm where personal data 
are associated with the privacy policy and passed together while exchanging data among 
enterprises. The IBM Enterprise Privacy Architecture (EPA) (Karjoth, Schunter and Waidner 
2002) is a methodology for enterprises to provide privacy. The EPA presents privacy awareness 
and privacy services into enterprises in a structured way and supports data subject's consent 
management on a per person basis. The consented policies are associated with the collected 
data and thus support the sticky policy paradigm.  
 
The Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P) (Karjoth, Schunter and Waidner 2003) is a 
model for describing enterprises’ access control policies to provide privacy to customers’ data. 
The authors show how personal data are collected; and also introduce separation of duties of 
different policy administrators. The privacy officer is responsible for defining privacy policies 
while the security officer is responsible for defining access control policies. A consent 
management paradigm provides greater control for the customers with regards to their 
personal data.  
Karjoth et al. (Karjoth and Schunter, A Privacy Policy Model for Enterprises 2002) describe a 
privacy policy model. By extending the Flexible Authorisation Framework the authors have 
created a privacy control language that includes user consent, obligations and distributed 
administration. In this model a group hierarchy is presented, where a group inherits all the 
permissions from its ancestors. Data are categorised depending on their linkage to the data 
subject. This model introduces a hierarchy of purposes along with conditions and obligations. 
The privacy policy model is described in the logical framework of authorisation specification 
languages. A solution to automatically translate the inner-enterprise privacy policy written in E-
P3P to publishable policies for customers in P3P is provided in (Karjoth, Schunter and 
Herreweghen 2003). The language has been formalised and refined to form the IBM Enterprise 
Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL) (Ni, et al. 2007).  
 
Nelson et al. (Nelson, McCullough and Bliss 2005) have focused on the need for privacy 




protection in distributed systems. The authors have described the various steps of collecting 
and using personal data in a distributed environment and discussed how to provide more trust 
in those steps. This paper only considers different issues but does not show any practical 
implementation or uniform solution. Schunter et al. (Schunter and Berghe 2006) have 
discussed different features of practical implementations and enforcement of the sticky policy 
paradigm. They have introduced the idea of privacy injector to add privacy enforcement to 
existing applications, which is comprised of two parts- the privacy meta-data tracking part and 
the privacy policy enforcement part. The first automatically assigns, preserves and updates a 
privacy policy and the second enforces the policy. They have described a life-cycle of personal 
data and a way to protect the privacy of personal data throughout its life-cycle.  
 
The IBM research on privacy has not provided a way to accommodate different policy 
languages. In a distributed environment, it cannot always be assumed that all the PDPs will use 
the same language. They have not provided a secured way of transferring data between 
enterprises or a provision for a mechanism to verify a signed message in the system. 
Furthermore, the obligations they present are just activity names such as log, notify, 
getConsent etc. (Karjoth and Schunter 2002). Conditions are provided to start and end 
obligations (Karjoth, Schunter and Waidner 2003), however they have not provided a way to 
practically enforce these. Moreover, they did not consider including the Legal authorisation 
policies. 
 
 Review of the model: 
 When data are accessed by a user to perform an operation for a particular purpose that 
purpose must match the conditions described in the consent associated with the data.  
 The data subject is given opt-in and opt-out choices for the privacy policy that governs 
the usage of data.  
 Does not ensure limited collection but assumes that the enterprise is trusted and so 
would minimise the data collection. 
 Checks whether a request by a user for a data item is authorised by the data subject and 
thus it limits the uses and disclosure and the data subject gets control over the access. 
 Does not specifically ensure that the data subject can access the data. As the data 
subject’s policy is protecting the access to the personal data it can be assumed that the 
data subject can access his/her personal data by his/her policy. 
 A future work is mentioned to store accounting information in the privacy metadata so 
that all the operations performed on a data can be observed and thus it will be possible 
to verify the protection offered. 
 Obligations are returned as activity names. 
 Allows distributed enforcement through sticky policies. 
2.3.2.2 Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control (P-RBAC)  
Ni et al. (Ni, et al. 2007) have defined the Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control (P-RBAC) 
model to support privacy related policies which are expressed as Permission Assignments 
(PA). Similar to RBAC in P-RBAC permissions are also assigned to roles and roles are assigned 
to users. However, the structure of a privacy permission in P-RBAC differs from the permission 
in RBAC. Along with the data and action it explicitly states the intended purpose, condition on 




permission and obligation. The privacy policy is combined with the existing access control 
model and the formal definition of privacy-aware permission is also provided. Like RBAC the 
family of conceptual models of P-RBAC consist of core P-RBAC, hierarchical P-RBAC, and 
conditional P-RBAC. The hierarchical P-RBAC model introduces the notions of role hierarchy, 
object hierarchy and purpose hierarchy. The conditional P-RBAC model allows the policy writer 
to specify relations between different permission assignments; the notions of conflicting 
permission assignments and conflict detection algorithms are also provided. When a conflict is 
detected feedback is provided to the policy author to modify or discard the policy. Constrained 
natural language policies from policy authors are written with the SPARCLE policy workbench 
(which is a tool for authoring policy) and are transformed into P-RBAC permissions. Although 
these models theoretically associate data permissions with purpose, condition and obligation, 
the authors admit that they are too complex to implement practically. Qun Ni et al (Ni, Bertino 
and Lobo 2008) have defined the obligation model for P-RBAC, and have mentioned that the 
traditional policy based access control approach is not good enough for enforcing obligations 
as it can involve time interval, conditions as well as actions. The authors have also mentioned 
the features related to obligations. A language for specifying and handling obligations is 
proposed in (Li, Chen and Bertino 2012). These papers are discussed in detail later in Section 
2.4. 
 
Review of the model: 
 Uses purposes with the permissions. The data subject can assign permissions and 
those are matched with the requests and thus the data subject gets control over the 
access. 
 Shows a way to write natural language policy rules by the user using a tool, thus policy 
rules from the data subject can work as consents. 
 Checks whether a request by a user for a data item is authorised by the permission and 
thus it limits the uses and disclosure.  
 With the enforcement of obligation it is possible to ensure that the data are deleted 
after a certain event occurs. 
 Does not address that data subjects can access the data. However, by assigning 
permissions it is possible to ensure that. 
 For enforcing obligations an obligation language is specified.  
2.3.2.3 Privacy research of HP  
HP has also worked on providing privacy of personal identity information by enforcing 
obligations. Mont (Mont 2004) has listed the different aspects that are required to deal with 
privacy obligations such as: validity period, event that triggers the obligations, enforceability of 
the obligation, target of the obligations and so on. He identifies the important issues that need 
to be considered for the management and enforcement of privacy obligations such as: 
modelling and representing privacy obligations, association of obligations to data, mapping 
obligations to data to name a few. Furthermore, this paper gives a high level design of the 
obligation management systems and provides a way of transmitting encrypted confidential 
data with obligations to other parties. Nevertheless, it only describes the obligations related to 
privacy and does not provide any uniform solution for integrating access control policies of the 
organisation with the privacy policies (set by the data subject). Mont et al. (Mont, Pearson and 




Bramhall 2003 A) have proposed a way to obfuscate personal information to protect its 
content. Obfuscation of data is done using the sticky policies as the IBE encryption keys. 
Alteration of that key makes it impossible to generate the decryption key. The sticky policies 
are then associated with the obfuscated data. The receiver of the personal data needs to get 
the decryption key from the trusted authority (TA) and provides information to the TA as 
required by the disclosure policy. The trusted authority issues the decryption key only if the 
requester acknowledges compliance to the disclosure policies. Mont et al. (Mont and Thyne 
2006) have described a privacy policy enforcement model with the technical details. In this 
model the requester's intent is checked against the purpose provided by the owner of the 
personal data to enforce privacy aware access control. No direct access to the databases is 
allowed in this model and the queries are analysed before using them for accessing databases. 
A working prototype has been integrated with HP Select Access, software for providing policy-
based authentication and authorisation to web-based applications and web services. Mont et 
al. (Mont and Beato 2007) have presented an obligation management system that 
automatically derives related obligation policies from the privacy preferences provided by the 
users. This paper is reviewed in detail in Section 2.4. 
Review of the model: 
 Uses purposes with the preferences and the purposes are checked for authorising 
access.  
 Consent is taken in the form of preferences.  
 Checks whether a request for a personal data item is authorised by the preferences of 
the data subject and thus it limits the uses and disclosure.  
 Accommodates a mechanism for obligation enforcement which also ensures data 
deletion after the occurrence of certain event.  
 Supports distributed enforcement by using a sticky policy paradigm. 
2.3.2.4 Privacy research of EnCoRe 
The Ensuring Consent and Revocation (EnCoRe) project (EnCoRe 2009) has worked towards 
the means for individuals to retain control over their personal data by providing and managing 
consent and revocation. By giving consent an individual gives permission to use personal data 
for specific purposes, under certain conditions. By performing revocation, on the other hand, 
s/he determines how personal data should be handled once it is disclosed. The key 
requirements and practical implications of handling consent and revocation are discussed in 
(Mont, et al. 2009). Consents define the privacy preferences and constraints on the personal 
data, how data should be used such as for a specific purpose and any obligation to be applied 
and so on. Revocation is a process by which an individual can modify or invalidate a previously 
given consent. A reference model for the management of consent and revocation is also 
provided. A consent and revocation policy is presented in (Agrafiotis, et al. 2010), which 
defines what consent preference a user can express and in what way he / she can revoke it. 
The privacy requirements and the related policies from different sources, such as legislation, 
organisation guidelines, user expectations and so on, are considered (Papanikolaou, et al. 
2010). The authors have tried to find an intermediate representation of all the policies having 
different levels of abstraction so that it can embody all high level requirements and be 
translated into low level (machine executable) policies. Such a representation consists of 
syntax for conditions that need to be checked, syntax for immediate actions that need to be 




performed if the conditions of a particular rule are met and syntax for obligations which the 
enterprise has if the given conditions are met. In (Mont, S. Pearson, et al. 2010) the authors 
have specified a hierarchy of policies based on the level of abstraction. Privacy policies of the 
laws and regulations constitute the top most layer since the requirements in these are 
presented in the most abstract form. In this hierarchy the low-level policies describe how 
privacy requirements are implemented; executable policy languages such as XACML belong to 
the lowest-level in the policy hierarchy. All the upper level policies eventually need to be 
translated into low-level policies for enforcing them. The preference of the data subject itself is 
treated as personal data. To protect access to the preferences of the data subject a complete 
separation of the decision making part of the authorisation system from the data access part is 
proposed in (Kounga, Mont and Bramhall 2010).  
Review of the model:  
 The user is given the option to modify or completely remove the previously given 
consent which gives more control to the data subject over his/her personal data. 
 Provides a way for verifying the compliance of the policies with the requirements. 
 Accommodates mechanism for obligation enforcement.  
 Plans to provide a user friendly interface in future. 
 Conceptually includes access control policies from laws and regulations. However, it is 
still lacking the practical implementation of the policies from law and they did not 
specify how these policies will be combined with the preferences of data subject and 
the organisation’s policy.  
2.3.2.5 Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)  
P3P (W3C 2002) has defined a machine interpretable format for websites to express their 
privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted 
easily by user agents. The notice and consent model of P3p allows websites to describe their 
privacy policies and users can read these and can choose to interact with the websites and 
thus provide their consent to the policies. P3P provides a human readable version of the 
policies, automated comparison of users’ preferences with the policies, reports if there is a 
mismatch as well as users’ preferences for viewing and changing policies. The limitation of P3P 
is that it just checks whether the users’ preferences match with the organisation’s stated 
privacy policies, it does not ensure whether the organisations actually enforce their stated 
privacy policies. It is notable that E-P3P (mentioned in Section 2.3.2.1) formalizes internal 
privacy practices of an enterprise while P3P formalizes advertised privacy promises. 
Review of the model:  
 Can use purposes with the preferences and the preferences along with purposes are 
checked with the organisation’s stated privacy policies.  
 Consent is taken in the form of preferences.  
 Checks whether a user’s preferences match with the organisation’s stated privacy 
policies. The data subject can assign, modify or completely remove preferences, but 
this model does not ensure the enforcement of the policy inside the enterprise and so 
does not actually provide control to the user. 
 Provides a way for verifying the compliance of the policies with user preferences. But 
does not provide a mechanism for verifying the compliance with the data protection 
requirements. 




 Does not accommodate a mechanism for obligation enforcement.  
 Provides a simple interface for obtaining users’ preferences. 
2.3.2.6 Primelife Policy Language (PPL) 
PPL (Trabelsi, et al. 2010, Trabelsi, Sendor and Reinicke 2011, Ardagna, et al. 2009) has 
extended the XACML v2.0 language to provide a similar syntax to express preferences of the 
data subject, controller’s policy and the sticky policy agreed upon by the data subject and 
controller. The data handling policy of the controller expresses how the information collected 
from the data subject is handled, the data handling preferences of the data subject specify 
how the he/she wants his/her data to be treated after they are collected. An applicable sticky 
policy is derived from the matched portion of the data handling policy and preferences and 
this represents the policy upon which both parties, i.e., the controller and the data subject, 
have agreed. It also extends the XACML model to have a credential handler. The architecture 
of PPL consists of the following three layers. The Presentation Layer consists of a policy editor 
and a matching handler, the Core Layer consists of a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy 
Decision Point (PDP), Credential Handler and Obligation Handler and the Persistence Layer 
handles the data and policy store and credential store. A new obligation handling mechanism 
including temporal constraints, pre-obligations, conditional obligations and repeating 
obligations is proposed. However, it does not support policies from multiple authorities in 
multiple languages, does not include policies from law with the highest priority, does not have 
dynamic conflict resolution strategy and credential or contract validation. Review of the 
model:  
 Uses preferences from the data subject and purposes may be added in the 
preferences.  
 Consent is taken in the form of preferences. The model checks the preferences of the 
data subject with the policy of the data controller.  
 Checks whether a user’s preferences match with the organisation’s stated privacy 
policies. The agreed policy of the data subject and controller is used as a sticky policy 
and that is enforced; which limits the uses and disclosure of data and thus the users 
are provided a bit of control over the personal data. But whether the data subject can 
modify or completely remove preferences is not stated. 
 Has separate storages for data, policy and credential but does not provide details of 
the mechanism for providing safe storage of them. 
 Provides mechanism for obligation enforcement.  
 Provides interface for getting user’s preferences.  
2.3.2.7 PuRBAC: Purpose-Aware Role-Based Access Control  
PuRBAC (Masoumzadeh and Joshi 2008) has attempted to extend the RBAC model to include 
the purpose as a separate and central entity. It has increased the capability of the RBAC model 
to include privacy requirements while reducing the complexity of the P-RBAC (Ni, Trombetta, 
et al. 2007) model. The focus of the model is that the subject should specify the purpose of 
access in its request while accessing a piece of data. The hierarchy of role and purpose has also 
been considered. A user gets permission to access a piece of data only if the purpose of access 
is allowed for the currently active role. This model is mainly designed for an organisation 
where different levels of employees get access to the personal data suitable for their roles. 




The model does not facilitate the data subject to specify for what purposes who he/she allows 
to access his/her data.  
Review of the PuRBAC model:  
 Uses a hierarchy of purposes and based on different active roles of a requester the 
purposes are allowed. The purpose specification is enterprise centric rather than user 
centric i.e. the organisation specifies what role in the organisation is allowed to access 
data for what purposes, and the data subject does not specify for what purposes who 
(a role or another organisation) can access the data. 
 Only the authorised role can access the personal data for the authorised purposes and 
the user has to satisfy the conditions to get the permission to access. Hence the 
system provides limited use and disclosure. 
 Allows limited retention through the use of obligation to delete the data after a certain 
amount of time. 
 Has a mechanism to enforce pre and post obligations.  
2.3.2.8 Privacy model of Al-Harabi and Osborn  
Al-Harabi and Osborn (Al-Harbi and Osborn 2011) have provided a model based on the Role 
Graph Model (RGM). They include purpose with the permission assignment. Roles in this 
model consist of a role name and permissions which are arranged in a hierarchy called the 
Role-Graph. They provided a simple model to include purpose in the RGM model to provide 
privacy but their work does not accommodate many aspects of privacy.  
Review of the model:  
 Accommodates purposes with the permission assignments. Only the permission is 
activated (for a role) for which the access purpose is equal to or more general than the 
intended purpose. This purpose in a way is an indirect consent. 
 Only the authorised role can access the personal data for the authorised purpose. 
Hence the system provides limited use and disclosure. 
 How the model will attempt to ease the user interactions is not mentioned. 
2.3.2.9 Access control model of Byun and Li  
Byun and Li (Byun and Li 2008) have provided a purpose based access control model for 
privacy protection based on the RBAC model. This model allows multiple purposes to be 
associated with each data item and also accommodates explicit prohibitions i.e. the purposes 
for which the data should not be used. It also specifies different levels of granularity of data 
i.e. the units of data with which purposes can be associated in the context of relational 
databases.  
Review of the model:  
 Accommodates intended purpose i.e. the purposes for which access is allowed and the 
access purposes i.e. the purposes for which access is requested.  
 Allows explicit prohibition, purpose compliance and granular association of purposes.  
 Does not support distributed enforcement in its reviewed version. 
2.3.2.10 Trust and privacy model of Smari et al.  
Smari et al. (Smari, Zhu and Clemente 2009) (Zhu 2008) have proposed a model to incorporate 
trust and privacy in attribute based access control for collaborative environments. The access 




control model is based on attributes of subjects and objects. They provide algorithms for 
calculating trust levels and assigning trust based subject attributes. They provide six aspects of 
privacy along with purpose matching.  
Review of the model:  
 Incorporates purpose matching associated with an object but does not mention how 
to obtain the purposes.  
 Allows purpose compliance. Unauthorised users are prohibited from knowing the 
existence of an object; an authorised user can access only the minimum necessary 
views of the object. 
 Plans to limit access time according to the necessity of a subject to fulfil a purpose. 
 Aims to allow authorised user to disclose or know usage status of an object when 
necessary. 
 Whether the user can change the purpose later, and how the purposes can be passed 
to another organisation are not specified. 
 Has no mechanism for obligation enforcement in the reviewed version.  
2.3.2.11 Privacy enhanced access control model of Xu et al.  
Xu et al. (Xu, et al. 2009) (Xu, He, et al. 2010) have proposed an enhancement of the traditional 
access control matrix model to integrate privacy; as that only presents subjects and objects. 
The enhanced model has a third dimension representing a set of privacy-concerning subjects. 
A privacy access right is an entry in the matrix that indicates a particular access right along with 
conditions that determine whether the access right is authorised. The conditions presented 
are very simple which may not be appropriate for a complex scenario. 
Review of the model: 
 Does not specify purpose matching.  
 Incorporates conditions for which the access right is authorised. One of such 
conditions is ‘ask’, which means the authorisation of the privacy concerning subject is 
needed. The model does not provide the semantics to obtain real time authorisation 
from the subject. 
 Allows checking the conditions of the privacy concerning subjects and thus limits the 
disclosure and the subjects are given control over the access to the data.  
2.3.2.12 Policy-based Privacy Authorisation System (PPAS) 
In PPAS (Choi, Lee and Lee 2006) privacy is maintained in a policy based authorisation system. 
In this simple system two kinds of policy are maintained, one is for every data item in the 
system which is set by the administrator and another is set by the owner of the resource or 
data. A request for data access comes with three elements- subject (the requester), resource 
(consists of resource and the owner) and action (consists of access mode i.e. read, write, 
create, delete and purpose). The requests are written as an XACML request context. Policies 
are stored and retrieved in an Oracle 9i database, and a simple conflict resolution policy is also 
implemented. The system is suitable for a single organisation, not for a distributed 
environment. Review of the model: 
 Uses the purpose as one of the elements of privacy policy. 
 Accepts policies from the owners of personal data and those policies work as consents 
of the owners.  




 Checks whether a request can be granted by the privacy policy. So it provides limited 
use and disclosure. 
 Does not ensure limited retention specifically, but with an obligation it may be possible 
to provide it. 
 Whether the data subject can modify or completely remove the given preferences is 
not stated. 
 Includes obligations as a part of the privacy policy, although does not provide details 
on their enforcement.  
2.3.2.13 Privacy policy enforcement system of Goyal et al.  
Goyal et al. (Goyal, Deodia and Gupta 2007) have proposed a system for privacy aware access 
control with RBAC. The authors have implemented the system using the PHP scripting 
language. The privacy policy is enforced by associating intent with the access control policy. An 
authorisation table stores the policies and another table stores the roles. Policies are grouped 
into policy sets according to the purposes, and when an access request comes in, the policy set 
is extracted according to the purpose. Obligations for the policies are also handled. A policy is 
modelled to have fields of purpose, attribute, target type, requester type, condition, 
obligationID. An obligation is presented with fields of Obligation-ID, Obligation_Name, 
Obligation_function, Ob_Argument_list. The tables of the system have a fixed number of 
fields, hence are restricted for modifications. This model is not suitable for distributed 
environment.  
Review of the model: 
 Uses the purpose as one of the elements of privacy policy. 
 Assumes that the user account and information management module are responsible 
for the consent management.  
 Checks whether a request is granted by the access control policies. Thus it provides 
limited use and disclosure. 
 Separates the data handler so that no direct query can be made to the table. 
 Includes obligations as a part of the privacy policy but does not provide details on their 
enforcement. Each obligation has Obligation-ID, Name, Function and Parameter, but 
does not specify various types of obligations. 
 Accepts policies from the users but does not give details on how these policies are 
obtained from the user. 
 Does not support distributed enforcement of privacy policies. 
2.4 Use of Obligations to Protect Privacy 
Obligations are the actions that must be performed when an event occurs. When the event is 
an authorisation decision the obligations are the actions that must be performed before, after 
or along with the enforcement of the authorisation decision.  
 
Enforcement of privacy obligations is an important part of ensuring the privacy of personal 
data. Systems that want to protect the privacy of personal data must provide a way for the 
proper enforcement of privacy obligations which a traditional access control system is unable 
to do. Some privacy related obligations can be, for example, sending e-mail to the subject of 




the personal data when the data are accessed or deleting the personal data after a certain 
amount of time. Many research works have been published related to the handling of 
obligations and are discussed in this section. 
 
Randic et al. (Randic, Kunstic and Blaskovic 2004) have described how the operations of PEP 
can be improved by using an “object by value” transfer mechanism for loading objects 
representing obligation policies. The authors describe the policy based management system of 
the IETF policy framework which is composed of a Policy Management Application (PMA), 
Policy Repository (PR), Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). It is 
assumed that the policies are stored in a LDAP directory as policy objects and are transferred 
from the repository to the PDP. The PDP receives policy requests and returns policy decisions 
to the PEP which enforces the policy i.e. it performs the action according to the decision 
returned by the PDP. Obligation policies are events triggered that specify what action a subject 
must perform on an object. State information is transferred from the PDP as a local creation of 
an object and with that the PEP creates the policy enforcement object. The authors have 
claimed that the object by value technology in policy based management architecture has 
satisfied the adaptability requirement of agents. They specified policies in the Ponder policy 
language; however, this language does not support the pre-obligations, which is equivalent to 
our temporal type “before” (Chadwick and Fatema 2009). 
 
Ni et al. (Ni, Bertino and Lobo 2008) have defined an obligation model for Privacy- aware Role 
Based Access Control (P-RBAC). The authors have mentioned that the traditional policy based 
access control approach is not good enough for enforcing obligations as that can involve time 
intervals, conditions and actions. Obligations are defined as actions that some subjects have to 
fulfill during some time intervals and the time interval is specified by a temporal constraint 
component. They have defined the pre-obligation as one that should be fulfilled before an 
action and the post obligation as one that should be fulfilled after the action. If the condition 
of a conditional obligation cannot be fulfilled, the obligation will not be satisfied. In the 
repeated obligation, an obligation will be attempted to be fulfilled at most ‘n’ times. 
Obligations are presented in tuples of conditions, users, actions, objects and temporal 
constraints where the temporal constraint is a tuple of start time, end time and count (number 
of times the obligation is to be fulfilled). Obligations cascading is defined as a phenomenon 
where the execution of an obligation can trigger the execution of another obligation. The term 
“dominance” refers to the situation where an obligation dominates another obligation. It is 
stated that the model is not implemented yet due to the complexity of obligations in privacy 
policies, and they are working on it.  
 
Mont (Mont 2004) has documented different aspects that are needed to deal with privacy 
obligations such as validity periods, trigger events, enforceability, target and so on. Important 
issues that need to be considered for the management and enforcement of privacy obligations 
are such things as modelling and representation, association and mapping to data and so on. 
Furthermore, this paper presents a high level design of the obligation management system. It 
has also provided a way of transmitting encrypted confidential data along with the obligations 
to other parties.  
 




The obligation management system presented in (Mont and Beato 2007) automatically derives 
the related obligation policies from the privacy preferences provided by the users. Here an 
obligation policy template is introduced which is instantiated by replacing the place-holders 
with the actual privacy preference value to provide flexibility in defining the privacy obligation 
policies. Each piece of data is associated with one or more “instances” of obligation policies. In 
this approach, a large quantity of data needs to be dealt with and a parametric obligation 
policy is introduced to make the system scalable. The key feature of this is that the privacy 
preferences are stored separately from the policies which provide a way to apply the policy to 
a potentially large set of personal data. The explicit reference to the privacy preference is 
stored elsewhere. The parametric obligation policy is presented as a tuple of unique identifiers, 
target, parametric events that trigger an obligation, parametric action and parametric “on 
violation” actions which are executed to re-mediate any violation enforced by obligations and 
is represented as an XML formatted reactive rule. This paper has also described the Scalable 
Obligation Management System, which can manage both the parametric obligations and 
traditional obligations. In summary, this model mainly focuses on the scalability problem when 
dealing with a large amount of private data, each having different privileges and user 
consents.  
 
In (Ananthanarayanan, Mohania and Gupta 2005) the detection and resolution of conflicts 
amongst conflicting obligations are discussed. An obligation is defined as a task, optionally 
associated with some rules specifying an action that needs to be mandatorily performed after 
the user's request is fulfilled. Obligations are classified as notification related and retention 
related and conflict arises when two or more defined on the same data item specify different 
actions and it is only possible to achieve one of them or enforcing two of them leaves one or 
more data items in an inconsistent state. The authors claim that static conflicts exist in rules 
and runtime conflicts arise based on user requests. If one data item is mapped to more than 
one obligation then a static conflict may arise. Policy level and obligation management level 
resolutions of static conflict are mentioned. As more than one obligation cannot be executed 
at the same time, in order to choose which obligation to execute, a ranking of the obligations 
is done and resolving conflicts for the runtime obligation is attempted by removing overridden 
obligations. A prototype for the automated enforcement of obligations related to privacy 
policies is implemented, and the authors have also described a prototype for the conflict 
management system.  
 
Bettini (Bettini 2002) has defined provisions as actions to be performed before the decision is 
taken and obligations as actions to be performed after. Obligation monitoring is needed to 
ensure that a user has fulfilled the agreed obligations. The authors mention that the user's 
history of obligation fulfillment needs to be utilised for dealing with the user in the future. This 
can be done by assigning a numerical reliability rating similar to a credit rating. A fulfilling 
clause defines the actions to be taken when the obligation is fulfilled and a defaulting clause 
defines the actions to be taken when it is not by the user. The server is assumed to have a 
mechanism to monitor atomic obligations. An obligation, in a disjunctive normal form is said to 
be fulfilled if one of the obligations is achieved and in a conjunctive normal form if all are. The 
authors have proposed temporal reasoning support in order to monitor the obligations with 
timing constraints. The concept of “guarding” time has been defined as a time such that if no 




event occurs until that time, the corresponding defaulting action will be performed at the next 
time instance. This paper mainly focuses on monitoring the user’s action that is supposed to be 
completed by the user when s/he gains some permission, but the model focuses on limited 
types of obligations. This work did not focus much on implementing provisions i.e. the actions 
to be performed before taking decisions.  
 
Irwin et al. (Irwin, Yu and Winsborough 2006) have described obligations as “a requirement for 
a subject to take some action at some time in the future” where it cannot be enforced by a 
system in a direct way. The authors say that these obligations are unenforceable but are 
monitor-able by the system. They describe a meta model where an obligation system is 
represented as a tuple of subject, action, object and time-frame and can be in four states: 
invalid, pending, fulfilled and violated. The authors say that a system is in an accountable state 
if all the users in the system have sufficient privileges and resources to carry out their 
obligations. A state transition in a system is said to be an obligation-abiding transition if after 
transitioning to the new state no pending obligation of the previous state becomes violated. 
They introduce the concept of system accountability and show how complex it is to determine 
whether it is accountable and further defined a simplified concrete model to determine this. If 
an obligation has been enforced by the system then it no longer remains an obligation 
according to their definition.  
 
Demchenko et al. (Demchenko, et al. 2008) have enhanced the obligation handling mechanism 
of XACML where the obligations are returned by the PDP as these are written in the policy. 
Their obligation handling processes have three stages as follows: obligations are returned by 
the PDP in the form they are written in policy, next templates and instructions of the 
obligations are replaced by the real attributes and finally the obligations are actually enforced 
by the resource itself or by the trusted services managed by the resource.  
  
Gama et al. (Gama and Ferreira 2005) have described a policy platform called Heimdall that 
provides a mechanism for the enforcement of different types of obligations. Heimdall 
separates the application development from the policy specification and enforcement, which 
provides a way for the policy administrator to define obligation policies independently from 
the application developer. For the enforcement of obligations an event is matched against the 
predefined policies set by the administrator. However, Heimdall does not provide any way for 
the user to define their own obligations which makes the model unsuitable for implementing 
privacy obligations. In our model we have a mechanism for supporting obligations residing in 
the administrator’s policy and those coming with the access request, for example, with a sticky 
policy.  
 
Katt et al. (Katt, et al. 2008) have proposed extensions of the Usage Control (UCON) (Park and 
Sandhu 2004) Model by adding post obligations into it which are not enforceable with the 
original core UCON model. It assumes that obligations are mandatory requirements a 
subject/system has to perform before or during a usage of an object. An obligation is viewed 
from four points- 1. Who must perform the action, 2. What object the obligation must be 
applied to, 3. When the obligation is to be performed (before/ during/ after a usage control 
session) and 4. For how long. Our work further considers application independent/ dependent 




obligations and obligation combinations as an important addition to the privacy preserving 
authorisation system as described below. 
 
In most of the work related to obligation handling they are left for the application developers 
to enforce, however, not all obligations are application specific. There are some obligations 
that do not vary for different applications (such as sending e-mail), and they can be processed 
in an application independent way. In our proposed model, the application independent 
obligations are designed to be handled by the system; so that the application developers do 
not need to worry about them. Furthermore, we have proposed to accommodate the policies 
and obligations from a number of authorities. The obligations returned by the policies from 
various authorities are combined if the policies have the same effect, unlike the presented 
works above, which do not address the idea of combining obligations.  
2.5 Review of Conflict Resolution Strategies 
The proposed privacy protecting advanced authorisation system, P-PAAS, is designed to 
combine policies written by a number of authorities in different policy languages. Conflicts 
may arise in the system when more than one access control policy is defined for the same set 
of subject, action and target. Different PDPs may return different access decisions, and the 
Master PDP needs to resolve the conflicts among them. The system needs to be provided with 
a conflict resolution policy which it uses to resolve conflicts among the policy decisions. In this 
section the various conflict resolution strategies taken by prior research are discussed.  
The conflict resolution strategy of XACML is defined as a rule and policy combining algorithm 
as presented in Section 2.2.9.  
  
Linington et al. (Linington, Milosevic and Raymond 1998) have mentioned three principles that 
are commonly used by legal frameworks in many countries which can be used for defining 
policy priority -  
Lex specialis legi generali derogat- the specific overrides the general. 
Lex superior legi inferiori derogat- higher authority overrules lower authorities. 
Lex posterior legi auteriori derogat -new law overrides old law.  
 
These principles are later used by Dunlop et al. (Dunlop, Indulska and Raymond 2003) for 
establishing precedence for resolving conflicts in policies. The authors have classified policy 
conflicts into four categories- Internal, External, Space and Role conflicts, and have proposed 
different strategies of when and how to resolve them. In the Pessimistic Conflict Resolution 
approach, it is assumed that all the potential conflicting states result in a conflict at some time 
and it takes preventive steps to resolve them at compile time. However, it is not always 
possible to detect all of them at compile time especially in distributed systems. The Optimistic 
Conflict Resolution Approach does not take any preventive measure but rather it detects and 
resolves conflicts at the run time. The Balanced Conflict Resolution approach assumes that the 
likelihood of conflicts occurring is high and so takes some preventive steps to resolve the static 
ones and if some potential conflicting states cannot be prevented they are monitored and 
resolved at run time. In the Individual Conflict Resolution approach each detected conflict is 
assessed separately to determine when to resolve it. Different strategies are described for 




establishing precedence in order to resolve the conflicts. In the principle Specific Overrides 
General the policies applying to a more specific role gets precedence over those applying to a 
general role. In the new law overrides old law principle the creation date of both policies are 
examined to determine the precedence and in the higher authority overrides lower authority 
strategy a hierarchy of authority determines it. The assigning of explicit weights or priorities to 
policies is useful in a single domain but is difficult for a distributed domain. In the 
negative/positive policy precedence strategy either the negative or the positive policy takes 
precedence when conflicts arise. The authors also show that some strategies are valid for 
some situations and invalid for others and have suggested that only one principle is not 
suitable to resolve all the conflicts. In a single domain the local authority determines the 
resolution strategy and in a multi-domain it depends on the organisation’s rules.  
 
Ma et al. (Ma, Lu and Qiu 2009) have defined a way for the static and dynamic detection of 
policy conflicts by representing the policies in a graph. They note that the relationship 
between the policies needs to be characterised according to the conflict resolution 
requirements of the system. They have proposed a step-by-step process for conflict resolution 
where a rule of higher priority is selected at each step for resolving the remaining conflict until 
none remains.  
 
Russello et al. (Russello, Dong and Dulay 2007) have mentioned that conflicts arise when 
multiple policies apply on the same subject, target and action. They have provided rules to 
define precedence between conflicting policies based on domain nesting which gives 
precedence to policies that apply to more specific instances of subjects or targets or both. 
Furthermore, they provide a solution for the situation where a global policy needs to override 
a more specific one and to identify such a policy, a special keyword 'final' is used in the 
definition of it. The strategies they use for conflict resolution are: firstly searching for policies 
with the keyword 'final', if more than one 'final' policy is found precedence is given to the 
negative authorisation policy. If no 'final' policy is found then searching is done for the most 
specific one and precedence in given to the negative one. 
 
The policy conflict resolution techniques proposed by Syukur et al. (Syukur, Loke and Stanski 
2005) for pervasive computing environment are: role hierarchy overrides policy and obligation 
holds precedence over rights. The first strategy is used when conflict occurs between the users 
of different roles and the user with a higher role gets precedence, and the later one is used 
when conflict occurs between the obligations and rights. They propose that a conflict can be 
resolved when it is detected or at the time when the potential conflict becomes actual.  
 
For resolving conflict instead of identifying which policy prevails Charalambides et al. 
(Charalambides, et al. 2006) have proposed to provide conflict resolution policies in an 
application specific environment. These policies are triggered when the condition for conflict is 
satisfied and this paper only used policies related to Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning for 
Differentiated Service (DiffServ) networks.  
 
Chanda (Chanda 2006) has provided conflict resolution for policies in military network 
management systems. The author has classified conflicts as application-independent and 




application-specific conflicts. The application-independent conflicts are the modality conflict – 
which occurs when one policy requires that certain actions occur and other forbids the same 
set of actions; and the redundancy conflict occurs when two or more identical policies exist in 
the system. Among the application-specific conflicts the redundancy conflict is the same as the 
previous one; the mutually exclusive configuration conflict occurs when a parameter of the 
target is set to two different values by two different actions; and the inconsistent configuration 
conflict when multiple policies inconsistently configure a set of related parameters. The author 
notes that resolving conflicts of the mutually exclusive configuration depends on the intended 
semantics of whether to forbid another policy to set parameters or the most recently 
performed action needs to stay. For resolving the inconsistent configuration conflict, a 
constraint is inserted as a condition in the policy, to maintain the relationship of related 
parameters.  
 
Lupu et al. (Lupu and Sloman 1999) mainly discuss the modality conflict which occurs when 
two or more policies with opposite modality signs refer to the same subjects, action and 
targets. They specify maintaining policy precedence relationships as a resolution of conflicts 
whereby the negative policy has priority. They also mention providing explicit priority values to 
policies whereby a more specific policy i.e. a policy applying to a sub-domain overrules the 
policy applying to a more general domain. However, this precedence rule fails when one 
conflicting policy has a more specific subject while the other has a more specific object.  
 
Li et al. (Li, Wang, et al. 2009) have presented a Policy Combining Language (PCL) while 
identifying several problems of XACML. The authors have shown many strategies that cannot 
be specified in XACML, such as, weak-consensus: which permits (or denies) when at least one 
policy permits (or denies) while no other policy denies (or permits), strong-consensus: which 
permits (or denies) if all the policies permit (or deny) and the policy decision based on the 
majority of decisions. It has provided a general formalism of policy and obligation combination 
which is implemented and integrated with XACML and can be used by other languages.  
 
Crampton et al. have introduced a resilient policy evaluation solution to protect the policy 
evaluation of a distributed computer system from failure if a sub-policy fails to be retrieved or 
evaluated (Crampton and Huth 2010 B). Three semantics have been presented for policy 
evaluation, two of which handle the exceptional situation by considering different possible 
outcomes. The authors have provided an interesting concept of having orchestration policies 
to combine decisions of “base” policies in a tree structure (Crampton and Huth 2010 A). In 
their demonstrated model a Policy Orchestration Point (POP) forwards requests to other PDP 
or POP for evaluation and combines the decisions according to the orchestration patterns 
defined for that POP. Our authorisation system component, Master PDP, (Chadwick and 
Fatema 2009), which is published earlier than the above, calls the conflict resolution policy and 
gets a decision combining algorithm (which can vary based on request context) and combines 
the decisions of relevant PDPs. However our authorisation system also considers combining 
the obligations returned by the PDPs which is missing in their model.  
 
Mazzoleni et al. (Mazzoleni, et al. 2008) have proposed a solution for integrating  the resource 
owner’s and third party’s policies based on the integration preferences chosen by the policy 




authorities and the similarity measurement of those in a complex way. They also identify 
situations where integration is not possible. There is no such limitation in our work. Their work 
makes a suggestion about choosing a party to collaborate with. The focus of our work is 
different since we do not aim to provide such suggestions; rather we try to provide a way 
which always ensures that the policies of various authorities always get the right priority in 
terms of privacy protection of personal data. In our case, the relationship among authorities is 
hierarchical whereas it is peer-to-peer in theirs. With our system, the data subject’s conflict 
resolution policy always gets certain privileges regardless of that of the controller and no 
other authorities’ policies are allowed to override policies provided by the law. In such a case 
the data subject is assured of certain privileges and does not need to carry out the complex 
similarity matching of policies to choose a party to collaborate with. Our strategy assures that 
the privilege of certain parties is always preserved while choosing a dynamic conflict resolution 
algorithm based on the request contexts.  
 
Mohan et al. (Mohan and Blough 2010) have argued that static conflict resolution may not be 
suitable for a dynamic environment where there is a need to adapt the policies dynamically. 
They proposed a dynamic conflict resolution strategy that chooses an applicable policy 
combining algorithm based on a set of environmental attributes. Although their strategy 
improves the applicability of the authorisation system for a dynamic environment, it does not 
yet solve the problem entirely. The limitation with their system is that the policy combining 
algorithm (PCA) rules have to be mutually exclusive which makes it unsuitable for a dynamic 
environment where individual parties are expected to provide independent policies. 
Moreover, the existence of more than one applicable PCA rule is treated as an error which 
halts the authorisation procedure. The protocol of our strategy is influenced by that of Mohan 
et al., but we have made the system suitable for a dynamic environment where all the parties 
can provide their own independent conflict resolution policies. Only one conflict resolution 
algorithm is chosen for a request context regardless of the number of conflict resolution 
policies defined for the same conditions; which resolves the problem of requiring the conflict 
resolution policies to be mutually exclusive. 
2.6 Privacy Protection in the Cloud 
Cloud computing has brought a new era of internet based data storage and processing power. 
The cloud offers enormous benefits to businesses such as reduced costs, since they no longer 
need to spend a large amount of capital on buying expensive application software or 
sophisticated hardware that they might never need. The key characteristics of Cloud include 
agility, low cost, device and location independence, multi-tenancy, high reliability, high 
scalability, security and sustainability (Gong, et al. 2010). However, despite all these benefits 
the cloud has to offer, privacy and security issues are still major challenges of cloud computing 
(Sabahi 2011). There are many security issues to consider, including fine grained access to cloud 
resources, privacy protection of data in the cloud, and auditing of cloud operations. Some 
threat models assume that the cloud provider cannot be trusted, and therefore propose 
storing only encrypted data. Others assume that the cloud provider can be trusted, and, that 
the threats come primarily from outside attackers and other cloud users. Given that most 
public cloud services are currently being run by large, trusted organisations such as Amazon, 
IBM, Microsoft and Google, we believe that the latter threat model is reasonable for many 




users. Furthermore, organisations are now able to run their own private clouds, using open 
source software such as Eucalyptus (http://eucalyptus.com/). A private cloud implementation 
aims to avoid security risks by setting up the cloud inside the corporate firewall, within the 
organisation’s infrastructure boundary. The trusted provider model is the most appropriate 
one for this scenario. For example, the National Grid Service in the UK is already experimenting 
with private clouds for use by the academic community, so consequently the trusted provider 
model is the one we adopt in this work.  
Gellman’s report at the World Privacy Forum (Gellman 2009) focuses on privacy issues and 
legal compliance of sharing data in the cloud. He mentions various legal issues such as the 
possibility of the cloud being in more than one location at the same time with different legal 
consequences and such legal uncertainty makes it difficult to assess the privacy protection 
available to users. We cater for this by allowing different policies from law to be configured 
into our authorisation system and allowing them to stop data being transferred to jurisdictions 
which do not have proper privacy protection. 
Pearson (Pearson 2009) points out the key privacy requirements for clouds such as: giving 
notice to users before collecting their data, getting consent of the data subjects, safeguards to 
prevent unauthorised access and so on. She attempts to provide a set of guidelines for 
designing a cloud service with privacy protection. Pearson et al. (Pearson and Charlesworth 
2009) propose to use accountability (created with a combination of privacy policy and 
contractual terms) to enhance privacy protection in the cloud. She identifies the key elements 
for provisioning accountability within the cloud which include transparency of data handling, 
assurance through privacy policy, control of access to data and compliance with laws. Pearson 
et al. (Pearson, Shen and Mowbray 2009) and Mowbray et al. (Mowbray and Pearson 2009) 
propose a privacy manager which can obfuscate personal data in the client site before sending 
it to the cloud service provider. This approach minimises the amount of sensitive data held 
within the cloud as only the client can obfuscate or de-obfuscate data with their chosen key. 
The problem with this approach is that the applications that are able to use the obfuscated 
data are limited, and this affects the services available to the user. Also the computation 
overhead of obfuscating and de-obfuscating is large and so it imposes constraints on the 
computing resources available to the user.  
Lin et al. (Lin and Squicciarini 2010) propose a data protection model by which a potential 
cloud user can find and choose a cloud service provider based on a user based ranking of the 
service providers. The user can then integrate their privacy policy with that of the service 
provider and any sub-contractors, and this combined policy can be coupled with the data, 
rather like our sticky policies. The work is still at a very preliminary stage and more design and 
implementation is needed.  
Itani et al. (Itani, Kayssi and Chehab 2009) present a security infrastructure for cloud providers 
to adopt. Privacy of the data in the cloud is ensured by the use of a secure cryptographic co-
processor which provides a trusted and isolated execution environment in the computing 
cloud.  
Wang et al. (Wang, et al. 2009) propose an anonymity based privacy preservation method in 
the cloud. They show a simple example for anonymisation of some data based on the 
background knowledge of the service provider but their work lacks the automation of such 
anonymisation and is suitable for very limited services.  
 




We believe that the obfuscation or encryption of the data is not necessary for many cloud 
usage scenarios, especially private clouds. Our P-PASS can be used as a cloud authorisation 
service that can use privacy policies to protect access to the personal data at trusted cloud 
providers, who can independently encrypt/decrypt the data for storage in the cloud as 
required. 
2.7 Previous Work on Obtaining Authorisation Rules from 
Legislation 
Even though privacy laws have existed for quite a long time, the automatic enforcement of 
them is still lacking, and the process of converting them into automatically enforceable 
formats is considered to be tedious and complicated work (Papanikolaou, Pearson and Mont 
2011). Much research has been performed on obtaining requirements from legislation which is 
mainly used as a guideline or for compliance checking.  
 
The NEURONA project (Casellas, et al. 2010) has developed a data protection application based 
on the Spanish data protection requirements. It produces reports regarding the correct 
application of privacy measures to files containing personal data. If a file contains personal 
data but does not comply with an adequate level of security then it is classified as an 
erroneous file by their ontology. They provide a semi-automated way to determine whether 
any aspects of the current state of a company's personal data files might not comply with the 
established set of regulations.  
 
Breaux et al. (Breaux and Anton 2005 B) have proposed a semantic parameterisation process 
to derive semantic models from privacy regulations. In a content analysis technique, goal-
mining, the text is parsed to extract structured natural language statements expressed as 
goals. The goals that are obtained from privacy policy documents are re-stated to form 
Restricted Natural Language Statements (RNLS). By semantic parameterisation the RNLS are 
expressed as a semantic model where every component comprises at least an actor, action 
and object. Unfortunately, the semantic parameterisation process is not capable of 
parameterising many goals. For example, it cannot present the conditions which coincide with 
the conjunction “unless”. In (Breaux and Anton 2005 A) the semantic parameterisation 
process is applied to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Fact 
Sheet that has been prepared to define the rights (i.e. the permissions) and the obligations 
(i.e. what people and systems must do). The analysis procedure had three steps- 1. Identify a 
natural language statement that expresses rights, permissions or obligations 2. Derive a 
semantic model for actors, actions and objects for each statement 3. Derive rules with pre-
conditions (if a pre-condition is true the corresponding effects must also be true) and effects 
built from temporal constraints. In (Breaux, Vail and Anton 2006) the methodology is 
presented for extracting and prioritising rights and obligations from regulations. The semantic 
parameterisation is developed from Grounded Theory which states that a theory that is 
obtained from a dataset is valid for that dataset (Charmaz 2003). The authors note that 
heuristics, used by their method, may be insufficient or inconsistent when analysing other 
regulations or policies. Breaux et al. (Breaux and Anton 2007) note that acquiring 
requirements from regulations is complex due to the intended and unintended ambiguities. 




They have introduced a frame-based requirements analysis method (FBRAM) to get a semi-
formal representation from regulations. However, there are limitations in their method such as 
relying upon a specific format of regulatory texts, and analyst’s skills. The results from applying 
their methods on HIPAA privacy rules are presented in (Breaux and Anton 2008). However, the 
authors say that their methodology may not be applicable for other regulations. The manual 
process of identifying rights and obligations from regulatory texts are replaced by a tool called 
Centro framework in (Kiyavitskaya, et al. 2008). The Centro framework requires the manual 
construction of grammatical rules to identify basic concepts. They applied this method to the 
HIPAA regulations, but there is inadequate assessment of its applicability to other regulations. 
 
Massacci et al. (Massacci, Prest and Zannone) present a case study of using Security-Enhanced 
Tropos, an agent based requirement engineering modeling and formal analysis methodology, 
to validate the compliance of the University of Trento to the Italian Data Protection 
Legislation. Their scope of focus is different from ours as they did not try to obtain access 
control policies from legislation.  
 
Bkara et al. (Bekara and Laurent 2011) have presented a semantic information model that 
formalises legal requirements. This model can be used by the user to check automatically 
whether the service provider’s request is compliant with the legislation. The semantic model 
associates the personal data type and service type with explicit legislative rules. For each 
service type, the data type allowed by the legislative framework for the service type is 
displayed. After selecting the data type for a service type the related privacy rules are 
displayed and the resulting privacy policy is then compared with the service provider’s privacy 
policy to judge its compatibility with the legal requirements. The ontology can be a powerful 
tool to determine whether a service provider’s privacy policy is compatible with legislation or 
not. However, the work does not focus on extracting all the access control rules from the 
legislative rules. In other words, not all the legislative rules were possible to express with this 
ontology. For example, “the data subject can access the personal data if there is no legal 
objection” is not possible to express with this model. The legislative based privacy rules are 
only capable of expressing the rules an enterprise can provide to the customer while collecting 
personal data.  
 
Waterman (Waterman 2010) has identified that the translation of privacy laws and regulations 
into machine executable form is slow and difficult because of the unstructured form of legal 
text. In order to develop a policy aware accountable system that can compute compliance 
with data usage policy, they have worked on forming isomorphic intermediate representations 
of the US Privacy Act and Massachusetts Criminal Offender Records Law. The table based 
presentation of the intermediate representation was useful, but according to the authors it is 
not sufficient for the programmer to make them computer executable.  
 
Mont et al. (M. Mont, S. Pearson, et al. 2010) say that translation of legislation/regulation to 
machine readable policies has proven to be very difficult. They have presented a hierarchy of 
policies based on a level of abstraction and consider that the legislation/ regulations present 
the most abstract policies and so those policies stay on the top of the hierarchy. Papanikolaou 
et al. (Papanikolaou, Pearson and Mont 2011) say that it is unreasonable to expect a computer 




program to fully understand the legal or other policy text. However, even with the limited 
capabilities, the automation of Legal policy enforcement significantly reduces the effort 
required to ensure compliance. They have grouped previous research on the analysis of privacy 
and privacy related regulations and proposed to use techniques such as analysing natural 
language privacy texts, extraction of formalised rules and then their automatic enforcement. 
The work is still at an initial stage and hence the details of the procedure or findings are 
currently not available.  
 
Wu et al. (Wu, Ahn and Hu 2012) propose a framework to determine whether the policies of a 
health care system are compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) regulations. They first extract the policy patterns from both the HIPAA regulations 
and the local policies in a health care system to transform them into a formal representation. 
The formal representations are then transformed into a logic based representation using 
answer set programming (ASP). For compliance checking, they apply the same request to the 
two policies and if the effects are the same then the local policy is compliant. If the effect of 
the health care system policy is allow and the effect of the HIPAA regulation is deny then this 
non-compliance case is less-constrained non-compliance. If the effect of the health care system 
policy is deny and the effect of the HIPAA regulation is allow then this non-compliance case is 
over-constrained non-compliance. 
 
Gopalan et al. (Gopalan, Anton and Doyle 2012) have presented a usage control model 
UCONLEGAL to express access and usage rules that they identified in HIPAA Privacy Rule. First a 
dataset is identified from the rules that govern access, use and disclosure of information. Then 
an inquiry driven approach is used to analyse the data set to identify the components of the 
Legal ACRs. Each statement of the data set is analysed by using inquiry questions to determine 
whether it grants or denies access, use or disclosure. The components in the Legal rules are 
identified that are not possible to present using the UCONABC (Park and Sandhu 2004) model 
and hence they proposed the UCONLEGAL model that accommodates those components. The 
UCONLEgAL components are identified using seven sections of the HIPAA privacy rules. Further 
study is needed to ensure the reliability of the methodology so that it can be repeated by 
others. Their methodology is a bit similar to ours, which is published earlier than theirs 
(Fatema, Chadwick and Van Alsenoy 2011), in a way that it first separates the Legal rules that 
are related to access control. We also have used methods like inquiry question to identify 
whether the rule expresses a condition on accessing a data item. However, their work focuses 
on analysing the Legal rules to express in the UCON system and proposes a modification of 
UCONABC to construct the UCONLEGAL system to express the Legal rules. On the contrary, our 
work focuses on obtaining attribute based enforceable access control rules, which we have 
implemented using XACML and PERMIS policy languages and installed into the P-PAAS 
authorisation system (using either a XACML or PERMIS PDP).  
 
Xiao et al. (Xiao, et al. 2012) have provided a procedure for automatic extraction of XACML 
Access Control Policy (ACP) from Natural Language (NL) software documents. Their approach 
consists of three steps: i) Linguistic Analysis: parses NL software documents and annotates 
sentences with semantic meanings for words and phrases. ii) Model-Instance construction: 
identifies subject, action, resource elements and effects and constructs ACP model instances 




based on that. Transformation: transformation of each ACP rule into XACML rule. Their 
approach is not suitable for extracting ACP from the EU DPD for two reasons: i) This approach 
works for software documents with ACP rules which follows a specific style [subject] 
[Can/can’t/ is allowed to][action][resources] whereas the language of the EU DPD is 
ambiguous, includes implicit information and is highly dependent on human judgment and 
interpretation.  
ii) Their approach identifies only the basic elements: subject, action, resource and those are 
transformed into XACML role, action-id and resource-id attributes and does not include any 
other type of attributes. Our constructed ACPs from the EU DPD are full of complex conditions 
on a number of different types of attributes which this system fails to incorporate in their ACP 
construction.  
 
Deontic logic, the logic of expressing pertaining to the obligations, permissions and rights of 
agents, has been proposed in legal knowledge representation (Jones and Sergot 1992, Ortalo 
1996). Deontic logic is concerned with the presentation and analysis of reasoning from the 
legal text to find the modal of a sentence i.e. whether it is an obligation, permission or right. 
However this complex analysis is not sufficient in identifying or formalising the enforceable 
conditions for which the agent is permitted or denied an action on an object. For example 
Deontic logic might be helpful in analysing whether Article 7. (c), “Personal data may be 
processed if processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject”, represents an obligation, permission or right by exposing the ambiguity 
of the meaning of the presented text. Besides, it cannot help to identify enforceable 
conditions from the legal texts. Finding or constructing an enforceable condition from a 
complex legal document human judgment is essential.  
 
In comparison, to all of the above our work is based on the analysis and extraction of rules 
from the EU DPD and converting these into executable policies (using both XACML and 
PERMIS PDPs) so that automated decisions can be obtained. To our knowledge no other work 
has been performed on obtaining all possible access control rules from the EU DPD to get 
automated access decisions on behalf of it.  
2.8 Conclusion  
From the literature review we conclude that none of the privacy protecting authorisation 
systems considered the need for having support for multiple policy languages, which our 
system does. Only one of the recent research projects (EnCoRe) has thought of having an 
access control policy from the law included in the system, but they did not mention how the 
policy from the law can be integrated with the other policies, or whether Legal policy will be 
given the highest priority or not. Moreover, they could not show how to obtain the policy from 
the law. Unlike P-PAAS no other previous privacy protecting authorisation system addresses 
the issues related to privileged access to personal data by individual parties, transfer of 
personal data based on certain conditions or access to personal data based on contract. 
Furthermore, none of the work considered combining obligations returned by various 
authorities. So far no other previous work has been done on obtaining access control rules 
from the EU DPD and other works related to the extraction of authorisation rules from 









An authorisation system provides decisions for who is allowed to perform what actions on 
what data. While designing an authorisation system that provides privacy of personal data we 
are aware of the following high level requirements: 
- The need to protect the privacy of the data subject (obviously). 
- The only data we are concerned about are personal data. 
- Data protection legislation should be adhered to. 
- The need to ensure the distributed enforcement of privacy policies so that when 
personal data are transferred between systems, the privacy policies can go with them. 
- We should build on previous knowledge, know-how and tools for authorisation system 
construction wherever possible in order to minimise the cost of building a privacy 
preserving authorisation system. 
When considering the legislative requirement, we need to decide which legislation should be 
adhered to, since we cannot assume that all countries have the same legislation. In this thesis, 
we have only concerned ourselves with the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC 
1995). Section 2.3.1 has already outlined the EU DPD requirements for a privacy protecting 
system. Applying these to the authorisation component of a system leads to the following 
requirements: 
- Access should only be granted if it is in line with the original purpose of collection. 
- The wishes of the data subject should be taken into account (informed consent). 
- Data subjects should have access to their own personal data, except under certain 
conditions. 
- Data subject should have control over their personal data, e.g. be allowed to object to 
the processing of personal data, request for update of data, ability to submit policy to 
protect access to his/her personal data.  
- Under certain conditions, the data subject should be informed when his personal data 
are accessed. 
- Certain privileged people should be given unrestricted access to personal data. 
- There should be special rules for transferring personal data from the EU to other 
countries. 
- Special access can be granted to personal data based on signed contracts between 
various parties.  
More information about the above requirements is given in Chapter 4 where the EU DPD is 
discussed in detail. 
 




Existing state of the art authorisation systems are policy based which enforce the policies of 
various stakeholders, providing they are all written in the same policy language. When conflicts 
arise between their policies, they have in-built conflict resolution mechanisms, which should 
provide a good basis for the construction of our privacy protecting authorisation system. 
However, they do not allow for policies specified in different languages, which we believe is 
essential as explained in Section 2.3.1. and 3.2. Most previous work has concentrated on adding 
user policies to the system, but no prior work has attempted to translate the EU DPD into an 
authorisation policy, and resolve conflicts between this and the user or controller policies. In 
addition, no previous work has attempted to integrate authorisation decision making with 
contract validation. 
  
In this research work, an authorisation system has been designed that is capable of satisfying 
the above requirements. This chapter presents the design of the Privacy-Protecting Advanced 
Authorisation System (P-PAAS).  
3.2 Assumptions 
The conceptual model of P-PAAS is designed based on some assumptions which are listed 
here: 
1. A one size fits all policy language is not suitable for constructing policies satisfying all types 
of requirements.  
 
Justification: Today we have many examples of different policy languages e.g. XACMLv2 
(XACMLv2 2005), XACMLv3 (XACMLv3 2013), PERMIS (Chadwick, et al. 2008), P3P (W3C 2002), 
Keynote (Blaze, Feigenbaum and Ioannidis 1999), EPAL (Ni, et al. 2007), DPAL (Barth, Mitchell 
and Rosenstein 2004) etc. and hence many different PDP implementations. For example, 
XACMLv2 does not support delegation of authority whilst XACMLv3 and PERMIS do. The 
XACML policy language assumes a stateless PDP and hence cannot support state based policy 
rules such as separation of duties (SoD), whilst PERMIS is state based and can support both 
dynamic and static SoD. Keynote, on the other hand, uses the same language to describe both 
credentials and policy rules whereas none of the other policy languages does this. P3P is 
designed specifically to express privacy policies, whereas most of the other policy languages 
are designed as access control or authorisation policy languages. EPAL was also specifically 
designed for privacy policies. EPAL uses sequential semantics that makes it consistent, but it 
does not provide guaranteed safety, local reasoning (i.e. the ability to express a statement 
that needs to be enforced by all policies) or logical combinations of policies whereas DPAL 
provides local reasoning and logical combination (Barth, Mitchell and Rosenstein 2004).  
 
2. Recipient organisations have to be trusted to a certain extent to handle the received 
personal data.  
 
Justification: If recipient organisations were not trusted at all to handle personal data, then we 
would need a DRM system or similar to pass the personal data to them. Even then, no DRM 
system has been invented that is hack proof and so ultimately they have to rely on legal 
measures to prosecute offenders who abuse the data given to them. The alternative model we 
adopt is that recipient organisations can be trusted to handle personal data, providing they 




have the proper tools to help them. If a sender does not trust a recipient then we assume they 
will simply not send any personal data to them. The trust we place in the recipient 
organisation, is that it will evaluate any incoming sticky policy, and if it knows it can obey it, it 
will accept the personal data, otherwise it will refuse to accept the data (since it will not want 
to break the law by violating the policy). A sender trusts some entities and not others. For 
those it trusts, it only trusts them to give an honest answer as to whether it can or is able to 
enforce the sticky policy. If it can it will accept the data, and if not it will refuse to accept the 
data. 
 
3. We assume that the law is paramount, and that it must always be obeyed. Thus legal policies 
must override all other conflicting policies. 
 
Justification: We assume that no organisation wants to be prosecuted for breaking the law as 
this will badly affect its reputation and ultimately its bottom line. 
 
4. We assume that implementers will want a simple way of integrating a privacy protecting 
authorisation system into their applications, and that most will not want to be locked into any 
commercial software supplier via proprietary interfaces or protocols. 
 
Justification.  If a privacy protecting authorisation system remains independent from any 
application and can communicate using a standard protocol it eases the process of integrating 
the authorisation system with applications. This will inspire the organisations to adopt the 
authorisation system with their already existing applications.  
 5. We assume that developers are willing to develop their applications to conform to 
appropriate standards.  
 
Justification.  Having an application that conforms to standards makes it easier to mix and 
match components, and avoids lock in to proprietary interfaces. Consequently we will design 
our system to conform to appropriate standards where at all possible. 
 
6. We assume that applications will uniquely identify their protected resources.  
 
Justification.  This is a reasonable assumption to make, since applications need to be able to 
differentiate between their protected resources. 
 
3.3 Conceptual Model  
At the highest level of abstraction the P-PAAS can be seen to comprise an application 
independent conceptual component, namely the authorisation service (see Figure 3.1) and an 
application dependent component called the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) that calls the 
authorisation service. Even though the authorisation service comprises a complex set of 
functional components, it remains a black box to the application PEP. The P-PAAS further 
comprises a newly added component, the Contract Validation Service (CVS) for aiding the 




validation of contract based access to personal data. In this section the overall structure of the 
P-PAAS system is described.    
3.3.1 Application dependent PEP / PEP 
According to the ISO standard (ISO 1996) the PEP (which is named as the AEF in (ISO 1996)) is 
application dependent. Similar to the ISO standard, in P-PAAS it receives the access request 
(step 0 of Figure 3.1) and passes it to the authorisation service for an access decision (step 2 of 
Figure 3.1). The PEP also optionally calls the Contract Validation Service (ConVS) when it 
receives a request with a contract (discussed in Section 3.3.3). It also retrieves the resource 
attributes for a requested resource and adds those attributes to the request context before 
passing that to the authorisation service (step 1 of Figure 3.1). More about the resource 
attributes is discussed in Chapter 4.  When the PEP receives a decision from the authorisation 
service it enforces that decision by either allowing the user to access the requested resource 
(when the decision is a Grant) or by denying the access otherwise.  When a response along 
with an obligation is received, it executes the application dependent obligation by calling the 
obligations service. 
The PEP acts as an interface between the user and the protected resource. A privacy 
protecting authorisation system essentially deals with personal data and policies for 
protecting the personal data. It is not expected that the user is aware of the available policy 
languages or can write a policy with those languages. Therefore, a person needs to be 
provided with an easily usable interface to input his/her preferences or choices and these 
preferences need to be converted into the actual machine executable policies. The preference 
options provided (via an interface) to the user depend on the data the system handles and the 
functionalities of the application. For example, a hospital deals with medical data and may 
provide an interface for the user to choose the Medical Professional/s s/he wants to share 
his/her data with, whether s/he wants to allow medical students to read his/her data and so on. 
The provided options would be different for an organisation dealing with other types of 
personal data, such as personal blogs or CVs. This is due to the fact that the potential 
requester for accessing that data would be different. The application handling the policy 
preference interface converts the user’s chosen options into machine executable policies and 
the user’s request (provided via the interface) into a standard format which the authorisation 
service will understand. It then sends those to the authorisation service via the PEP. Some 
examples of converting the preference options into executable policies are given in Chapter 5.   
3.3.2 Authorisation service 
At the highest level of abstraction, we propose a conceptual model that comprises a 
standalone authorisation web service that makes authorisation decisions for remote 
applications. The authorisation web service should talk a standardised protocol so that 
different applications can interact with different authorisation services from different 
suppliers. The authorisation service should support many different policy languages, since 
there is no single ubiquitous authorisation policy language (see assumption 1).   
The authorisation service should provide support to applications for sticky policies, by 
analysing any incoming sticky policies and informing the application whether the policies can 




be enforced or not. This allows the application (owner) to conform to our trust assumption 
(see assumption 2). The authorisation service should relieve applications from the burden of 
having to store and retrieve sticky policies and should do it on their behalf, since this will make 
it easier to integrate sticky policies into applications (see assumption 4). The authorisation 
service should return all applicable sticky policies to the application when the associated data 
are to be transferred to another location.  
To provide privacy of personal data, the authorisation service needs to integrate the policies of 
all the authorities who have any control over the data. Therefore in this system we have 
considered four different types of authorities for any personal data – 
a. Law: Access to any personal data item needs to be protected by the relevant 
legislative rules. Consequently, the legislative rules related to accessing personal data need to 
be converted into machine executable authorisation rules and are then considered as 
authorisation rules from the “law”.  
b. Data subject: The data subject of any personal data is the person about whom 
the data reveal information. The data subject may have his/her own policy. 
c. Issuer: The issuer of any personal data is the entity who issues the data. For 
example, a doctor is the issuer of a medical record, the university authority is the issuer of a 
university degree and a person is the issuer of personal choice or statement such as his/her 
favourite drink. The issuer can also be identified by a role instead of a specific identity of a 
person. 
d. Controller: The system that is holding the personal data and controlling the 
flow of the personal data is the controller. The policies of the controller are, in fact, the policies 
of the administrator of a traditional authorisation system and these also need to be integrated 
with the policies from the other authorities. A data processor processes data on behalf of the 
controller and does not control the flow of data like a controller. Hence the processor is not 
considered as a policy authority.  
 
In our system the policies of the different authors remain independent of each other and are 
independently evaluated. This separation helps to enforce them in a distributed system, when 
they are transferred as “sticky policies” to other systems along with the data they control. The 
receiving system does not need to employ complex processing algorithms in order to create 
an integrated complex “super” policy from the received policies and the organisation’s own 
policy; it only needs to start an independent PDP (Fatema and Chadwick 2014). Furthermore, 
Having a separate Legal PDP offers some advantages, including: a) it helps to make sure that 
the legal policy always gets preference over any other policies; b) when personal data move 
from one legal domain to another, this separation will help to integrate the new legal rules just 
by replacing the legal PDP without manually integrating the policies of the new domain. 
 
Finally, the authorisation service should have a well-defined dynamic conflict resolution 
strategy in order to determine the ultimate authorisation decision to be returned to the 
application, should multiple policies that give conflicting decisions apply to any authorisation 
decision request. This is further described in Section 3.4. 
 
At the next level of abstraction we look inside the authorisation service black box to determine 




its conceptual set of functional components and the mechanism for sticky policy enforcement 
and distributed enforcement of policy.  
3.3.2.1 Application Independent PEP (AIPEP) 
Since the PEP and authorisation service are remote from each other, there needs to be a 
protocol handler that can receive the protocol message from the PEP and: 
- extract any attached sticky policy and put it in a sticky policy store,  
- ensure that there is an embedded PDP that can evaluate this sticky policy (i.e. supports 
the particular policy language.) If not, an “unsupported policy language” error 
message will need to be sent to the application, 
- extract the user’s credentials and pass them to a credential validation service for 
validating,  
- extract the authorisation decision request and give it to an embedded PDP for an 
authorisation decision. 
We have called this protocol handling component the application independent PEP (AIPEP) 
since it acts on behalf of all applications and calls the embedded PDP(s) on behalf of the 
application.  
From the PEP’s point of view, the AIPEP is a remote PDP, accessible via a standard secure 
protocol, and from the embedded PDP’s point of view, the AIPEP is a normal (local) PEP.  
 
In the privacy preserving scenario where the data subject should provide his/her own privacy 
policy, the policy needs to be passed dynamically along with the decision request to the 
authorisation server. The data subject, or the PEP acting on her behalf, should not need to 
access the policy store (or PAP) of the authorisation server to do this. Instead, a standard 
protocol for communicating with the authorisation service should ensure that it is capable of 
carrying this policy along with the request context. The implementation options for this are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The AIPEP is intended to reduce the burden on the application developers by handling as many 
application independent functions as possible. Consequently, it performs the application 
independent obligations (step 11 of Figure 3.1) so that the application developers remain free 
from the responsibility of enforcing those obligations. 
 
The application programmable interface (API) between the AIPEP and embedded PDPs should 
be standardised if possible, so that different PDPs that support different policy languages can 
be embedded into the authorisation server. Different implementations of the same policy 
language PDP can also be embedded with this design, as some implementations may be 
quicker or less resource intensive than others. In chapter 5 we look at the different 
alternatives for this standard API. Suffice to note here that since we propose to use a 
standardised PDP API, then it either cannot pass a policy (since there are numerous different 
policy languages and no ubiquitous standard policy language) or it must have an extensible 
way of referring to them, for example, by using the ASN.1 “any” or XML “string” construct. We 
propose to adopt the former approach, so that a policy will never be carried across the AIPEP-
PDP (Master PDP) API. Therefore another function of the AIPEP is to ensure that the 
embedded PDPs are initialised with the correct policies that are needed to handle the current 




authorisation decision request before the request is passed to them. Since there are a number 




Figure 3-1. P-PAAS infrastructure 
 
3.3.2.2 Master PDP 
An authorisation decision request may require a number of different policies to be evaluated, 
possibly written in different policy languages by different authorities, so this raises the 
necessity to have a well-defined conflict resolution strategy. Since the dynamic conflict 
resolution strategy of the system demands a broader description it is described fully in a 
separate section, in Section 3.4.  Suffice to say here, that we model this in terms of a Master 
PDP that dynamically determines the conflict resolution rule to use for the current 
authorisation decision request, and then sequentially calls multiple PDPs, each being capable 
of working with one specific policy language (step 8 of Figure 3-1), obtains their authorisation 
decisions (step 9 of Figure 3-1), and then resolves any conflicts, before returning the overall 
authorisation decision and any resulting obligations to the AIPEP (in step 10 of Figure 3-1). 
Consequently, the AIPEP will only interface with the Master PDP, and will delegate the task of 
multiple policy evaluation to it. The API for the Master PDP – PDP communication will be the 
same as the API for the AIPEP-Master PDP interface. 
When the Master PDP returns the final authorisation decision to the AIPEP, this decision may 
be accompanied by a number of obligations. The AIPEP passes these obligations to an 
obligations service for evaluation. Any outstanding obligations that have not been evaluated 
by the obligations service will be passed back to the application along with the authorisation 




decision response, for it to evaluate them. These obligations may be written in a number of 
different policy languages since they will have been generated by different PDPs. Providing 
each obligation clearly indicates its policy language, the appropriate obligation handler can be 
called. The Master PDP further provides a mechanism for obligation co-ordination which 
allows integrating obligations returned by multiple PDPs. The details are provided in Section 
3.4.3.2.       
3.3.2.3 Credential Validation Service (CVS) 
The CVS is a component responsible for validating a set of credentials of a subject according to 
a credential validation policy which is usually provided by the Policy Administration Point 
(PAP). This policy tells it which credentials are valid, in terms of who the trusted attribute 
authorities (AAs) are, the maximum set of attributes each can issue and which attributes each 
is trusted to issue to which groups of users. The credentials are issued by multiple dynamic 
attribute authorities of different domains. The functionality of the CVS is like the XACML 
component Policy Information Point (PIP) which acts as a “source of attribute values”. The 
idea of the CVS was introduced in the PERMIS project prior to the start of the research 
presented in this thesis and is described in detail in (Chadwick, et al. 2008, Chadwick and Su 
2009). For a given set of validation policy and credentials the CVS returns a set of locally valid 
attributes.  
The CVS is called by the AIPEP (step3 of Figure 3.1) for validating credentials. The CVS can work 
in pull, push or push-and-pull mode. Pull mode means that the requester does not have any 
credentials and requires the CVS to pull the credentials from the remote authorities. Push 
mode means that the WS-Trust request message contains the full set of credentials which are 
to be validated by the CVS. Push-and-pull mode, as its name implies, requests the CVS to 
validate the credentials in the request message and pull any further credentials that it can find 
for the subject of the authorisation decision query.  
3.3.2.4 Obligations service 
One important mechanism for ensuring privacy is to provide a way for enforcing obligations 
associated to a privacy policy. Obligations are the actions that must be performed when a 
certain event occurs; therefore when the event is an authorisation decision, the obligations are 
actions that must be performed before, after, or along with the enforcement of the 
authorisation decision, as defined in (Chadwick, Su and Laborde 2008). An example of before 
obligation can be to increase the amount of logging before a user is given access to monitor 
what s/he is doing or to ask for the consent of the data subject before granting access to 
personal data. An example of with obligation is to decrement the user’s balance 
simultaneously with the user's access to the system for withdrawing money. An example of 
after obligation can be to send an email to the data subject notifying his/her data have been 
accessed. 
 
Many obligations are application specific, such as, an obligation to charge the customer a fee if 
s/he goes overdrawn on his/her current account. However, some obligations can be 
implemented in an application independent way, for example, recording the authorisation 
decision in a secure audit trail, or emailing the security administrator that a certain decision has 




been made. Each obligation should have a unique identity. At the time of construction, the 
obligations service is configured with the set of obligation IDs it can support. When passed a 
set of obligations by the AIPEP, the obligations service walks through this list and calls the 
appropriate application independent obligation service. If all obligations are processed 
successfully, a success result is returned. Each of the application independent obligations must 
be of temporal type before; otherwise they cannot be enacted by the AIPEP. This is because 
the AIPEP only gets invoked in advance of the PEP enforcing its decision and is inactive after 
the actual enforcement has taken place. 
3.3.2.5 Sticky policy enforcement 
To enforce privacy based on the policies of various authorities we need to make sure that the 
policies are stuck with the data within the system so that the relevant policies are enforced 
while making an authorisation decision to access a resource. Hence there is a need to maintain 
a link between the data and the policies.  
Policy store: The policy store is the location where policies can be safely stored and retrieved. 
If the store is trusted then policies can be placed there in an unsecured manner. Otherwise 
policies need to be protected e.g. digitally signed and/or encrypted, to ensure that they remain 
confidential and are not tampered with. Each policy has an identity, the policy identity (PID). 
The AIPEP can use the PID when asking either the PDP/CVS factory to spawn a new PDP/CVS or 
the sticky store (described in the next section) to stick this policy to some personal data. This 
design clearly separates the implementation details of the policy store from the rest of the 
infrastructure, and allows different types of policy store to be constructed e.g. built on an 
LDAP directory or RDBMS. 
Sticky store: The sticky store holds the mapping between the policies and the resources to 
which they are stuck. This is a many to many mapping so that one policy can apply to many 
resources, and one resource can have many sticky policies applied to it. The design requires 
that each PID is globally unique so that when a sticky policy is moved from one system to 
another, the receiver can determine if it needs to analyse each policy or not. Already known 
PIDs do not need to be analysed, whereas unknown PIDs need to be evaluated to ensure that 
they can be supported, otherwise the incoming data and sticky policy are rejected. Each 
resource protected by the system has a locally unique resource identity (RID). When the PEP 
passes a request for storing a resource to the AIPEP, it also passes the RID along with the 
policy. The AIPEP stores the policy in the policy store and the RID along with the PID in the 
sticky store. While passing an authorisation request for accessing a resource, the PEP passes 
the RID of the requested resource to the AIPEP (for it to retrieve the PID stuck with the RID).  
Sticky policy contents: To combine the privacy policy and the private data together the 
concept of stickyPAD is proposed which is a combination of a sticky policy (or a set of sticky 
policy) and the data to which the policy applies. The schema of the stickyPAD is presented in 
Chapter 5.  Different kinds of sticky policy are defined in (Chadwick and Fatema 2009).  
Sticky transfer mechanism: Prior research focussed on different methods for enforcing sticky 
polices (Chadwick and Lievens 2008). Three methods for enforcing sticky policy have been 
proposed as- Application Protocol Enhancement Model, Encapsulating Security Layer Model 




and Back Channel Model. Some applications, for example S/MIME, are already able to attach 
data and policy, and hence are capable of forming a StickyPAD. When the PEP receives a 
message to be sent to a remote PEP, it parses the message and sends the extracted 
information to the AIPEP who passes the request to PDP. If the PDP grants the request it 
optionally returns an obligation to the AIPEP which tells the AIPEP what policy should be sent 
with the outgoing message. The AIPEP enforces the obligation and makes the policy packet to 
send with the outgoing message and passes to the PEP with the decision returned by the PDP, 
the PEP then attaches the policy packet with the data in an application dependent way and 
sends to the remote PEP, where the remote PEP can parse the received packet and extract 
policy and message to pass to the AIPEP and the AIPEP may also update the PDP policy to 
carry out the same policy.  
3.3.2.6 Distributed enforcement of policies  
 
Figure 3-2. Flow of data when a remote third party requests access to a resource 
Prior research on distributed enforcement of sticky policy of Mont et al. (Mont et al 2003 A, 
Mont et al. 2003 B) has focused on the problem of ensuring that personal data are only 
disclosed to trusted remote parties. This is achieved by encrypting a sticky policy along with 
the personal data before sending that to the other parties, and only distributing the decryption 
keys if they were trusted. However, the authors have admitted that their solution only helps to 
mitigate against the risk of unauthorised access to the data whilst it is shared encrypted to the 
remote party, but does nothing to ensure enforcement of the sticky policy. Once the data are 
disclosed it is not possible to control the misuse of that. We would argue that the complex 




procedure of encrypted sticky policy distribution is both unnecessary and insufficient, and 
does not solve the problem of the recipient obeying the policy of the sender. If the remote site 
is trusted, encryption is not necessary, since it can be trusted to store its own data securely in 
whatever way it wants to. If it is not trusted, then it may ignore the sticky policy after the 
decryption has taken place, since their procedure does not provide any way to make sure the 
obtained sticky policy is enforced. Instead, we have proposed an alternative mechanism that 
ensures that a trusted recipient obeys the sender’s sticky policy. To do this, we use an 
obligation based protocol for the distributed enforcement of sticky policy. In our mechanism, 
if the remote system is not trusted, and by this we mean is not running a P-PAAS conformant 
system, then it is not be sent anything. If it is trusted, then the sticky policy is sent to it 
(unencrypted) along with an obligation to start a PDP. The authorisation system only allows 
the receipt and storing of the personal data if the obligation to start a PDP with the received 
policy can be enforced i.e. it knows that it supports the policy language, has a PDP for this, and 
also has implemented the obligations. If the receiving authorisation system knows that it 
cannot enforce the incoming policy, then it denies the incoming request and never receives 
the private data. Our protocol for distributed enforcement of sticky policy is described below.  
When an application wishes to transfer a user’s personal data, the holding application service 
intercepts the request and makes an authorisation decision query to the authorisation service 
asking if this application has permission to transfer (or other access mode depending upon the 
client’s request) the data identified by its unique RID. The authorisation decision request for 
transferring personal data becomes “Does this third party have permission to retrieve the data 
identified by this unique RID?” When the subordinate PDPs are asked if the third party is 
allowed to retrieve the personal data, then along with each Grant decision there is a “before” 
obligation which instructs the authorisation system to retrieve the PDP’s policy from the sticky 
store and return it to the application service, together with a “with” obligation which requires 
the PEP to put this sticky policy in the relevant application protocol field along with the 
personal data. Once the third party’s authorisation system receives the response, the 
application extracts the sticky policy(ies) and passes this/these to the authorisation 
infrastructure service along with the authorisation decision request“can this third party 
receive this data item into its data store, using this policy(ies) in conjunction with the existing 
policies”.  Eventually, all the relevant policies (including the data subject’s one) are evaluated. 
The data subject’s policy (at least) requires the third party to store and enforce the subject’s 
policy, and this causes a “before” obligation to be returned to the AIPEP, which ensures that 
the sticky policy is safely stored in the authorisation infrastructure before returning Grant to 
the receiving application. If the receiving authorisation infrastructure is not able to enforce the 
sticky policy then the application is denied permission to receive the personal data.  
3.3.3 Contract Validation Service  
A component Contract Validation Service (ConVS) is added to the P-PAAS in order to validate a 
digital contract, which is an agreement between the parties and is signed by the agreeing 
parties. The concept of contract came from the idea of enforcement of some Legal rules of the 
EU DPD (Directive 95/46/EC 1995) which allows access to personal data when it is necessary for 
the performance of a contract and the data subject is a party of the contract (Article 7 (b)). It 
also allows transfer of personal data to a non-EU country or a country that does not have an 




adequate level of protection to personal data if there is a contract between the data subject 
and the controller or between the controller and a third party which is concluded in the 
interests of the data subject (Article 26.1 (b) and (c)). Nowhere in the literature have we seen 
to address this important issue to automate the contract based access to personal data which 
the law has specified. Here we present the ConVS component which helps to automate the 
contract based access to personal data and we show how to integrate it with the authorisation 
system.  We have shown a way to automate the authorisation of contract based access to 
personal data with the help of the ConVS component and the Legal PDP rules (presented in 
Chapter 4) which allow access to personal data based on contracts. The validation of such 
authorisation scenarios are presented in Chapter 5 along with the request contexts presented 
in the Appendix 5. 
Here are some examples of the use cases of contract based access to personal data.  
1. Data subject has a contract with a third party, e.g., Mr. M signs a contract with a health 
insurance company (HIC) to let HIC access the summary of treatment information and the 
billing information at X Medical Centre. Both Mr. M and HIC are the parties of the contract and 
sign it (a representative officer actually signs on behalf of HIC). The contract also mentions the 
data (treatment information or billing information) that is allowed to be processed due to the 
contract and also mentions the employee of HIC as an authorised requester so that only the 
employee can access the personal data.  
2. Data subject has a contract with the data controller, e.g., Mr. M signs a membership contract 
with a gym GetFit to pay £25 monthly for the next 12 months and provides his name, address 
and bank details. The gym has appointed a financial service provider company SafeCollect for 
collecting the membership fees monthly from the members’ accounts. The membership 
contract of Mr. M with GetFit mentions that the employee of the organisation SafeCollect is an 
authorised requester to let the employee of SafeCollect access Mr. M’s personal data (name, 
address and bank details) to ensure timely collection of payments. The company SafeCollect is 
passed a copy of the contract or the contract’s unique identifier which the employee can use 
while requesting access to personal data mentioned in the contract. In this case, the controller 
itself is a party so it can store the signed contract or information from the validated contract in 
its repository. 
3. Data controller has a contract with a third party, e.g. there is a contract between a health 
care centre and each of the registered pharmacies to access the prescriptions of patients for 
providing medicines. The contract indicates what type of data (prescription) is allowed to be 
accessed by the authorised requester (employee of the registered pharmacy) by this contract. 
The validation of the use cases for the contract based access to personal data are presented in 
Chapter 5.  
3.3.3.1 Construction of the signed contract  
A contract is an agreement between parties. Therefore, a contract needs to define the terms 
and conditions on which the parties have agreed, which we call the contract document, and 
the signatures of the parties as a proof of their agreement on the defined terms and condition. 




All the parties have to sign on the same contract document. The contract document and 
signatures of the parties over that form the full signed contract.  Each contract needs to have a 
globally unique identity which also needs to be mentioned in the signed contract and the 
signatures, in order to verify the signatures have been done on the same contract document. In 
order to provide globally unique identify for the contract document a URL can be used since it 
not only provides a unique identity to the contract document but also provides a way to access 
a document remotely.  All the parties sign over the contents of the contract document with 
their own keys. The URL and the digest of the contract document become a part of the digital 
signatures and are used while validating the contract. The URL of the contract document and 
the signatures by all the parties over the contract document together form the signed 
contract.  The process of constructing the signed contract is described in Figure 3-3. All the 
parties have access to the signed contract which they can use for validation while accessing 
data based on that contract. The schema of the signed contract is given in Chapter 5. Various 
implementation options for the contract document and the signature methods are also 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Figure 3-3. Construction of the signed contract 
3.3.3.2 Construction of the contract document  
Before defining the schema of the contract document we need to analyse the components 
needed in a contract document. Here we rationalise the attributes that we need for the 
contract document. 
The contract document ideally needs to identify who is allowed to access what data based on 




the contract. Hence the contract document needs to identify the resource. Using a locally 
unique resource ID (RID, as mentioned in 3.3.2.5) would not be ideal in this case. To allow it to 
identify a personal data regardless of local identity of the resource the ResourceType (which 
identifies the type of the resource that is being allowed to be processed by this contract) and 
the SubjectOfContract (which identifies the subject whose data are being allows to be 
processed by the contract) are used. For example, to identify Mr. M’s account information in a 
system holding different types of personal data, it firstly needs to determine which person’s 
data is being identified and then the type of data. Hence the SubjectOfContract (e.g. the 
identifying attributes of Mr. M) and the ResourceType (e.g. account information) can identify a 
particular personal data without knowing the local resource identifier (RID) of the data. Note 
that, as IdentifyingAttributes of a person a set of attributes can be used, such as {{name} and 
{address}}, {NHS number}, {{role} and {organisation}}, {e-mail address}. If the 
SubjectOfContract element is absent in the contract document, the contract allows access to 
the type of resource mentioned in ResourceType in general. 
The contract needs to identify who is authorised to access the resource by the contract. Hence 
an attribute named AuthorisedRequester is used which contains the identifying attributes of 
the persons who are allowed to process data due to the contract. The resource type 
mentioned in the contract is allowed to be processed only by the AuthorisedRequester. This 
makes sure that no other person can access a personal data item just by presenting a contract, 
to access the mentioned data the requester has to be an AuthorisedRequester.  
The digital signature only tells who individually has signed the contract. To identify the parties 
of the contract, i.e. who are authorised to sign the contract, the identities of the parties also 
need to be mentioned in the contract document so that no one can simply present a contract 
signed by him/herself and get access to the data. If only signature verification is used anyone 
could sign over a contract and would get access to the data. Therefore, an element named 
PartyOfContract is used in the contract document that contains the identifying information of 
the parties, which consists of SignerOfContract and IdentifyingAttributesOfParty. Since a 
digital signature can only contain the Distinguishing Name (DN) of the signer the contract 
should contain the DN which is used to check if that of the contract and the signature matches 
to prove that the signer mentioned in the contract has signed it. Hence the SignerOfContract 
element contains a DN element which is of string type but its format should be of X.500 
format. The signer of the contract can be the party himself (e.g. the data subject himself can 
be a party) or the signer can be an authorised person signing on behalf of an organisation (e.g. 
the authority of a bank can sign on behalf of the bank). The SignerOfContract element can 
contain an optional OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner to indicate the identifying attributes of 
the signer other than the DN. For example, if the data subject is identified by his/her NHS 
number to a health care system and has signed a contract with the health insurance company 
the data subject needs to mention the NHS number as an OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner 
element. The ConVS matches the DN mentioned in the contract’s DN element with that of the 
digital signature to authenticate the person as a SignerOfContract, and the NHS number 
mentioned as the OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner is used to identify the person as a data 
subject in the health care system.  
The other element, IdentifyingAttributesOfParty is an optional element which contains the 




attributes of the party in cases where the party is an organisation, and the signer signed the 
contract on their behalf. For example, an authority of a bank signs on behalf of the bank. In 
this case the DN element of the SignerOfContract has the DN of the signer (i.e. the DN of the 
bank authority), OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner has the other identifying attributes of the 
signer such as the role and organisation of the authority (i.e. the role of the authority who 
signed the contract and the name of the bank as the organisation) and the 
IdentifyingAttributesOfParty contains the identity of the organisation (e.g. the name and 
address of the bank).  
Last but not the least each contract should mention a validity time. Therefore, each contract 
document has a ValidityTime which comprises a StartDate and an EndDate. The contract is not 
valid before the StartDate or beyond the EndDate. The schema of the contract document is 
presented in Chapter 5.  
3.3.3.3 Validation of contracts 
While requesting access to personal data based on a contract, the requester can either provide 
the signed contract or the unique identifier if the system already has the contract in its 
repository (e.g., when the controller itself is a party or when a previous request has been made 
with the same contract the system should already have a copy). The system can validate a 
signed contract with the ConVS when it receives that for the first time and can store the 
retrieved information from the ConVS in the repository. Next time when a request comes with 
the same contract identifier it does not need to validate it again and can use the information 
from the repository. When the controller is a party of the contract, it also validates the signed 
copy to make sure the other parties have signed before storing the information in the 
repository. 
The signed contract containing the URL of the contract document and the signatures of the 
parties over the contract document is passed to the ConVS. The validation process of the 
ConVS consists of four steps as mentioned in Figure 3-4. These are as follows- 
i) Validation of URL: The contract document is presented in a URL reference. All the 
signing parties sign the contents referred to by the URL and the URL is also mentioned in the 
signature element (W3CXMLSignature 2008). The ConVS first checks whether the signatures 
are done on the same content i.e. all the signatures have the same URL mentioned in it. If the 
URLs mentioned in the signatures are not the same, it would mean that the signatures are not 
done on the same content and so an error message is returned by the ConVS. 
ii) Validation of schema: The schema of the contract document obtained from the URL 
reference is matched against the schema of the contract document. If they don’t match an 
error message is returned by the ConVS since it would mean all the essential elements of the 
contract document are not present.  
  






Figure 3-4. Flow chart of ConVS 
iii) Validation of parties: The digital signature only tells who individually has signed the 
contract. To identify the parties of the contract, i.e. who are authorised to sign the contract, 
the identities of the parties are mentioned in the contract document and the ConVS checks the 
signer of the contract is in fact authorised to sign the contract. This checks if the DN of each of 
the signer is also mentioned in the SignerOfContract (as a part of the PartyOfContract) of the 
contract document. The digital signature’s DN element is matched with the DN of the signer of 
contract SignerOfContract. If any of the signers is not mentioned in a SignerOfContract 
element then an error message will be returned by the ConVS. 
iv) Validation of signatures: This portion determines the core validation of signature in 
the following two steps as mentioned in the W3C standard (W3CXMLSignature 2008). 
Reference/ Contract document validation 
a. Obtains the content from the URL of the actual contract document. 
b. Digest the resulting data object using the digest method specified in the 
signature.  
c. Compare the generated digest value against digest value present in the signature; 
if there is any mismatch, validation fails and returns error message. 
Signature validation 
a.  Obtains the keying information element of the signature. 




b.  The signature is verified using the signature method and the keying information 
to confirm the signature is done over contract document.  
If the validation passes all the above steps the ConVS returns the validity time, resource type 
and the identifying attributes of the subject of contract, authorised requesters, and all the 
parties of the contract. The PEP can format the received information according to its need and 
can store for a later use when sending to the authorisation service for authorisation. 
3.3.3.4 How a request based on a contract is validated  
The PEP has a contract repository containing information obtained from the validated 
contracts. When the PEP gets an access request with a signed contract or a unique identifier it 
first checks with the contract identifier whether it has already been validated and the 
information from the contract is present in the contract repository. If the contract has not 
been validated before (i.e. the information is not present in the repository) and it is passed the 
copy of the signed contract it calls the ConVS for validating the contract. If it validates, the 
ConVS passes the information from the contract back to the PEP, which stores it in the 
repository. The PEP then formats this information as environment attributes and adds this to 
the request context as described in Section 5.2 and appendix 7. 
  
 Figure 3-5. How PEP works with ConVS to validate a contract based access 
request 
If the contract has not been validated before (i.e. the contract information is not present in the 
repository) and it is passed only a contract identifier and not a signed copy it just passes the 




request context to the AIPEP ignoring the contract and does not add the contract information. 
The flow chart of Figure 3-5 shows how the PEP uses the ConVS for the validation of a request 
to access a personal data item based on a contract.  
If it passes all the four validation steps of the ConVS as mentioned above the PEP receives 
information such as validity time, resource type, identifying attributes of the subject of 
contract, authorised requesters and the parties of the contract. The PEP then purses the 
response provided by the ConVS and forms attributes of the standard request element for 
authorisation service to understand and adds that to the original request context. The PEP also 
adds the resource attributes of the requested resource to the request context. The resource 
attributes contain information such as resource type, identifying attributes of the data subject 
and so on. It also passes the identifying attributes of the authorised signer (discussed in 
Section 3.3.3.6) of the controller as environment attributes to the request context before 
sending it to the AIPEP. Based on the request context the PDPs provide decisions and these 
are combined into one decision by the Master PDP. However, if an error is returned by the 
ConVS the PEP simply passes the request context to the next level (i.e. to AIPEP) ignoring the 
contract. 
3.3.3.5 How to determine the data subject is a party of a contract 
The EU DPD allows access to personal data based on a contract which is performed either with 
data subject or with the controller (as can be seen from the noted articles in 3.3.3). When the 
data subject is a party of a contract and has signed it, the DN of the data subject is mentioned 
as a DN element in the SignerOfContract element (as a part of the PartyOfContract) of the 
contract document. The other identifying attributes of the data subject (e.g. NHS number) are 
mentioned as the OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner. For each personal data item the 
identifying attributes of the data subject are stored as resource attributes and when a request 
for a data item is received all the identifying attributes of the data subject are passed to the 
request context by the PEP. The policies in the PDP (specifically the Legal PDP) match the 
attributes mentioned in the OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner with the data subject’s 
identifying attributes passed with the request context to identify him/her as a party of the 
contract.  
3.3.3.6 How to determine the controller is a party of a contract 
A controller is usually an organisation that holds the personal data and controls the flow of 
that data. When the controller is a party of a contract an authority of the controller signs the 
contract with his/her DN on behalf of the controller and that DN is mentioned as a DN element 
in the SignerOfContract (as a part of PartyOfContract) of the contract document. Any other 
optional identifying attributes of the signer are mentioned in the OtherIdentifyingAttributes-
OfSigner element (as a part of PartyOfContract). The IdentifyingAttributesOfParty is only used 
when the signer has signed the contract on behalf of an organisation and it contains the 
identifying attributes of the organisation such as the name and address. The PEP of the 
controller has a list of identifying attributes of the authorities of the controller who are 
authorised to sign a contract on behalf of the controller organisation. These identifying 
attributes of the authorised signer of the controller are passed as environment attributes with 
the request context by the PEP and are matched with the identifying attributes mentioned in 




the OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner elements to identify the controller as a party of the 
contract. 
3.4 Dynamic Conflict Resolution 
The P-PAAS infrastructure includes policies from multiple authorities such as the law, the 
issuer, data subject and controller (who is currently holding and controlling the flow of the 
data). A strategy that combines all these policies into a single ‘super’ policy may not be 
suitable for all situations, and such an example scenario is presented here. We propose a 
dynamic conflict resolution strategy that can integrate the decisions of the policy decision 
points (PDPs) evaluating the policies provided by the various parties. Using XACML (XACMLv2 
2005, XACMLv3 2013), due to its static policy / policy set combining algorithm, it is not always 
sufficient to satisfy the policy needs of an organisation where multiple parties provide their 
own individual policies. Different conflict resolution strategies are often required for different 
situations. Thus combining one or more sets of policies into a single XACML ‘super policy’ that 
is evaluated by a single policy decision point (PDP), cannot always provide the correct 
authorisation decision, due to the static conflict resolution algorithms that have to be built in. 
We therefore, propose a dynamic conflict resolution strategy that chooses different conflict 
resolution algorithms based on the authorisation request context. The proposed system 
receives individual and independent policies, as well as conflict resolution rules, from different 
policy authors, but instead of combining these into one super policy with static conflict 
resolution rules, each policy is evaluated separately and the conflicts among their 
authorisation decisions are dynamically resolved using the conflict resolution algorithm that 
best matches the authorisation decision request. It further combines the obligations of 
independent policies returning similar decisions which XACML cannot do while keeping each 
author’s policy intact. 
3.4.1 Use case 
Here we show the necessity for a dynamic conflict resolution strategy with a use case 
example, we consider a university which awards degrees and scholarships and maintains a 
profile for each student containing various personal data such as degree certificates, 
transcripts, and awarded scholarships. For personal data like degree certificates or transcripts, 
the university may want to deny access to anyone unless the data subject (i.e. the graduate) 
has specifically granted an access to the requester (for example, s/he can authorise a potential 
employer in his/her policy to access the degree certificates). For the scholarship awards, the 
university may want to publish this on its web site for marketing purposes, unless the data 
subject (i.e. the student) has specifically requested that the public be denied access to it. Since 
scholarships are usually regarded as achievements by students most of them will usually like to 
be honoured in this way, (and the university might also make it a condition of the scholarship 
that the award can be published except in exceptional circumstances). In the degree 
certificate case the conflict resolution rule will be GrantOverrides, since the issuer’s 
(university’s) policy denies access but the subject’s policy may override this with a Grant 
decision. In the scholarship case, the conflict resolution rule will be DenyOverrides, since the 
issuer’s (university’s) policy grants access but the subject’s policy may deny access. It is 
therefore not possible to effectively combine the issuer’s policy for both types of resources 
with a subject’s policy since two different conflict resolution rules are required, whilst XACML 




only allows one conflict resolution rule to be applied to a set of policies. In order to implement 
this scenario in a single XACML super policy, both the subject’s and issuer’s policies would 
need to be dissected into their separate rules for each type or subtype of resources and then 
combined together per type or subtype of resource with separate conflict resolution rules. 
Depending upon the number of types or subtypes of a resource covered in any policy, this 
splitting and merging could get very complex. Furthermore it might be envisaged that 
different conflict resolution rules are needed for different actions or subjects (requesters) on 
the same resource, which would make the splitting even more complex. We conclude that in a 
single organisation, there may be the need for various policy conflict resolution strategies 
which are not possible to satisfy with one static XACML policy, without sacrificing the integrity 
of the individual policies provided by the different authorities. We therefore, propose a 
solution where each author’s policy remains intact and is evaluated as it is, but the conflicts 
between policies are dynamically resolved based on a dynamically determined conflict 
resolution rule. In this motivating example, this means that if the access request is to read a 
degree certificate, the conflict resolution rule chosen by the issuer is GrantOverrides, but if the 
access request is to read the scholarship awards, the conflict resolution rule chosen by the 
same is DenyOverrides. 
3.4.2 Conflict resolution strategy 
Our authorisation system P-PAAS includes many different PDPs each with policies from 
different authorities and possibly written in different policy languages. As a consequence, a 
mechanism is needed to combine the decisions returned by these PDPs resolving any conflicts 
among them. Each PDP can return five different results – Grant (Permit), Deny, BTG, 
NotApplicable and Indeterminate. Where Grant (Permit) means the request is granted and 
Deny means the request is denied. NotApplicable means that the PDP has no policy covering 
the authorisation request. Indeterminate means that the request context is either mal-formed 
e.g. a String value is found in place of an Integer, or is missing some vital information so that 
the PDP does not currently know the answer. BTG (Break the Glass) (Ferreira, et al. 2009) 
means that the requester is currently not allowed access but can break the glass to gain access 
to the resource if s/he so wishes. In this case her/his activity is monitored and s/he is 
accountable for her/his actions. BTG provides a facility for emergency access.  
 
We have introduced a component, the Master PDP, which is responsible for combining the 
decisions returned by the subordinate PDPs and resolving conflicts among their decisions. The 
system is enriched with an automated, sophisticated and dynamic conflict resolution strategy. 
The strategy is dynamic as it can choose the conflict resolution strategy dynamically depending 
on the request context. Each authority of a personal data item can provide a Conflict 
Resolution Policy (CRP) along with the Access Control Policy (ACP). Each CRP consists of 
Conflict Resolution Rules (CRRs). Each conflict resolution rule (CRR) comprises: 
- a condition, which defines some logical relations among some attributes and values. 
The attributes and values presented in the request context are compared according to the 
relations defined in the conditions of the CRR. The evaluation of a condition is true if the 
attributes and values presented in the request context are evaluated to true according to the 
relations of those presented in the condition. The evaluation of condition of CRR is similar to 
the evaluation of condition element of XACML policy, to see if the attached decision combining 




algorithm should be used, 
- a decision combining algorithm (DCA), 
- optionally, an ordering of policy authors (to be used by FirstApplicable DCA), 
- an author and 
- a time of creation. 
A DCA can take one of five values: FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, GrantOverrides, 
SpecificOverrides or MajorityWins which applies to the decisions returned by the subordinate 
PDPs. In other words the DCA (to be discussed shortly) is applied to the decisions returned by 
the PDPs of different authorities and a single final decision is obtained. 
The system receives independent access control policies and conflict resolution policies from 
all policy authors i. e. from the law, issuer, data subject and controller. The Master PDP is also 
configured with a default CRP. The CRR of the default CRP is set by the administrator of the 
system during the initialisation time of the authorisation system and has no condition 
mentioned (so that it matches any request context) but only a DCA. The CRPs from different 
authorities are ordered based on a precedence rule and the law or Legal CRP has the highest 
priority so that no other authority can override the rights provided by the legislation. The next 
higher priority is given to the issuer of the personal data. For example, the university is the 
issuer of degree certificates, the bank of credit cards, and the person of personal data like 
personal diaries or personal choices like favourite drinks or personal information such as CVs. 
When the issuer withdraws the data, even the data subject (in cases where the data subject is 
different from the issuer) cannot access the personal data. In that sense the issuer is given the 
2nd highest priority. The next higher priority is given to the data subject of the personal data 
and finally the controller of the data so that the controller cannot override the choice made by 
the issuer or the data subject. Here it is notable that only the CRPs of the different authorities 
are ordered according to this priority order. All the access control policies of all the authorities 
(expect for the FirstApplicable DCA) are evaluated and the conflicts among the decisions 
returned by the ACPs are resolved using the DCA of the chosen CRR. The default CRP and the 
fixed CRPs (i.e. the Legal CRP and the controller’s CRP that do not change due to requests for 
various data) are read at program initialisation time, and additional CRPs are dynamically 
obtained from the subjects’ and issuers’ sticky policies. 
Figure 3-6 shows the simplified form of the P-PAAS structure. Here the Application Dependent 
Policy Enforcement Point and the Application Independent Policy Enforcement Point are 
mentioned together as the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) for simplification. When an access 
request is received by the PEP, (step 1 of Figure 3-6) it passes the request to the Master PDP 
(step2 of Figure 3-6). As there are a number of PDPs in the system the Master PDP needs to call 
only the ones related to the current request it is handling. The Master PDP finds the related 
PDPs searching with the RID (obtained from the request context) in the sticky store. After 
getting the request context and the information of the PDPs the Master PDPs first gets the 
CRR following the steps of Figure 3-7.  





Figure 3-6. The P-PAAS system in a simplified form 
The Master PDP has all the CRPs defined by different authorities as well as a default one. The 
CRPs are ordered according to the hierarchy of authorities (which is law, issuer, data subject 
and controller in order). For the same authority the CRRs are ordered according to the ToC 
(Time of Creation) so that the CRR with the latest creation time always comes first in the 
ordered list. For the default CRR the authorities and ToC contains no value and is placed at the 
end of the ordered list.  
 
Figure 3-7. The process of selecting CRR by the Master PDP 
All the conditions of a CRR need to match the request context for it to be applicable. The CRRs 
from the ordered queue are tested one by one against the request context. If a CRR’s 




conditions do not match the request context the next one from the queue is tested. If a CRR’s 
conditions match the request context that one is chosen and so is the DCA of that CRR. After 
obtaining the DCA the PDPs are called (step 3 of Figure 3-6) and Master PDP gathers the 
responses from all the PDPs (step 4 of Figure 3-6). For different DCA the PDPs are called 
differently, for example, the FirstApplicable DCA requires the PDPs to be called in a provided 
order while other DCAs require no ordering, and the results returned by the PDPs are 
combined differently based on the value of the DCA.  
 
We have proposed a merging strategy for combining obligations of the returned decisions. 
When a final decision returned by the Master PDP is Grant (or Deny) the obligations of all the 
PDPs returning a Grant (or Deny) result are merged to form the final set of obligations. The 
rational for combining obligations in such a way will be clearer with the examples provided in 
Section 3.4.3.2.  
 
In our system, the policies by different authorities remain independent of each other and that 
also helps to enforce them when they are transferred to other systems along with the data. 
The receiving system does not need any extra effort to write an integrated complex policy 
combining the received policies with their organisation’s policy; it only needs to start the 
independent PDPs. Initially, the system has the law and controller PDPs running as these two 
are common for all request contexts and, based on the request context the issuer and the data 
subject’s PDP may be started.  
 
Next we describe the Decision Combining Algorithms (DCAs). 
3.4.2.1 FirstApplicable 
If DCA=FirstApplicable the Master PDP calls each subordinate PDP in order and stops 
processing when the first Grant or Deny decision is obtained. If DCA=FirstApplicable the CRR is 
accompanied by a precedence rule (OrderOfAuthors of the CRR) which says the order in which 
to call the PDPs. For example, a CRR specifying a FirstApplicable DCA can be specified as 
follows, if (ResourceType=PII, requester=data subject) DCA=FirstApplicable, 
OrderOfAuthor=law, data subject, controller. The Master PDP calls each subordinate PDP in 
order (according to the order of authors), and stops processing when the first Grant or Deny 
decision is obtained. If no order of author is mentioned in the CRR the default order (the law, 
issuer, data subject and controller in order) is used. The flow chart for First applicable is given 
in Figure 3-8.  





Figure 3-8. Flow chart of First Applicable 
3.4.2.2 SpecificOverrides  
For SpecificOverrides the decision returned by the most specific policy gets preference. A 
policy is defined to be the most specific if it is assigned to the most specific resource. An 
element x is more specific than y if all the members of x are also members of y but not vice 
versa (di Vimercati, Samarati and Jajodia 2005). When the resources are organised according 
to the containment hierarchy a resource x is more specific than y if the path of y is the prefix of 
that of x.  
All the resources in the system, for example, can have their RID formatted using the tree based 
file structure such as Kent/CS/Module1/Result where the elements of the RID are separated by 
‘/’. Each policy applicable to a resource is linked by its PID to that RID. In this containment 
model of resources, policies applied to a less specific resource are also applied to the more 
specific one, but not vice versa. If multiple most specific policies exist, all of those are 
evaluated and a Deny result gets precedence; in other words DenyOverrides is applied when 
SpecificOverrides cannot differentiate between multiple policies. It should be mentioned that 
the SpecificOverrides can only be applicable when the RIDs of the resources are formatted 




using the containment model of resources.  
 
3.4.2.3. DenyOverrides 
For DenyOverrides the Master PDP calls all the subordinate PDPs. The flow chart of Deny 
Overrides is given in Figure 3-9. The precedence of decisions for DenyOverride is 
Deny>Indeterminate>BTG>Grant>NotApplicable. 
 
Figure 3-9. Flow chart of DenyOverrides 
This means that, the Deny decision overrides all other decisions. If any PDP returns a Deny then 
it becomes the final decision returned by the Master PDP. If no other PDP returns a Deny and 
any PDP returns an Indeterminate then Indeterminate is the final decision returned. Similarly if 
no other PDP returns a Deny or Indeterminate and if any PDP returns a BTG then BTG is the 
final answer and if no other PDP returns Deny or Indeterminate or BTG and if any PDP returns 
Grant then Grant is the final decision. NotApplicable is given only if no PDP returns any 
decision. The rationale behind the precedence of decision for DenyOverrides is that it tries to 
provide the highest possible restriction on any access request. With the Deny decision no one 
can access the resource so it gets the highest priority for this conflict resolution strategy. The 
Indeterminate decision means that there is a problem with the request and no one gets access 
to the resource for this decision hence this gets second higher priority. The BTG decision does 




not give access to the resource directly but it allows the requester to Break the Glass to gain 
access. So this is more restricted than Grant but less restricted than Indeterminate (since 
Indeterminate does not give access at all). Hence BTG stays between Grant and Indeterminate.  
 
Figure 3-10. Flow chart of GrantOverrides 
3.4.2.4 GrantOverrides 
For GrantOverrides the Master PDP calls all the subordinate PDPs and the flow chart of 
GrantOverrides is given in Figure 3-10. The precedence of decisions for GrantOverrides is 
Grant>BTG>Indeterminate>Deny>NotApplicable and a Grant result overrides all other results. 
If any PDP returns Grant then it is the final decision returned by the Master PDP, but if no other 
PDP returns Grant and any PDP returns BTG then BTG is the final answer. Similarly if no other 
PDP returns Grant or BTG and if any PDP returns Indeterminate then Indeterminate is the final 
decision. If no other PDP returns Grant or BTG or Indeterminate and if any PDP returns Deny 
then Deny is the final decision. NotApplicable is returned only if no PDP returns any decision. 
The rationale behind the precedence of decision for GrantOverrides is that it tries to provide 
the highest possible flexibility on any request to access a resource. With the Grant decision the 
access to the resource is allowed, therefore, it gets the highest priority for this conflict 
resolution strategy. The BTG decision does not give access to the resource directly, but it 
allows the requester to Break the Glass to gain access. So this is less permissible than Grant but 
less restricted that Indeterminate (since Indeterminate does not give access at all). Hence BTG 




stays between Grant and Indeterminate. The Indeterminate decision means that there is a 
problem with the request, and no one gets access to the resource for this decision but the 
access may be granted if the request is improved. With the Deny decision no one can access 
the resource and so it stays at the bottom of priority for the GrantOverrides DCA.  
3.4.2.5 MajorityWins 
For MajorityWins all the PDPs are called and the numbers of Grant, Deny and BTG responses 
are counted. The final decision (Grant/Deny/BTG) is the same as that returned by the majority 
number of PDPs. If there is no majority decision and the same numbers of PDPs return Grant, 
Deny or BTG then the precedence order is Deny>BTG>Grant. NotApplicable is returned if no 
other decision is returned by any other PDP. So, if the same numbers of PDP return Grant and 
BTG the final answer would be BTG. Similarly if they return Grant and Deny the outcome would 
be Deny. Finally if they return Deny and BTG the final answer would be Deny. If none of them 
return Grant/Deny/BTG but return Indeterminate, then that would be the final answer.  
3.4.3 Comparison with XACML 
In this section, the conflict resolution strategy of XACML (presented in Section 2.2.9) is 
compared with that of our system.  
3.4.3.1 Policy creation and integration strategy  
We first look into the strategy that can be taken to convert the previous example use case 
scenario into policies for our system and then the same into one XACML ‘super’ policy. While 
forming the conflict resolution policy the conflict resolution rules (CRRs) obtained from 
legislation (Fatema, Chadwick and Van Alsenoy 2011) come first, then come the CRRs from the 
issuer, then from the data subject and then from the controller and finally the default one.  
For the scenario of our example the issuer of the student profile (the university) has 2 different 
CRRs to contribute to the conflict resolution policy. The CRRs of issuer are 1. If 
ResourceType=scholarship_info, DCA=DenyOverrides 2. If ResourceType=degree_certificate, 
DCA=GrantOverrides. 
The issuer has policy saying “for ResourceType=scholarship_info, effect= Permit and for 
ResourceType=degree_certificate, effect = Deny” 
Suppose that the data subject has a policy saying “for ResourceType=scholarship_info, 
ScholarshipType=hardship assistance, effect= Deny” 
The data subject can have any conflict resolution rule and that CRR comes after the one of 
issuer on the ordered list of CRRs and so it is only evaluated if there is no CRR from that law or 
issuer matching the request context.  
So the CRP has the CRRs in the following order 
1. CRRs from the law (presented in Chapter 4) 
2. CRRs from the issuer (CRR no. 1. If ResourceType=scholarship_info, 
DCA=DenyOverrides CRRs no. 2. If ResourceType=degree_certificate, 
DCA=GrantOverrides.) 
3. CRRs from the data subject 
4. CRRs from the controller  





When a request to view a person’s scholarship information arrives, the Master PDP evaluates 
the ordered list of CRRs. The law has no CRR regarding this. The next CRRs on the list are from 
the Issuer, thus the CRR no. 1 of issuer CRR matches the request context for which 
DCA=DenyOverrides. So the DCA=DenyOverrides is chosen by the Master PDP. Then the 
Master PDPs calls the independent PDPs of the law, issuer, data subject and controller. In this 
case the Legal PDP returns NotApplicable, the issuer PDP returns Grant. The data subject PDP 
returns Deny when the ScholarshipType=hardship assistance otherwise it returns 
NotApplicable. There is no controller PDP for this use case scenario as the controller and issuer 
are the same for this use case (i.e. the university). So in examples of ScholarshipType= 
hardship assistance the final result is Deny (according to the DenyOverrides DCA). For other 
types of scholarship information, the DCA remains the same i.e. the DenyOverrides. The Legal 
PDP returns NotApplicable, the issuer PDP returns Grant, data subject’s PDP returns 
NotApplicable, and therefore, the final decision becomes Grant. 
When a request to view a person’s degree certificate arrives, the Master PDP evaluates the 
ordered list of CRRs. The law has no CRR regarding this (see Chapter 4) and the next CRRs are 
the ones from the issuer. Issuer CRR no 2 matches the request context which has a 
DCA=GrantOverrides, so it chooses the DCA=GrantOverrides. Then the Master PDPs calls the 
independent PDPs of law, issuer, data subject and controller. In this case the Legal PDP returns 
NotApplicable, the issuer PDP returns Deny and the data Subject PDP returns NotApplicable. 
So according to the GrantOverrides DCA the final result is Deny (unless the person specifically 
grants the access in his/ her policy) 
Now if we try to combine the policies from the law, issuer, and data subject under one XACML 
PDP policy the policies from different authorities cannot remain independent anymore. In 
order to make sure that the law always has the highest priority the top policy combining 
algorithm cannot be Deny / GrantOverrides as the decision of Legal policy can be overridden by 
the other authorities. To give the Legal policy the highest priority the top combining algorithm 
needs to be first applicable with the Legal policy coming first. To implement our example 
policies the policies from the issuer and data subject need to be combined under 
DenyOverrides algorithm for one case (for ResourceType=scholarship_info) and under 
GrantOverrides algorithm for another (ResourceType=degree_certificate). That means it 
requires splitting the policies of different authors and then combining them and this may 
require manual interpretation and implementation depending on the needs of an organisation. 
In contrast, our system keeps the policies written by different authorities independent of each 
other, and makes it easier to travel to a new system and be configurable. The integration of 
policies from different authorities in one PDP will require a policy administrator to manually 
integrate them according to needs and it damages the integrity of the individual policies by 
splitting them. 
3.4.3.2 Integration of Obligations 
Each XACML policy document contains one Policy or PolicySet element as a root XML tag. A 
PolicySet can contain a number of Policies or PolicySets. A Policy represents a single access 
control policy, expressed through a set of Rules. Each Policy or PolicySet or Rule (for v3 only) 
element can define Obligations which can contain a number of Obligation elements. Each 




Obligation element has an Obligation ID and a FulfillOn attribute. XACML’s obligation 
combination strategy can be viewed as a vertical procedure where the Obligations of a 
contained Rule/Policy/PolicySet are combined with the Obligations of the containing 
Policy/PolicySet. An Obligation associated with a Rule or Policy is returned with a decision only 
if the effect of the Rule or Policy being evaluated is the same as the FulfillOn attribute of the 
Obligation. If the Policy is contained in a PolicySet, the Obligations associated with the 
PolicySet having a FulfillOn attribute value matching the effect of the PolicySet are combined 
with the returned Obligations of the contained Policy. For example, if PolicySet A has 
obligation o1 and it contains Policy A with obligation o2 and Policy B with obligation o3 then 
the final obligations returned could be o1 and o2 or o1 and o3 (assuming they all have the same 
FulfillOn attribute) depending upon the combining algorithm (see below) and the order in 
which Policy A and B are evaluated. This procedure continues recursively.  
 
The limitations of the XACML obligations combining algorithm is that if a rule, policy or policy 
set is not evaluated then no obligations from them are returned to the PEP (XACMLv2 2005 (p 
87), XACMLv3 2013 (p 82)). With XACML’s GrantOverrides / DenyOverrides combining 
algorithms as soon as a Grant/ Deny decision is encountered the Grant / Deny is returned 
without evaluating the rest of the policies. Also with the FirstApplicable combining algorithm 
as soon as a decision (Grant/Deny) is obtained it is returned. This strategy of obligation 
combination may result in losing important obligations that ought to be returned. For 
example, if the controller’s policy says that every time a Grant decision is returned, there is an 
obligation to “log the request” whilst the data subject’s policy has a similar requirement that 
when a Grant decision is returned there is an obligation to “e-mail the data subject”; then if 
these policies are combined in a single XACML PolicySet with a GrantOverrides combining 
algorithm, then one of these obligations is always lost. In light of the above one can see that 
the integration of policies from different authorities into one ‘super’ XACML policy is more 
complex than simply splitting the policies of the different authors and then combining them 
together into PolicySets based on the resource type, as this may result in the loss of 
obligations.  
In contrast to XACML, our system’s policy evaluation and obligation combination strategy can 
be viewed as a horizontal procedure. In our system for both GrantOverrides and 
DenyOverrides all the PDPs are evaluated, and the final decision is chosen based on the DCA. 
The obligations that are returned by all the PDPs that have a decision equal to the final 
decision are combined. For example if the controller PDP returns a decision Grant with an 
obligation to “log the request” and the data subject’s PDP returns a decision Grant with an 
obligation to “e-mail the data subject” and the final decision is Grant; then in our system the 
returned obligations are the combination of the obligations attached to the Grant decisions. If 
the policies are implemented in a single XACML PDP with either a GrantOverrides or 
DenyOverrides combining algorithm, the returned obligation(s) is only the obligation(s) 
attached to the policy that is encountered first and that contributed to the final decision.  
3.5 How a Request is Processed in P-PAAS 
The P-PAAS receives user’s (or application’s) requests via an application dependent interface. 
The format of the interface depends on the application and we do not discuss this here. The 
application handling user’s interface converts the application request into a standard format 




before sending the request context to the AIPEP via the PEP. However, we require that all 
resources are identified by a Resource identifier (RID) by the PEP. It is assumed that either the 
application requesting to access a resource specifies the RID or the PEP maps the requested 
resource to a particular RID in the system e.g. by database lookup to find the unique key of an 
entry. The application also maintains a database for storing the identifying attributes of a 
resource (e.g. name, RID, owner, location, type etc.) which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
The application passes the resource attributes which are appropriate to the requested access, 
to the AIPEP in the request context via the PEP.  
After receiving the request context from the PEP, the AIPEP first validates any subject 
credentials in the request, before passing the (possibly modified) request to the Master PDP. If 
the request context contains any sticky policy the AIPEP stores it in the policy store (discussed 
in Section 3.3.2.5) and stores the policy identifier (PID) along with the related information of 
the policy such as the policy author, language, type (authorisation policy / conflict resolution 
policy) and so on in the sticky-store before sending the request to the Master PDP. A request 
context containing sticky policies is presented in Appendix 5. 
The Master PDP retrieves the relevant policies and policy related information from the sticky 
store with the RID from the request context. It then evaluates the conflict resolution policies 
(identified from the policy type information attached) in the sequence of law, issuer, data 
subject, controller and the default one (input at configuration time) and gets a decision 
combining algorithm (DCA) (explained in Section 3.4.2).  
The Master PDP enforces all the authorisation policies retrieved with the RID (if any), and the 
law and controller policies which are specified during the configuration of the system, by 
calling the appropriate PDP object for each policy based on the policy language information 
specified. If the PEP’s authorisation request does not contain a RID, then the Master PDP only 
calls the law and controller PDPs that the system is configured with, and does not call any 
sticky policy PDPs. The evaluation of each policy in a PDP depends on the policy engine it is 
configured with. How the PDP does this is of no concern to the Master PDP, since it assumes 
that every PDP knows precisely how to evaluate the policies that it has been written for 
(otherwise it would not be fit for purpose). The only requirement that is placed on a PDP is 
that it can support a standard request and response format. The Master PDP gathers the 
decisions and obligations returned by the PDPs. It then resolves any conflicts in these 
decisions, based on the previously selected DCR and returns all the obligations that are 
associated with the final decision to the AIPEP.  
The AIPEP gets the decision with obligations and sees if it can enforce any of the “before” type 
ones (as discussed in Section 3.3.2.4). The AIPEP enforces an obligation if it has been 
configured to understand it; otherwise it returns that to the PEP. Since each obligation 
contains a globally unique ID, then it is trivial for the obligation engine to determine which 
ones it can enforce. The AIPEP can enforce application independent obligations such as 
sending an email to someone, attaching a sticky policy to the decision returned by the Master 
PDP, and writing information to a secure audit trail. How the PEP enforces the remaining 
obligations depends on the application.  
 





In this chapter, the design of the P-PAAS is discussed. P-PAAS provides a generic infrastructure 
for providing privacy for various types of personal data based on privacy policies written by a 
number of authorities, possibly in different policy languages. Access to any data or resource of 
an organisation can be authorised by this system. The system is capable of storing policies and 
maintaining a link between the policy and the resource ID so that when a request for a 
resource (by the RID) is received all the policies related to that RID are consulted for making an 
authorisation decision. The system allows co–ordination of policies from multiple authorities 
(law, issuer, data subject and controller) written in different languages and resolving conflicts 
among them with a sophisticated, automated, dynamic conflict resolution strategy. The 
proposed strategy allows our system to choose a different combing algorithm based on the 
request context while allowing the policies written by different authorities to be separate and 
independent of each other. The separation of policies facilitates the easy integration of 
policies in a new system while the personal data are transferred to a different system along 
with them. Furthermore the proposed system allows us to integrate obligations (as a part of 
policies) written by different authorities which the current XACML policy combining strategy is 
unable to do. The system is integrated with a new component ConVS that facilitates the 
contract based access to personal data. Using this component some of the Legal data access 
rights mentioned in the EU DPD is made automated. The system also provides distributed 
enforcement of the privacy policies by transferring them along with the data and starting PDP 
with them so that they can be enforced while taking a decision on accessing that data. The 
system also enforces the application independent ‘before’ obligations (such as e-mail, secure 
audit trail) so that the application developer does not need to enforce them and thus it 
reduces the burden on them. Many other systems might have some of these features but to 
our knowledge no other system has a combination of all of these features. We do not claim to 
make each of the components better than other similar one (of fewer) system components, 








4 Extraction of Machine Executable Rules 




In order to ensure the enforcement of Legal rules our designed authorisation system, Privacy-
Protecting Advanced Authorisation System (P-PAAS), has included a separate Legal PDP 
(Policy Decision Point) in its architecture. This Legal PDP contains all the authorisation rules 
obtained from legislation. Having a Legal PDP that is capable of giving automated 
authorisation decisions helps to enforce the legislative rights automatically. Furthermore, the 
separation of the Legal PDP helps to prioritise the enforcement of Legal rules so that no other 
PDP decisions can override the rights mentioned in the Legal PDP. In this chapter we present 
the research that has been performed on the extraction of the authorisation rules from one 
particular legislation, the EU DPD (European Union Data Protection Directive) (Directive 
95/46/EC 1995), so that a PDP can evaluate those rules to provide automated decisions on 
behalf of the legislation. We conducted a manual examination of the EU DPD following a 
structured methodology which is described below, in order to obtain the automated access 
control or authorisation rules2 from it. In this chapter, the methodology that we have used to 
obtain the authorisation rules from the EU DPD is described.  
For the example of obtaining access control rules from legislation, we considered the EU DPD 
(Directive 95/46/EC 1995) as it contains all the important privacy features. Privacy legislation, 
on the other hand, of other regions such as the USA is not as strong as the EU DPD. In fact, in 
the USA there is neither comprehensive privacy law for the private sectors nor a supervisory 
authority to monitor the privacy protection which the EU DPD has (Fischer-Hubner 2001).  
The strengths of the EU DPD are discussed in the review of the directive provided to the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (Robinson, et al. 2009) and some of those strengths are:  
• sets out the basic framework of data protection in a comprehensive manner. 
• sets standards which are widely regarded as “high”.  
• sets out important and usable rights of humans. 
• its principles are proven to be stable over time. 




• is largely neutral in terms of technology. 
• has helped to harmonise data protection rules across the European Union and provides an 
international reference model for good practice. 
4.2 The Basics of the EU DPD 
4.2.1 Historical background 
The very first Data Protection Act has been adopted by the Parliament of the West German 
state Hessen which also serves as a basis for similar laws by the other German states (Fischer-
Hubner 2001). The first national Data Protection Act is Sweden’s Data Act which is passed in 
1973. Privacy is first acknowledged as a fundamental human right by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of the United Nations in 1974 (Assembly 1948). The privacy right is brought 
into a legal framework by the US privacy Act in 1974 (PublicLaw93-579 1974). The Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) first provides the Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Trans border flow of Personal Data with a view to helping 
harmonisation of national privacy legislation. They represent a consensus on the basic 
principles which can serve as a basis for national privacy legislation. The guidelines, in the form 
of a Recommendation by the Council of the OECD, are adopted in 1980. The council of Europe 
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data in 1981. The aim of the convention is to secure the individual’s fundamental 
freedoms and right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to 
him/her (EC 1981). The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD guidelines form the core of 
many data protection laws (Fischer-Hubner 2001). The European Community issued the first 
draft of the Directive on Personal Data Protection in order to protect the privacy of individuals. 
This is revised later and the final EU Directive 95/46/EC was adopted by the European Council in 
19953. The Directive mandates the member states to bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive.  
4.2.2 Principles of the EU DPD 
The EU DPD has the following data protection principles:  
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully. 
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, 
and shall only be processed for those purposes unless there is an informed consent 
from the data subject. 
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose 
or purposes for which they are processed. 
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than 
is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
6. The data subject has right to access, to get notification and right to correction, erasure 
or blocking of incorrect or illegally obtained personal data. 
                                                                                                                                             
2 In this chapter the term “access control” and “authorisation” are used interchangeably.  
3 The EU DPD is currently being revised but the final revised version is not yet available. Furthermore, 




7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European 
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection 
for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal 
data. 
4.2.3 Structure of the EU DPD  
The EU DPD is composed of seven chapters.  
Chapter 1 (General Provisions) defines the objects and scopes of the directive and the 
definitions of the terms used.  
Chapter 2 (General rules on the lawfulness of the processing of personal data) sets out the 
privacy principles such as the rules for purpose specification, keeping data accurate, criteria for 
making data processing legitimate, information to be given to the data subject, rights of a data 
subject and exemptions to the rights.  
Chapter 3 (Judicial remedies, liability and sanctions) ensures the right of a person to receive 
compensation if s/he has suffered damage due to any processing incompatible with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. 
Chapter 4 (Transfer of personal data to third countries) states the principles for transferring 
personal data; such as personal data can be transferred to the EU countries or to the countries 
having an adequate level of protection to personal data or when the data subject has 
unambiguously given consent to the transfer or the transfer is necessary to protect the vital 
interest of the data subject and so on. 
Chapter 5 (Codes of conduct) provides instructions for drawing up a code of conduct for the 
proper implementation of the national provisions adopted by the member states pursuant to 
the Directive. 
Chapter 6 (Supervisory authority and working party on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data) states the instruction for the appointment of one or 
more supervisory authorities and also mentions the duties, responsibilities and rights of the 
supervisory authority.  
Chapter 7 (Community implementing measures) instructs the member states to ensure 
compliance with the Directive.  
4.3 Methodology 
The processing steps have been followed to extract the machine executable Legal access 
control rules from the EU DPD are:  
Step1. List the Legal provisions that are directly related to authorisation. This step ensures that 
the legal rules which are not related to access control/ authorisation are eliminated from our 
consideration.  
Step2. Analyse the Legal provisions obtained from step 1 with the aid of a legal expert to see if 
                                                                                                                                             
no drafts were available at the time this research was performed. 




they can form enforceable access control / authorisation rules (in natural language). In this 
step the Legal provisions are examined one by one in order to form a set of enforceable access 
control rules / authorisation rules from each of them. The Legal rules that are not capable of 
giving automated, independent decisions are discarded at this stage (see 4.5.2).  
Step3. Refine the natural language rules by grouping similar rules together and ordering them in 
terms of their exceptions which need to be evaluated before the ones without. For example, 
data subjects are allowed unconditional access to their personal data that are held by a data 
controller, but not if law enforcement would be jeopardised by this. Consequently the rule 
which concerns law enforcement must be evaluated before the rule which grants the data 
subject unconditional access. 
Step4. Convert the natural language rules into a controlled natural language (CNL) that is 
machine process-able. The grammar of the CNL is specified in Section 4.4. It allows an Access 
Control Rule (ACR) to be specified, which comprises a set of conditions on Subjects, Actions, 
Resources and the Environment, an Effect (Grant/Deny/BTG) and an optional set of 
Obligations. Alternatively a Conflict Resolution Rule (CRR) may be specified, which has the 
same terms as an ACR except that the Effect is always a Permit, and the Obligation is to always 
use a specific Decision Combining Algorithm (DCA). The rule conditions are specified in terms 
of attributes, and attribute names can contain any combination of String. Nevertheless, the 
conversion has to ensure that the same attributes are used in both request contexts and the 
specified rules (otherwise matching would never occur). A set of guidelines for attribute 
determination is given in Section 4.5.5. 
Step5.  Convert the controlled natural language rules into executable rules in XML4. 
Step6. Validate the obtained Legal rules in a PDP. 
4.4 The Controlled Natural Language Grammar 
The grammar for the natural language that is used in step 2 is described in Augmented Backus-
Naur Form5 (ABNF) below: 
rule-definition=("ACR" wp rule-id wp ":" wp rule-statement ".") | ( "CRR" wp rule-id wp ":" wp 
crr-statement ".") ; 
crr-statement = "If" wp conditions wp "then" wp "DCR=" DCR; 
 
rule-id = STRING; 
 
rule-statement = "If" wp conditions wp "then" wp GrantOrDeny wp *prep wp article wp actions *( 
wp prep wp ) *( wp article wp ) *( wp ResourceType wp ) *( wp "with obligations to" wp 
obligations) ; 
 
conditions = (condition wp operator wp conditions) | (condition wp operator wp "(" wp conditions 
                                                 
4The actual schema that is used for the XML will depend upon the PDP that is used in the validation, so 
different programs will be needed for different PDP policy languages. 
 
5 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2234.txt 




wp ")" wp *(conditions)) | (condition); 
 
condition = (article attributes wp relationalOperator wp article attributes ) | (wp "there is" article 
booleanAttributes) / (wp "there is no" wp booleanAttributes); 
 
attributes = attribute | values ; 
 
attribute = category ":" name ":" type; 
 




type = "string"|"boolean"|"integer"|"double"|"time"| "date"|"dateTime"; 
 
article= ( wp "a" wp ) | ( wp "an" wp ) | ( wp "the" wp ) | (wp); 
 
values= (value wp "|" wp values) | (value); 
 
value= DQUOTE STRING DQUOTE; 
 
 





actions = action *(wp "|" wp action); 
 
action = word; 
 
ResourceType = word; 
 
prep = "to"| "on"| "at" | "for"; 
 
booleanAttributes= (booleanAttribute wp "|" wp booleanAttributes) | (booleanAttribute); 
 
booleanAttribute= category ":" name ":boolean" ; 
 




DCR= "DenyOverrides" | "GrantOverrides" | "FirstApplicable" | "SpecificOverrides"| 
"MajorityWins"; 
 
GrantOrDeny = "Deny" | "Grant" |"BreakTheGlass"; 
 








wp = *(%x20 | %x09 | (%x0D %x0A)); 
 
DQUOTE = %x22; 
 
Where the notation “|” indicates alternate values and * indicates 0 or more repetitions.  
4.5 Extracting the Rules From the EU DPD 
4.5.1 Step 1. Listing the Legal provisions of the EU DPD related to 
authorisation 
The EU DPD consists of seven chapters and 34 articles. Each article contains a number of 
paragraphs and sub paragraphs (which are referred to as Legal rules in this chapter). For 
obtaining the authorisation rules from the EU DPD the first step is to sort out the Legal rules 
that are related to authorisation.  
A rule is directly related to authorisation if it pertains directly to the processing, prohibiting, 
accessing, collecting, blocking or transferring of personal data, i.e. it mentions an action on 
personal data. Each rule of each article of the EU DPD is examined one by one in step1 to see if 
it mentions an action on personal data or if it points to any other rule that mentions an action 
on personal data. If it does then the rule is kept for processing at the next step otherwise it is 
discarded. For example, Article 8.4 states that “Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, 
Member States may, for reasons of substantial public interest, lay down exemptions in 
addition to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by national law or by decision of the 
supervisory authority.” This rule does not mention any action on a personal data item but 
paragraph 2 that is pointed here mentions some actions on the personal data and so this rule is 
kept for processing at the next step.  
4.5.2 Step 2. Analysing the Legal provisions 
The nature of the EU DPD is such that the outcomes of rules are subject to explanations, built 
on "it all depends" upon context, and human interpretation at the point of application (M. 
Mont, S. Pearson, et al. 2010). It requires human skills and interpretation to obtain 
deterministic PDP rules from the EU DPD. Consequently in this step the rules obtained from 
step 1 are carefully examined one by one with the help of a legal expert, in order to try to 
convert them into automated authorisation rules. A rule can form an authorisation rule if it can 
satisfy either of the following conditions - i) the rule can express who is or not permitted to do 
what action on personal data under what condition/s or ii) the rule can express on what 
conditions an action can or cannot be performed on personal data. A provision is discarded if 
no enforceable access control/authorisation rules can be extracted for it or if all the extracted 
rules require human judgment in order to be enforceable i.e. they cannot be easily translated 
into a deterministic rule, so that a fully automated enforcement is essentially precluded. If an 
alternative set of rules can be obtained from the same provision then the set that provides the 




most privacy protecting deterministic rules is chosen (see below). If a provision provides a 
mixed set of deterministic and human judgement rules, then the human judgement rules are 
discarded. If a rule does not form an automated authorisation rule the reason behind that is 
also discussed at this section. This step is the most time consuming and difficult in the 
methodology, and it cannot be done accurately or effectively without the help of a legal 
expert, since the rules often require interpretation and a nuanced understanding of their 
semantics. 
The conversion of some rules is very complex. For example, the conversion of the Legal policy 
"Article 8.1: Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and 
the processing of data concerning health or sex life" can lead to three different possibilities-  
Option 1: It can form a rule saying "if the request is for sensitive personal data (i.e. the data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the data concerning health or sex life) then deny the request " (and a DCA 
for the same conditions is DenyOverrides). However, this is only appropriate if all the rules that 
state exceptions to this rule can be fully implemented. The Legal PDP's decision has the 
highest priority for any authorisation request. So a straight Deny decision for a request to 
access sensitive personal data is not appropriate if there are legal exemptions to this rule 
which could not be implemented in the Legal PDP. 
Option 2: As the rule provides restrictions on processing sensitive personal data this can form a 
conflict resolution rule with a DenyOverrides DCA but no access control rule (i.e. the decision 
of the Legal access control PDP is NotApplicable) when a request comes for accessing 
sensitive personal data. The assumption here is twofold: either another PDP may deny the 
request and the DCA ensures that this takes precedence, or if all PDPs do not have a rule, then 
NotApplicable from all PDPs are converted into a Deny by the PEP. The problem with this 
approach is that if the data subject provides a Grant decision and the controller (or the issuer) 
says Deny the final decision becomes Deny. For example, a data subject provides a Grant 
decision to allow access to his medical record by his friend and the controller (or the issuer) 
may Deny it resulting in the friend being rejected. This may only be in conformity to the EU 
DPD depending upon national laws, since it says that national law can prohibit an access to 
personal data even when the data subject has given consent - "Article 8.2.(a): Paragraph 1 
(Article 8.1) shall not apply where: the data subject has given his explicit consent to the 
processing of those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the 
prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject's giving his 
consent;". Rejecting a third party even when the data subject has given consent might 
therefore not be illegal (depending on the national law). 
Option 3: A final option is not to convert this Legal rule into any access control rule, and to 
leave the decision up to the other authorities. The problem with this is that the issuer can 
grant access in defiance of the EU DPD regardless of the subject’s or controller’s policies. 
Furthermore the controller can grant access if the subject does not have a policy.  
Discussion: The first option is not suitable because all of the legal exceptions cannot be 




implemented by this research, especially considering the fact that national legislation can 
produce more exceptions. Also the data subject’s consent is one of the exceptions that need 
to be included in this rule, and this cannot be implemented (see below). 
Option 3 is not suitable since it allows the issuer and controller to override the EU DPD. 
Thus we are left with Option 2. The only negative effect of this option is that the data subject 
cannot always grant access to third parties, but the EU DPD does not say that the data subject 
should have this ability. Furthermore this option does empower the data subject always to be 
able to deny access. 
The conversion of the Legal rule “Article 8.2.(a): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply where: 
the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except where 
the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not 
be lifted by the data subject's giving his consent;” is also problematical, in that the data 
subject’s consent in our system is captured in the PDP of the data subject. All the PDPs in our 
system are separate from each other and provide their decisions independently but in a set 
precedence order, where the Legal PDP comes first. Hence the Legal PDP cannot know the 
consent of the data subject when making its decision since the data subject’s PDP is evaluated 
afterwards. Therefore, the conversion of the 1st part of this Legal rule can lead to the 
following two options. 
Option 1: The 1st part of the Legal rule of article 8.2. (a) could be converted into an access 
control rule- “if the request is for sensitive personal data then the decision is Deny”along with 
a conflict resolution rule of SubjectOverridesDeny. The DCA=SubjectOverridesDeny means that 
only the data subject’s PDP can override the Deny decision of the Legal PDP. So if the subject’s 
PDP returns Grant the final decision is Grant otherwise the final decision remains Deny. The 
issuer’s or controller's PDP is either never executed or their decisions are ignored.  
Option 2: The 1st part of this Legal rule does not form any access control rule or conflict 
resolution rule. In this case the assumption is that the data subject provides conflict resolution 
rules and thus the data subject’s choices override the controller’s choices. Consequently the 
access to personal data is protected by the data subject’s consent when there is no decision or 
DCA from the Legal PDP. However when there is no DCA returned by the Legal PDPs the 
issuer’s conflict resolution rule is checked next (before the data subject’s conflict resolution 
rule) and the issuer may be able to override the data subject’s decision.  
Discussion: The first option is not suitable as it ignores any local laws of Member States that 
may forbid the data subject from giving his consent. It also ignores the issuer’s and controller’s 
PDPs completely so they are not able to grant access to sensitive personal data such as for 
administrative reasons. The complete ignorance of these rules would not be appropriate.  
The slight problem with option 2 is that the issuer can override the data subject. However, if 
we assume that the issuer of personal data is either the data subject (e.g. for personal 
statements) or a trusted authority such as a Medical Professional (for medical data) then these 
authorities can be trusted to provide appropriate priority to the data subject’s choices or 
consent. Consequently we have chosen the second option. In Chapter 3 some use cases have 




been provided where an issuer (a University authority) chooses different DCAs and decisions 
for different personal data and still takes care of the data subject’s consent in an appropriate 
manner. 
The results of examination of each of the rules that are obtained in step1 are presented in 
Table A1.1 in Appendix 1. The natural language rules that are obtained after completing 
processing of step 2 are presented in Table A1.2 in Appendix 1.  
4.5.3 Step 3. Refining the natural language rule 
In the previous step the Legal rules were analyzed sequentially. In the EU DPD the legal texts 
are written in a way that it first states the rule and then it states the exceptions to that rule. 
For example, the rule “the data subject is allowed to access his/her personal data” is stated 
first and then the exemptions to the rules are stated which include “the data subject is denied 
to access his/her personal data when there is a national security issue”. These rules have 
matching subject, action and resource, whilst the conditions (i.e. having national security issue 
for the 2nd one) and effects (i.e. allow/ deny) might be different.  The PDP, on the other hand, 
executes rules sequentially and as soon as it gets a decision (at least in the case of the “first 
applicable” decision combining algorithm) it returns that and does not execute the rest of the 
rules. If the above rules are kept in the order they appear in the legal texts, the PDP might 
allow access to personal data by the data subject even when the restrictions should apply. 
Consequently, the order in which the rules are written in the policy is very important for 
getting a correct decision. Therefore, we need to make sure that similar rules, i.e. rules having 
matching subject/ action/ resource, are correctly ordered. For the above example if the 1st rule 
allowing unconditional access to personal data to the data subject is placed at the bottom of 
this group, this ordering makes sure that the data subject is allowed access to his/her personal 
data only when no specific condition denying access is true.  
Therefore, the natural language rules obtained from step 2 are refined during this step by 
grouping together similar rules and then ordering them to make sure the most general rule is 
placed at the bottom of the group. The ordering of rules is important only among similar rules. 
For example, if a rule says “the data subject can access his/her personal data” and another rule 
says “the treating Medical Professional can access the medical data” the ordering between 
these two rules will have no effect in the decision as the subject, action and resource are 
different for these two rules. Therefore, in this step we first group together only the similar 
rules. Similar rules are rules that have matching subject, action and resource. The term 
matching means the subject, action and resource of the two rules are the same or they contain 
the value “any” for subject, action or resource. This process is similar to the target matching of 
XACML. For example, if a rule says the data subject is allowed to transfer personal data and 
another rules says that any person is denied to transfer personal data, the two rules are similar 
according to the definition; as they have matching subject (one is data subject and another is 
“any”), action (both having the same action, transfer) and resource (both having same 
resource, personal data).  Therefore, the rules that allow or deny access to personal data by 
the data subject (rules having the same subject i.e. data subject, action and resource; rules 14 
and 16 of Table A1.2 of Appendix 1) are grouped together and the ones that allow/deny the 
transfer of personal data (rules 18-25 of Table A1.2 of Appendix 1) are grouped together. These 




rules have various subjects with one rule having “any” for subject, the same action (i.e. 
transfer) and resource (i.e. personal data). The rules within the group are then ordered 
according to the criteria mentioned above i.e. placing the rule that mentions no condition at 
the bottom of the group. When there are a number of conditions among the rules, the rules 
should be organized according to the specificity of conditions, with the most specific coming 
first. The conditions in a rule ‘A’ are more specific than the conditions of a rule ‘B’, if the 
conditions (i.e. the name, value pairs) of ‘B’ are contained in the conditions of ‘A’.  
4.5.4 Step 4. Convert into a Controlled Natural Language (CNL) 
At this step each of the natural language rules (except one that forms only a CRR, rule 10 of 
Table A 1. 2 of Appendix 1) is formalised in the form of an Access Control Rule (ACR) and a 
Conflict Resolution Rule (CRR) as follows: 
ACR – If condition (under what conditions) then effect (Permit, Deny or BTG) the action on the 
ResourceType with an optional obligation (subject to these actions being carried out); 
CRR – If condition (under what conditions) then effect (Permit) the action on the ResourceType 
with an Obligation (Decision Combining Algorithm (DCA) to be returned). 
Each Legal ACR rule is also converted into a matching CRR to make sure that the Legal rule 
gets precedence over any other authority’s rules. The difference between the CRR and its 
corresponding ACR is that the effect of the CRR is always a Permit and the obligation always 
returns the DCA that is applicable. If an ACR has an effect of Deny, the corresponding DCA is 
DenyOverrides and if an ACR has an effect of Permit the corresponding DCA is GrantOverrides. 
If the ACR has an effect of BTG, the CRR’s DCA is GrantOverrides, since a Grant from another 
PDP should not require the requester to first break the glass before gaining access.  
The condition element of the CNL rule defines the relationship of attributes with other 
attributes or values. Each attribute is defined with a combination of category (i.e. the kind of 
attributes: Subject, Resource, Action, Environment), name (i.e. the name of the attribute) and 
type (e.g. string, boolean, integer, double, time, date and dateTime). A guideline for 
determining attributes for converting the NL rules into CNL is given in Section 4.5.5. The 
converted CNL rules are presented in Table A1.3 of Appendix 1.  
4.5.5 Guidelines for attribute determination for policies 
For the automated execution of rules in an attribute based access control (ABAC) system we 
need to determine the attributes of each of the elements in the rules. Four different types of 
attribute are used in constructing the policy rules. 1. Subject attributes 2. Action attributes 3. 
Resource attributes 4. Environment attributes. Subject attributes identify the users who are to 
be granted or denied access. Action attributes describe the actions that are being controlled. 
Resource attributes describe the features of the protected resources (i.e. the personal data), 
such as: resource type, data issuer, data subject, date of creation etc. Environmental attributes 
describe the context in which the rule applies, such as the time of a day, location etc. These 
four types of attribute are also used to describe a user’s request to access a resource, and are 
passed to the PDP in the request context by the application. PDPs compare the attributes of 




the user’s request with those of the rules to determine whether an access should be granted 
or not. Each resource in the system is identified by a unique RID (Resource identifier) (see 
Section 3.3.2.5). Each resource has some attributes associated with it and these attributes are 
stored safely with the resource (the personal data) and added by the PEP (Policy Enforcement 
Point) to the request context and passed to the PDP when a request for accessing it is 
received.  
o The data subject is determined based on his/her set of identifying attributes (such as 
name and address, e-mail address, NI number, NHS Number etc.) given at the time the 
personal data are submitted or during the registration of the subject with the controller for a 
service. These identifying attributes are stored as resource’s attributes of the resource to 
which the data subject is related. The Legal PDP checks if these identifying attributes match 
with those of the requester (passed with the request context as subject attributes) to 
determine whether the requester is the data subject or not for the requested resource. In the 
current implementation of Legal rules the following sets of uniquely identifying attributes are 
used: {{name} and {address}}, {e-mail address}, or {NHS Number}, but these sets are 
configurable and can be changed and extended as needed by the application. The data subject 
should be able to choose any of these to identify her/himself. 
o ResourceType is a resource attribute that holds the type of the data, such as medical 
data, and is placed as an attribute of the resource by the issuer of the data. Only the issuer can 
modify the ResourceType of that data. An ontology is needed to classify the different types of 
personal data, and an ontology mapping server (e.g. as described in (Fatema, Chadwick and 
Lievens 2011)) may be used to hold it and be able to determine whether a resource type is a 
type of personal data or not. The ontology server may also determine the relationship among 
these data types; for example all the medical data types are subclasses of personal data.  
o PurposeOfCollection (mentioned in rule 1 of Table A1.2 and A1.3 of Appendix 1) is 
another resource attribute that states the set of purposes for which the data were collected 
from the data subject. It is set by the application when the data are first collected from the 
data subject. The Legal PDP matches this set with the purposes stated by the requester in the 
request context. 
o ValidityTime (mentioned in rule 3 of Table A1.2 and A1.3.) is another resource attribute 
collected from the issuer or data subject. A default value can also be set by the controller if the 
issuer or data subject does not provide a value for it. The controller needs to mention the 
default validity time of the data when collecting them. The Legal PDP matches the time of the 
access request (passed as an environment attribute of the request context) with the 
ValidityTime of the requested data.  
o Treating Medical Professional (mentioned in rule 12 of Table A1.2 and rule 11 of Table 
A1.3 ) is identified by an identifying attribute (e.g. PhysicianID) stored in the medical record of 
the patient (as a resource attribute). The value of this attribute must match that of the 
equivalent attribute of the requester, in order for the requester to be identified as the Treating 
Medical Professional. The name of this attribute is configurable in the Legal policy. 
o Social Security Authority, Medical Professional/ Supervisory Authority are Role 
attributes (mentioned in rules 8, 9, 17, 23, 26 and 27 of Table A1.2 and rules 8, 9, 15, 17 and 18 of 




Table A1.3) provided by the trusted Attribute Authorities. Who are the trusted authorities for 
which roles depends upon the application, and these are configurable values in the Legal 
policy.  
o LegalObjection, MedicalObjection, NationalSecurityIssue and Economic/ 
FinancialIssue (mentioned in the rule 16 of Table A1.2 and rule 14 of Table A1.3) are Boolean 
attributes of a resource which are used to flag the personal data that are not accessible to the 
data subject due to the national legislation which contains an exception to the data subject’s 
right of access. For example, a doctor may have the ability to invoke a MedicalObjection to 
prevent the patient from accessing certain information; or there is legal issue such that seeing 
the data by the data subject may harm a legal process such as a legal investigation. These 
attributes can only be issued by the designated (trusted) authorities. Note: If only one 
attribute (e.g. LegalObjection) was used there might be a situation that a LegalObjection set 
by one authority for one purpose would be overridden by another authority for a different 
purpose. 
o DataAccessMandate/ DataTransferMandate (mentioned in rules 7 and 22 of Table A1.2 
and rules 7 and 16e of Table A1.3) are credentials which can only be obtained by a requester 
following the appropriate legal procedure. Conceptually these are treated as subject attributes 
in the policy, so that if a requester possesses the appropriate mandate attribute he/she 
inherits the permissions assigned to the mandate (the DataAccessMandate is assigned for 
allowing access to personal data and the DataTransferMandate is assigned for allowing the 
transfer of personal data). These legal mandates are issued by various trusted Attribute 
Authorities and both the authorities and mandate types are configurable to suit the 
application. The requester (or the Attribute Authority) presents the Mandate to the 
application which either verifies it using a Credential Validation Service and passes the valid 
attribute to the PDP as a subject attribute, or passes it to the PDP as a subject credential for 
the latter to verify. 
o PartyOfContract and SubjectOfContract, AuthorisedRequester (mentioned in rules 
5,19 and 20 of Table A1.2 and rules 5 and 16 of Table A1.3) are attributes of a contract. A 
contract is defined to be a digitally signed XML document which has an element called 
PartyOfContract containing the identifying attributes (IDAs) of the people who have signed it 
and information of the organisation who are parties of the contract, and an element called 
SubjectOfContract containing the IDAs of the data subject. AuthorisedRequester contains the 
IDAs of the persons who are allowed to access the data due to a contract. When a requester 
wants to access a personal data item for a purpose related to the performance of a contract, 
s/he presents the contract or the unique contract identifier to the system if the system already 
has that (in cases where the controller is also a party of the contract then the controller’s 
system should have the contract in its repository). For validating contracts, a trusted 
component called the Contract Validation Service (ConVS) is added to the system (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3). If a contract is valid the ConVS passes information such as validity time, 
resource type and the identifying attributes of the authorised requester, parties and subject of 
the contract. This information is used by the Legal PDP while authorising an access request 
based on a contract.  




o SubjectConsentsToTransferTo (mentioned in rule 18 of Table A1.2 and rule 16 of Table 
A1.3) is an environment attribute set by the application to the IDA of the requester when the 
data subject consents to transfer his/her personal data to a requester. A requester can send a 
request for consent (via the application) to the data subject for transferring his/her personal 
data. If the data subject agrees to the transfer s/he can give his/her consent via the application 
(e.g. by clicking a button or ticking a box). This consent is stored by the application and when 
the requester requests the data this consent (in the form of SubjectConsentsToTransferTo 
environment attribute) is appended to the request context by the application. 
o SubjectRequestedToProcess and AllowedPartyToProcessData (mentioned in rule 6 of 
Table A1.2 and rule 6 of Table A1.3) these two attributes are used to indicate that the data 
subject of a personal data has allowed a person or party to process a personal data item prior 
to entering into a contract. These two attributes can be obtained from a digitally signed 
document by the data subject or can be obtained by the application (via a process similar to 
obtaining the previous attribute). The attribute SubjectRequestedToProcess contains the type 
of data the data subject is allowing to process and this is matched against the requested 
resource type. The attribute AllowedPartyToProcessData contains the IDA of the person or 
party the data subject is allowing to process the data for the purpose of entering into a 
contract. This value is matched against the IDA presented by the requester.  
o SubjectRequestedToTransfer and AllowedPartyToTransferData (mentioned in rule 21 
of Table A1.2 and rule 16 of Table A1.3) these two attributes are used to indicate that the data 
subject of a personal data has allowed a person or party to transfer a personal data item for 
the implementation of the pre contractual measure. These two attributes can be obtained 
from a digitally signed document by the data subject or can be obtained by the application (via 
a process similar to obtaining the previous attribute). The attribute 
SubjectRequestedToTransfer contains the type of data the data subject is allowing to process 
and this is matched against the requested resource type. The attribute 
AllowedPartyToTransferData contains the IDA of the person or party the data subject is 
allowing transferring the data for the purpose of entering into a contract. This value is 
matched against the IDA presented by the requester.  
o AdequateSafeguard (mentioned in rule 25 of Table A1.2 and rule 16 of Table A1.3) is 
another contextual attribute used by the current controller to indicate that the destination 
controller has agreed to provide adequate safeguards to the personal data when the transfer 
of personal data is being made to a country not having an adequate level of protection. For 
example, the current controller may have a contract with the destination controller stating 
that adequate safeguards will be provided.  
4.5.6 Step 5. Converting CNL to PDP rules 
Legal Access Control Policy and Legal Conflict Resolution Policy have been converted into 
machine executable policies using both the XACML and PERMIS policy languages manually 
following the steps presented in Section 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.4. The Rules have also been 
converted into XACML automatically by a Java program named XACMLConverter which is 
written following the steps presented in Section 5.3.3.  




4.5.7 Step 6. Validation 
A) Validation of the PDP rules  
   This procedure ensures that all the manually converted XACML rules produce correct 
answers from the PDP, according to human judgement. See Section 5.4 and Appendix 2. 
B) Validation of the automatic conversion to XACML 
The manually produced and validated (by the above step) XACML rules are compared 
automatically with a program line by line with the XACML rules produced by the 
XACMLConverter to make sure that they are an exact match.  
4.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
We have presented a semi-automated procedure to construct automated access control/ 
authorisation rules from the EU DPD. The rules balance the right of a data subject to access 
his/her personal information, as well as, the rights of others to forbid this access or to gain 
access to the personal data for a legitimate purpose. The Legal conflict resolution rules help to 
ensure the precedence of the Legal access control rules over that of any other stakeholders. 
The Legal PDP, however, does not completely capture all the legal constraints. Some 
conditions are extremely complex to automate and some decisions of judgment are highly 
dependent on human intervention. 
From the 53 rules of the EU DPD that were considered for analysis in step 2 (since they 
mentioned some actions on personal data) 27 of them could contribute to the construction of 
enforceable authorisation rules. However, 14 rules among these 53 are found to be guidelines 
or instructions only and there are no means to have authorisation rules from them. For 
example, Article 6.1.(a) states that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, Article 
17.1 says that controller must implement appropriate technical and organisational measure to 
protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, while 
Article 25.2 instructs about what to consider for determining whether a third country has 
adequate level of protections. These guidelines set out the overall requirements for privacy 
protection. Access control is one of the important aspects of privacy protection but it does not 
cover all such aspects. For example, Access control mechanisms are not capable of protecting 
against the accidental loss of data. This thesis attempts to cover the areas of privacy 
protection only within the boundary of access control. However three other rules can be 
supported by the system design, which are: 
1. The requirement that only data that is ‘adequate and relevant’ is released, can be 
ensured by making the granularity of the RID appropriate for the application, as access is 
granted only for the requested RID by our system.  
2. Consent of the data subject can be obtained by having sticky policies from him/her, and  
3. The requirement for providing notification to the data subject can be fulfilled by the use 
of an appropriate obligation in the subject’s sticky policy.  




The remaining 9 rules are found to be too dependent on other laws or human judgement to be 
turned into access control rules by themselves, for example, Article 8.2(b) requires 
employment law to be examined to determine the conditions for data release. Whilst Article 
13.2 requires human judgement to determine whether the data are being used for “taking 
decisions regarding the particular individual”. Article 7(f) “processing of personal data for 
legitimate interest are allowed except where such interests are overridden by the fundamental 
rights and freedom of data subject” presents an extremely complex condition where the 
balance of interests are not feasible to be presented in an access control policy.  
The proposed methodology is a proof of concept based on the EU DPD. Several of its 
directives may require far more complex access control rules to be formed due to divergences 
in national or sector specific law (e.g. more specific rules are available for medical data). 
Nevertheless we believe our methodology can be employed with these national or sector 
specific laws to produce enforceable access control rules. 
From the literature, it is evident that no other previous work attempted to obtain access 
control rules from the EU DPD. Although some other previous works attempted to get 
requirements from legal texts, the processes are highly dependent on the nature of the 
representation of the legislative language (Breaux and Anton 2008). The main limitation of our 
extraction process is that due to the nature of the EU DPD the analysis of the rules highly 
depends on the knowledge of the human expert. Even with the limitations of our 
methodology given above, having enforceable access control rules from legislation will reduce 
the effort of ensuring compliance (Papanikolaou, Pearson and Mont 2011). Although the full EU 
DPD cannot be covered with access control rules, the obtained machine executable rules will 










This chapter describes the implementation of the authorisation system, and the Legal access 
control and conflict resolution policies. It further presents the validation tests of the same. For 
the validation tests of the Legal policies, a set of test cases has been constructed and for each 
of the requests the outcomes of the Legal access control PDP and conflict resolution PDP are 
compared with the expected ones determined by human judgement. The validation tests of 
the system have been conducted based on various use case scenarios which involves policies 
from the multiple authorities. Finally, the performance of the system has also been measured, 
and the results are presented here.  
5.2 Implementation of the System 
5.2.1 Implementation and configuration of the authorisation 
system 
The high level conceptual mode described in Chapter 3 treats the authorisation service as a 
black box with a set of defined functionalities. The most important component at this level is 
the specification of the standard protocol that will be used to communicate with the 
authorisation service. The application developers will use this protocol for sending the request 
to the authorisation system (assumption 5 of Section 3.2). The policy needs to be passed 
dynamically along with the decision request to the authorisation service so that the data 
subject, or the application acting on her behalf, does not need to access the PAP for storing 
the policy prior to the authorisation decision. The chosen protocol should be able to pass 
policies in any policy language (assumption 1 of Section 3.2) along with the request context.  
 
The inability of the XACML request/response context to pass policies makes this OASIS 
standard  (XACMLv2 2005, XACMLv3 2013) unsuitable for this purpose. However, the SAML 2.0 
Profile of XACML, Version 2.0, Committee Specification 01, 10 August 2010 (SAML2.0 2010) 
does allow policies and credentials to be securely transferred with a request context, so this 
was chosen as the best fit for our requirements. However, this protocol has one major 
drawback in that it only supports policies written in the XACML policy language, and we 
required support for multiple policy languages. Professor Chadwick, who is a member of 
OASIS, therefore entered into discussions with the OASIS XACML working group about adding 
support for multiple policy languages to the SAML 2.0 Profile. After much discussion the 




working group agreed in 2011 to add this support to the SAML 2.0 profile by adding an 
extension to it (see Table 5.1). The revised Committee Specification was eventually published in 
August 2014 (SAMLv2.0 2014). 










<element ref="xacml-samlp:AdditionalAttributes" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/> 
<element ref="xacml:Policy" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element ref="xacml:PolicySet" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element ref="xacml-saml:ReferencedPolicies" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/> 
<element ref="xacml-samlp:Extensions" minOccurs="0"/> 
</sequence> 
<attribute name="InputContextOnly" type="boolean" use="optional" default="false"/> 
<attribute name="ReturnContext" type="boolean" use="optional" default="false"/> 





<element name="Extensions" xsi:type="xacml-samlp:ExtensionsType"/> 
<complexType name="ExtensionsType"> 
<sequence> 





In the SAML profile of XACML a new element called XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery has been 
defined which allows the PEP to combine the XACML authorisation decision request with the 
policy that is to be used by the PDP. This facility is helpful for enforcing sticky privacy policies 
where the PDP needs to be told which privacy policy to use for taking the access decision. The 
new Extensions element, shown in bold in Table 5.1, allows policies in languages other than 
XACML to be passed along with the request context. The SAML assertion 
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatementType (not shown) allows the XACML response context to 
optionally contain obligations and to be returned as a SAML response. This also facilitates the 
enforcement of privacy by including obligations with the access decision. 
Table 5.2 shows an example request context for passing a sticky policy in the PERMIS policy 
language to the authorisation service along with the authorisation request. The resource 
attribute “rid” defines the RID of the resource to be access controlled (as defined in Section 
3.3.2.5). The value “SUBMIT” for action attribute “action-id” indicates that this request is for 
submitting some new personal data (identified by the RID) along with a sticky policy to the 
authorisation service. The <Extensions> element contains the sticky policy as a <StickyPolicy> 
element. In the <StickyPolicy> element the PolicyID attribute is the PID (as defined in Section 
3.3.2.5) and the PolicyLanguage attribute defines the policy language to use whereas the 




<PolicyContents> contains the actual policy written in the specified language.   



































































































In order to transfer the data and policy together between the user’s client and the application, 
or application to application, we defined the StickyPAD schema, which is presented in 
Appendix 9. For the implementation of the sticky transfer mechanism (Chadwick and Lievens 
2008) we used the Application Protocol Enhancement Model, whereby the PEP augments the 
existing application protocol to make it capable of sending data with policies. The 
authoritative source combines the data/resources and policies together and signs the 
combined elements. The digital signature could be the XML signature defined in the StickyPAD 
or an externally provided one e.g. by using SSL/TLS to transfer it.  
 
The protocol used for communicating between the AIPEP and the CVS is based on WS-TRUST 
(OASIS 2007) and SAMLv2 (SAMLv2.0 2010) and is documented in the OGF specification 
(Chadwick and Su 2009). Once the CVS has finished validating the subject’s credentials, these 
are returned to the AIPEP as XACML formatted attributes and passed to the Master PDP. 
 
We needed to choose a standard API between the AIPEP and the Master PDP. Since policies 
are being passed with the SAML-XACML protocol and the AIPEP is storing the policy in the 
policy store, then we do not need to consider passing the policy via the API. There are a 




number of PDP APIs available, for example, the C authorisation API (Authorization C API 
Developer Reference 2003), the XACML Java API (Sun's XACML Implementation 2006) and the 
PERMIS Java API (Otenko, Chadwick and Thornton 2002). We chose to use the XAMCL API as it 
is only API that has come from a recognized standards organisation, OASIS.  
 
Due to the deadline of the EU TAS3 project (an IST FP7 funded Integrated Project) which 
funded this research, the complex design needed to be implemented in a short period of time 
and that required help from other project team members. The majority of the implementation 
of the authorization service was done by Dr. Stijn Lievens and can be found on (PERMIS 
Standalone Authorisation Server 2011). The authorisation system is implemented as a web 
service running in a servlet container (Apache Tomcat). The portions of the system that are 
implemented by the candidate, namely the PEP and Contract Validation Service, are described 
in the next sections. Here a brief description is presented for the configuration of the 
authorisation service. 
5.2.1.1 Configuration of the authorisation service 
The administrator of an organisation willing to use the authorisation service needs to 
download it from our open source repository (PERMIS Standalone Authorisation Server 2011). 
After installing the authorisation service the administrator needs to configure it. The 
administrator has full control over 1) the database configuration 2) the obligations service 
configuration and 3) the Master PDP configuration.  
 
In the database configuration the administrator defines where to store the sticky policies. It 
can be a file system or a relational database. To use a file system backed storage the following 
two attributes have to be used: “directory” and “filePath”. The directory attribute should give 
an existing (writable) folder on the file system which is the policy store defined in 3.3.2.5. New 
sticky policies will be stored inside this folder with a file name that is a (SHA-1) hash of the 
sticky policy’s identifier. The filePath attribute should give a file that contains the mapping 
between resource identifiers and sticky policies, which is the sticky store defined in 3.3.2.5.  
When a relational database is used the database configuration simply points to a configuration 
file containing the necessary information to connect to the database.  
 
The MasterPDPConfiguration element allows configuring the actual PDPs that will be used by 
the AIPEP. The administrator needs to specify the locations of the Legal and controller’s access 
control policies and the conflict resolution policy, along with the PDPs to use them (e.g. 
PERMIS PDP or XACML PDP).  When the LegalPDP or ControllerPDP element is missing, this is 
interpreted as having a PDP that always returns NotApplicable. 
 
The optional ObligationsServiceConfiguration element allows the administrator to specify their 
own obligations. 
5.2.2 Implementation of the application dependent PEP  
An application is implemented with PHP which provides a user interface at the front end and 
the PEP at the back end for calling the authorisation service using the right protocol on behalf 
of the user (or user’s application). This PHP application runs under an Apache web service and 




calls the authorisation service using the SOAP protocol. The application performs the following 
functionalities – 
i) When it is provided with an access request in SAML-XACML it passes the request via 
the PEP to the authorisation system which is running as a web service in another 
machine using the SOAP protocol and gets the response from that.  
ii) When it receives a data item (along with the policy) to store, it assigns a locally unique 
RID (Resource Identifier) to identify the resource and passes an authorisation request 
to the AIPEP via the PEP with the policy. When it receives a Grant response it stores 
the data and the resource attributes (such as, resource type, validity time, identity 
attributes of the issuer and the data subject) in a MySQL table.  
iii) When a request for accessing a data item identified by a specific RID is received it 
makes a MySQL query to retrieve the resource attributes attached to that resource. It 
formats each of the resource attributes to place them in the SAML-XACML request 
context. It then passes the request context to the authorisation system’s AIPEP via 
the PEP with a SOAP call. After receiving the Grant (or Deny) response from the 
AIPEP, it either retrieves the Data (with the RID) and passes that to the requester or 
sends a Deny to the requester. 
iv) When it receives an access request for any personal data item along with a signed 
digital contract it calls the ConVS to validate the contract. When it receives a response 
from the ConVS it formats the received data to form attributes of the SAML-XACML 
request context and passes the request context to the AIPEP via the PEP. The 
application/ the PEP also does necessary changes to the attributes’ names to match 
with the attributes presented in the policy. For example, in the policy the Resource-
Type attribute obtained from the contract is named as ContractResourceType to avoid 
confusion with the ResourceType obtained from the stored resource attributes of the 
requested resource. Therefore, the ResourceType attribute obtained from the 
contract is renamed as ContractResourceType. Similarly, the E-mail address of the first 
signer of contract obtained from the ConVS is renamed by as <ContractPartyOne’sE-
mail> and the E-mail address of the second signer of contract is renamed as 
<ContractPartyTwo’sE-mail>. 
v) Since the application is also intended to provide an interface to receive policies (in the 
form of preferences) from the user, based on a scenario of registering a person for a 
medical service at a medical service provider, a set of XACML policies is prepared. 
When a user registers at a medical service provider (e.g. Kent Health Centre) the 
person is provided with an electronic form, mainly with tick boxes, for giving his/her 
choices about who can access his/her medical record. Each of these tick boxes is 
converted into machine executable XACML policies as shown next.  





Figure 5-1. Conversion of choices (from tick boxes) into an XACML policy set 
The user registers with the Kent Health Centre for getting services from it. The user first 
authenticates him/herself to the Kent Health Centre and then is given a registration form. 
During registration, the person is also given an electronic policy preference form (with tick 
boxes) which presents some options to choose about allowing others to access his/her 
medical data. These choices are converted into machine executable policies using the XACML 
policy language. In this example scenario the person is given 6 options (see Figure 5-1) to 
choose from to indicate with who he/she wants to share his/her medical data. The options are 
– 
1. Dr. _ _ _ of Kent Health Centre 
2. Any Dr. of Kent Health Centre 
3. Dr. of other organisation _ _ _ . 
4. Health Insurance Company _ _ _. 
5. Researcher 




6. Other Organisation _ _ _. 
Some of these options contain spaces for providing extra information such as the name of a 
Dr., the name of another organisation and so on. 
There is a pre-defined policy for each of these choices. Depending on the person’s choices the 
policies are combined into a policy set and used in the data subject’s PDP. For example if a 
person only chooses policies no 1 and 3, then only 1 and 3 will be put into the final policy set 
and be used in the data subject’s PDP. If the person chooses option no 1 and writes the name 
of Dr. D in the space provided for that option then the XACML policy is formed as the policy 
presented in Table 5.3. This grants READ access to ResourceType =medical data to a subject 
with Name=Dr. D, working for Organisation Kent Health Centre with a Role of Medical 
Professional. 
Table 5.3: Policy for option 1 
<Policy PolicyId="PolicyNo1forMedicalData" 
 RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/> 
   <Rule RuleId="MedicalDataAccessByMedicalProfessional" Effect="Permit"> 
     <Description>Medical Professional of this organisation can read the medical data </Description>  
     <Target> 
        <Subjects> 
  <Subject> 
   <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
   <AttributeValue  
DataType= "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Medical Professional</AttributeValue>  
   <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId=Role DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </SubjectMatch> 
 </Subject> 
 <Subject> 
   <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
   <AttributeValue  
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Kent Health Centre</AttributeValue>  
   <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
  </SubjectMatch> 
         </Subject> 
         <Subject> 
  <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Dr. D</AttributeValue>  
    <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
  </SubjectMatch> 
        </Subject> 
     </Subjects>      
    <Resources> 
       <Resource> 
 <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Medical Data</AttributeValue>  
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="ResourceType"/>  
         </ResourceMatch> 
       </Resource> 
    </Resources> 
    <Actions> 
       <Action> 




  <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue>  
     <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/>  
  </ActionMatch> 
       </Action> 
     </Target>    
   </Rule> 
 </Policy> 
 
When the user chooses option 5 to allow a researcher to access his/her medical data, an 
obligation is added in the policy to anonymise the data. The user can be informed about this in 
the form. Option 5 creates the policy presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Policy for option 5 
<Policy PolicyId="PolicyNo5forMedicalData" 
 RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/> 
   <Rule RuleId="MedicalDataAccessByReseracher" Effect="Permit"> 
      <Description>Researcher can read the medical data </Description>  
      <Target> 
      <Subjects> 
  <Subject> 
    <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
       <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Reaseracher</AttributeValue>  
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId=Role DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </SubjectMatch> 
 </Subject> 
      </Subjects>          
     <Resources> 
        <Resource> 
  <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Medical Data</AttributeValue>  
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="ResourceType"/>  
  </ResourceMatch> 
        </Resource> 
     </Resources> 
     <Actions> 
         <Action> 
    <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
         <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue>  
           <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/>  
     </ActionMatch> 
 </Action> 
      </Target>    
    </Rule> 
    <Obligations> 
       <Obligation ObligationId="Anonymise the requested data" FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
    </Obligations> 
 </Policy> 
When these 2 policies are put into one policy set it creates the full policy in XACML as 
presented in Table 5.5. The default policy combining rule is DenyOverrides. It can also be 
obtained from the data subject by providing him/her with a set of policy combining algorithms 




(such as FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, PermitOverride and so on) to choose from and the 
chosen combining algorithm can be used to combine the chosen policies. 
Table 5.5: Combined policy from option 1 and 5 
<PolicySet xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os /location-to-schema/access_control-xacml-





     <Policy PolicyId="PolicyNo1forMedicalData" 
       RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
     ........... 
    </Policy> 
    <Policy PolicyId="PolicyNo5forMedicalData" 
    RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
     ............ 
    </Policy> 
</PolicySet> 
 
User friendly interfaces and comprehensible texts can be provided with the options, so that 
the user can understand the options he/she is choosing without worrying about the complex 
policy languages underneath.  
5.2.3 Implementation of the ConVS  
For designing a signed contract that would allow some parties to access some data, we first 
have looked at the possible options of constructing the contract document and the way of 
accommodating signatures of the parties. The contract document that describes the terms and 
conditions of data access can be a plain document describing that. However to make the 
document easily interpretable by both machine and human a good option is to use the XML 
format. It allows to present data is a structured way and it is a W3C recommendation for 
describing data. The rationale of choosing various elements of the contract document is 
presented in Section 3.3.3.2. The schema of the contract document is presented in Table 5.6 
and an example of that is presented in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.6: Schema definition of the contract document 
------ schema of the contract document that is referred by the URL of a contractID--- 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
 <xs:element name="ContractDocument" type="ContractDocumentType"/> 
  <xs:complexType name="ContractDocumentType"> 
 <xs:sequence minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">   
  <xs:element name="ValidityTime" type="ValidityTimeType"/> 
  <xs:element name="ResourceType" type="xs:string" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  
  <xs:element name="Description" type="xs:string"/>  
  <xs:element name="SubjectOfContract" type="IdentifyingAttributesType" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
  <xs:element name="AuthorisedRequester" type="IdentifyingAttributesType" 
minOccurs="0"/>     
  <xs:element name="PartyOfContract" type="PartyOfContractType" minOccurs="2" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
  <xs:element name="ExtensionElement" type="AnyXMLType" minOccurs="0"/> 




  </xs:sequence>     
  </xs:complexType> 
  <xs:complexType name="ValidityTimeType"> 
 <xs:sequence> 
    <xs:element name="StartDate" type="xs:date" /> 
  <xs:element name="EndDate" type="xs:date" /> 
   </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
  <xs:complexType name="IdentifyingAttributeType"> 
 <xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
  <xs:element name="E-mail" type="xs:string"/>   
  <xs:element name="NameAndAddress" type="NameAndAddressType"/> 
  <xs:element name="NHSNumber" type="xs:string"/> 
    <xs:element name="RoleAndOrganisation" type="RoleAndOrganisationType"/> 
    <xs:element name="ExtensionElement" type="AnyXMLType" minOccurs="0"/> 
 </xs:choice> 
  </xs:complexType>   
 <xs:complexType name="PartyOfContractType"> 
 <xs:sequence>  
   <xs:element name="SignerOfContract" type="SignerOfContractType" minOccurs="1"/>  
          <xs:element name="IdentifyingAttributesOfParty" type=" IdentifyingAttributesType " 




 <xs:complexType name="SignerOfContractType"> 
   <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element name="DN" type="xs:string" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/> 
  <xs:element name="OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner" type="IdentifyingAttributesType" 
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
   </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
  
 <xs:complexType name="NameAndAddressType"> 
 <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 




 <xs:complexType name="RoleAndOrganisationType"> 
 <xs:sequence> 
   <xs:element name="role" type="xs:string"/> 
   <xs:element name="organisation" type="xs:string"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 <xs:complexType name="AnyXMLType" mixed="true"> 
     <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:any minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" namespace="##any"  
processContents="lax"> 
        <xs:annotation> 
          <xs:documentation> 
          Any xml content is allowed in this element. 
          </xs:documentation> 
        </xs:annotation> 
      </xs:any> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
</xs:schema> 
 




Table 5.7: Example of contract document 
--- Example of Contract --- 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<ContractDocument xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation ="contractDocumentXMLSchema.xsd"> 
  <ValidityTime> 
    <StartDate>2009-09-24</StartDate>  
    <EndDate>2012-10-23</EndDate> 
  </ValidityTime> 
  <ResourceType>MedicalData</ResourceType> 
  <Description> 
  This is a contract between CN=kaniz,O=UKC,C=GB and O=HIC,C=GB for a service.  
  </Description> 
  <SubjectOfContract> 
   <E-mail>kf66@kent.ac.uk</E-mail>   
  </SubjectOfContract> 
  <AuthorisedRequester> 
   <RoleAndOrganisation> 
         <role>Employee</role> 
         <organisation>HIC</organisation> 
    </RoleAndOrganisation>   
  </AuthorisedRequester> 
  <PartyOfContract> 
   <SignerOfContract>CN=A,O=HIC,C=GB</SignerOfContract> 
   <OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> 
       <RoleAndOrganisation> 
         <role>Authority</role> 
         <organisation>HIC</organisation> 
       </RoleAndOrganisation> 
    </OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> 
    <IdentifyingAttributesOfParty>       
         <name>HIC</name> 
         <address>Kent,UK</address>        
    </IdentifyingAttributesOfParty> 
 </PartyOfContract> 
 <PartyOfContract> 
   <SignerOfContract> 
      <DN>CN=Kaniz,O=UKC,C=GB</DN> 
     <OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> 
        <E-mail>kf66@kent.ac.uk</E-mail>     
      </OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> 
    </SignerOfContract> 
 </PartyOfContract>  
</ContractDocument>     
          
We then have looked into various options for signing an XML document with a digital 
signature which are presented next. 
The syntax and semantics of the XML signature can be found in the W3C standard document 
(W3CXMLSignature 2008). A brief description of the formats of the XML signature is given 
here to justify the reason for choosing this format.  
i) Enveloped signature- in which the resultant signed content contains the signature as 
an element.  
ii) Enveloping signature- in which the signed content is embedded within the XML 
signature in the resultant signed document i.e. the signature is the parent element. 
iii) Detached signature- in this format the XML content is external to the Signature 




element, and can be identified via a URL. Consequently, the signature is "detached" from the 
content it signs. 
Since the implementation of a digital contract requires that the same content (the XML 
formatted contract document) be signed by a number of parties the detached signature seems 
to be more suitable than the other two formats. Hence, the XML formatted contract document 
is presented via a URL and all the parties sign over the contents of the contract document with 
their own keys. The URL and the digest of the contract document become a part of the digital 
signatures and are used while validating the contract. The URL of the contract document and 
the signatures by all the parties over the contract document together form the signed contract 
and is used as a unique identifier of the contract. The schema of the signed contract is given in 
Table 5.8. All the parties have access to the signed contract which they can use for validation 
while accessing data based on that contract.  
The element Signature of the signed contract schema is defined by the W3C. A brief 
description of the signature element is provided to aid understanding of the validation 
process.  
The SignedInfo element includes the canonicalisation6 algorithm, a signature algorithm, and 
one or more references. The Reference element (not shown in Table 5.8, can be seen in 
(W3CXMLSignature 2008)) contains the URL of the resource, the list of processing steps 
performed on the reference’s content before it was digested (in Transforms element of 
Reference element), the digest method and the value of the digest of the referenced resource.  
The SignatureValue element contains the actual value of the digital signature (i.e. the 
encrypted digest) in base64 encoded form.  
The optional KeyInfo element contains keys, names, certificates and other public key 
management information, such as in-band key distribution or key agreement data. The 
optional element Object may contain MIME type, ID, encoding attributes which attribute 
allows an element to be referenced by other objects.  
 
The XML formatted digital contract resides inside an Apache web server. The URI of the 
contract is used for signing by the parties of the contract. For generating a digest of the 
document SHA1 is used and for the signature the RSA algorithm is used. The signatures of each 
party of the contract are passed to the ConVS by the application or the PEP (which is 
implemented in PHP). If the signatures are valid and the contract is valid (i.e., if the contract 
passes the four validity steps mentioned in Section 3.3.3), a string containing the information 
from the detached signatures and the contract document in a comma separated value (CSV) 
format is passed to the calling element. After receiving the information the application / PEP 
parses that, constructs and adds the desired XACML elements to the request context to pass 
them to the authorisation service.  
The ConVS is implemented as a Web Service (although it could also be used as an API if 
desired) using both Java SE and J2EE. It relies on the Axis2 (AXIS2 2004) framework to provide 
                                                 
6 It is the process of making something canonical, which means in conformance with some specification. 




the web services functionality. The ConVS runs inside a servlet container (Apache Tomcat). 
Figure 5.2 presents the Snapshot of the ConVS web service. The web service has only one 
public class which is called by the application or the PEP and is passed the detached signatures 
of the contract. This public class calls all the other private classes for providing the four 
functionalities mentioned in Section 3.3.3. 
Table 5.8: Schema definition of the signed contract 







<xs:element name="SignedContract" type="SignedContractType" /> 
  <xs:complexType name="SignedContractType"> 
   <xs:sequence> 
     <xs:element name="ContractIdentifier" type="xs:httpURL" /> 
     <xs:element name="Signature" type="ds:SignatureType" minOccurs="2" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
     </xs:element> 
   </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType>    
</xs:schema> 
--digital signature schema definition from http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/-- 
   <complexType name="SignatureType"> 
     <sequence>  
      <element ref="ds:SignedInfo"/>  
      <element ref="ds:SignatureValue"/>  
      <element ref="ds:KeyInfo" minOccurs="0"/>  
      <element ref="ds:Object" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      </sequence>  
      <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/> 
   </complexType> 
   <element name="SignedInfo" type="ds:SignedInfoType"/>  
   <complexType name="SignedInfoType"> 
       <sequence>  
       <element ref="ds:CanonicalizationMethod"/> 
      <element ref="ds:SignatureMethod"/>  
      <element ref="ds:Reference" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
       </sequence>  
       <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>  









Figure 5-2. Snapshot of the ConVS web service 
5.3 Conversion of CNL Rules to PDP Rules  
The Legal access control and conflict resolution policies are implemented using both the 
XACMLv2 and PERMIS policy languages. We chose XACML as a language for implementing 
Legal policies as it is an OASIS standard and is regarded as the most popular policy language. 
Since our system is capable of dealing with more than one language we wanted to 
demonstrate such capability by encoding the Legal rules in another policy language as well and 
enforcing that in our system. Therefore, we chose PERMIS for this purpose due to the 
availability of the code (being open source) and expertise within the project. Here a brief 
description of the procedure is provided. Both the XACML and PERMIS rules are obtained 
manually following the procedure. A program is written to automatically convert the rules in 
XACML and compare with the corresponding manually obtained XACML rules to demonstrate 
that it is possible to have automatic extraction of machine executable rules from the CNL rules.  
5.3.1 Conversion of CNL rules to XACMLv2 rules  
The basic structure XACMLv2 policy elements and the evaluation process of that are presented 
in Section 2.2.9. Each of the <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> element contains a <Target> 
element that specifies the set of subject, resource, action and environment attributes to which 
to apply. A <Target> value evaluates to “Match” if the all the <Subjects>, <Resources>, 
<Actions> and <Environments> elements specified in the <Target> match the values in the 
request context. If any of the <Subjects>, <Resources>, <Actions> and <Environments> 
elements specified in the <Target> evaluates to “Indeterminate”, then the <Target> and 




eventually the effects of the <Rule>, <Policy> and <PolicySet> containing the target evaluates 
to “Indeterminate”. The absence of an attribute in the request context that is found in the 
<Policy> is evaluated to “Indeterminate”.  
 
Let us consider the implementation of a Legal rule saying that the data subject can submit 
policy for his/her personal data, where the data subject can be identified by either an {e-
mailAddress}, or {{Name} and {Address}}, or a {NHS Number}. The requester is expected to 
provide any one of these sets of attributes to identify him or herself. The data subject’s 
identity attributes are passed by the PEP as resource attributes in the request context. The 
attributes passed by the requester should be the same as a subset of these subject’s identity 
attributes in order for the requester to be granted access. If these identity attributes are 
written inside the target element of the rule then they all are needed to be present in the 
request context for the requester to be granted access. If any of the attributes are missing 
from the request context then an “Indeterminate” decision is returned. However, the 
requester only needs to be identified by one of these sets of attributes at a time and the other 
sets of attributes need not be present in the request context. Therefore a single target 
element is not the correct place to do the matching. Instead either three separate policies or 
rules with one set of identity attributes in each target element should be used, or one policy or 
rule with an empty target element and a condition element need to be used. 
 
The <Condition> element represents a Boolean expression. When the <Target> element of an 
XACML policy evaluates to “Match” and the condition element evaluates to “True”, the rule 
evaluates to “Effect” and when the <Target> element of an XACML policy evaluates to 
“Match” and the condition element evaluates to “False” the rule evaluates to “NotApplicable” 
(XACMLv2 2005). XACML has a collection of functions that provide a powerful way to compare 
attribute values. The XACML function urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:type-at-least-one-
member-of takes two arguments that are both a bag of ‘type’ values. It returns a Boolean 
value. The function evaluates to "True" if and only if at least one element of the first argument 
is contained in the second argument as determined by 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:x.x:function:type-is-in". In this case the <Condition> element 
containing the function evaluates to “True” and eventually the rule evaluates to the “effect”. 
Otherwise the function returns “False” and the <Condition> evaluates to “False” and 
consequently the rule evaluates to “NotApplicable”. Hence this strategy is used to match the 
subject attributes and the above rule is implemented as mentioned in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9: Implementation of a Legal rule in XACML v2 
<Rule RuleId="3" Effect="Permit"> 
<Description> ACR 3: If the Subject:Email:string is equal to the resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string OR the 
Subject:NHSNumber:string is equal to the Resource:DataSubject'sNHSNumber:string then Grant the SubmitPolicy for 
PersonalData. </Description> 
<Target>    
</Target> 
 <Condition> 
  <Apply FunctionId="X:and">   
     <Apply FunctionId="X:or"> 
 <Apply FunctionId="X:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
   <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-mail" DataType="Y#string" /> 
   <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="Y#string" /> 





 <Apply FunctionId="X:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
    <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" DataType="Y#string" /> 
    <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="X#string" /> 
 </Apply> 
 <Apply FunctionId="X:any-of"> 
            <Function FunctionId="X:string-equal"/> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="Y#string" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="Y#string">SubmitPolicy</AttributeValue> 
       </Apply> 
            <Apply FunctionId="X:any-of"> 
            <Function FunctionId="X:string-equal"/> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="Y#string" 
AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="Y#string">PersonalData</AttributeValue> 
       </Apply> 
   </Apply> 
 </Condition>    
</Rule> 
Here X= urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function and Y= http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema 
 
The CNL rules written according to the ABNF grammar (presented in Section 4.4) are 
converted into XACML using the following steps- 
1. The initial string of a rule “ACR” indicates that the rule is an access control rule 
and the initial string “CRR” indicates that the rule is a CRR.  
2. The ABNF grammar element <rule-id> becomes the <PolicyId> and <Rule-Id> of 
the XACML policy. 
3. The ABNF grammar element <GrantOrDeny> becomes the <effect> of XACML 
rule. 
4. Depending on the value of <GrantOrDeny> the rule combining algorithm is 
chosen for XACML. If the value of <GrantOrDeny> is Grant then the rule 
combining algorithm is permit-overrides and if the value is Deny or 
BreakTheGlass then rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides. Note: the 
policy combining algorithm for Legal PDP is first-applicable. 
5. The whole rule is copied to the <Description> element of the XACML rule. 
6. All the <relationaloperator> of the ABNF grammar are translated into 
corresponding XACML functions. 
7. Each <attribute> of a <condition> element of the ABNF grammar consists of 
<category>, <name> and <type>. The value of <category> becomes the prefix 
(i.e. Subject /Resource /Action /Environment) of the AttributeDesignator of 
XACML, the value of <name> becomes the AttributeId and the <type> 
becomes the <DataType> of the AttributeDesignator of XACML.  
8. The attribute <value> of ABNF becomes the <AttributeValue> of XACML. 
9. The ABNF <operator> “AND” / “OR” becomes the XACML FunctionId = “and” / 
“or” 7 .  
[Note: the XACML FunctionId= “not” comes from the ABNF 
<relationaloperator> “is not” and “is not equal to”.]  
10. The <action> element of the ABNF grammar becomes the <AttributeValue> in 




XACML against which the <ActionAttributeDesignator> with AttributeId= 
action-id8 is matched.  
11. The <obligations> of the ABNF element becomes the XACML <Obligations>. 
5.3.2 Conversion of CNL rules to PERMIS rules  
The basic construction of PERMIS rules is explained in Section 2.2.10. Here we consider the 
implementation of the same example of the rule mentioned in the Section 5.3.1 in PERMIS The 
data subject can submit a policy for his/her personal data, where the data subject can be 
identified by either an {e-mailAddress}, or a {NHS Number}. In PERMIS policies there is no way 
to define arbitrary subject’s or resource’s attributes. They are tested to be either present or 
not. So the requester’s identity attributes are passed as environment attributes, as are the 
resource’s subject identity attributes as presented in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.10: Implementation of a Legal rule in PERMIS 
     <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList>       
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target> 
          <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
          <AllowedAction ID="SubmitPolicy"/> 
        </Target>       
      </TargetList> 
      <IF>  
         <OR> 
 <EQ> 
             <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="DataSubject’sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 </OR> 
      </IF> 
    </TargetAccess> 
Similar to XACML the CNL rules written according to the ABNF grammar (presented in Section 
4.4) are converted into PERMIS using the following steps- 
a) The initial of a rule “ACR” indicates that the rule is an access control rule and the initial 
“CRR” indicates that the rule is a CRR.  
b) The ABNF grammar element <rule-id> becomes the OID of the PERMIS policy. 
c) If the value of <GrantOrDeny> is Grant then the value of DenyBased attribute of 
PERMIS policy is “false”, otherwise it is “true”.  
d) All the <relationaloperator> of the ABNF grammar are translated into the 
corresponding PERMIS functions <EQ> (equal to), <GT> (greater than), <LT> (less 
than), <NOT> (not). 
e) Each <attribute> of a <condition> element of the ABNF grammar consists of 
<category>, <name> and <type>. Since no arbitrary subject/ resource attributes can be 
                                                                                                                                             
7 The prefix “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:” is omitted for readability.  
8 The prefix “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:” is omitted for readability.  




defined in PERMIS all the attributes are presented as Environment attributes. The 
value of <name> becomes the value of Parameter and the <type> becomes the Type of 
the Environment attribute of PERMIS.  
f) The attribute <value> of the ABNF becomes the Constant Value against which the 
environment attributes are compared according to the PERMIS function. 
g) The ABNF <operator> of “AND” / “OR” becomes the <AND> / <OR> function of 
PERMIS. 
h) The value of the <action> element of the ABNF grammar becomes the Action Name 
and ID of the PERMIS policy. 
i) The <obligations> of the ABNF element becomes the PERMIS <Obligations>. 
5.3.3 Automated conversion of CNL rules to XACML rules 
A tool named XACMLConverter was created in Java to convert the CNL rules into XACML. The 
conversion process is performed in two stages as shown in Figure 5-3.  
 
Stage1: Parsing the input.txt (containing the CNL rules) according to the ABNF grammar 
(passed by grammar.txt) produces an intermediate.xml file. Intermediate.xml is XML whose 




Figure 5-3. Automated conversion process from CNL rules to XACML rules. 




Table 5.11 is showing the intermediate.txt9 produced from this input.txt containing “ACR 3: If the 
Environment:RequestTime:date is less than Resource:ValidityTime:date then Deny the Access to the 
PersonalData.” 








</attribute></attributes><relationalOperator>is less than</relationalOperator> 
<attributes><attribute><category>Resource</category>:<name><STRING>ValidityTime</STRING> 
</name>:<type>date</type></attribute></attributes></condition></conditions> 
<wp> </wp>then<wp> </wp> 
<GrantOrDeny>Deny</GrantOrDeny><article>the</article> 
<actions><action><word>Access</word></action></actions> 
< <prep>to</prep><article><wp></wp>the<wp> </wp></article> 
<ResourceType><word>PersonalData</word></ResourceType</rule-statement>.</rule-definition> 
 
For implementing stage 1 a free Java tool aParse (http://www.parse2.com) is used to convert 
the CNL rules into XACML.  
Stage 2: Converting the intermediate.xml into policy.xml using XPath and JAVA Architecture 
for XML binding.  
A Java object representation of XACML is created first. Java Architecture for XML binding 
(JABX) is used to convert the Java classes into XML. For example, to represent  <Rule 
RuleId="3" Effect="Grant"> the following Java classes are created:  
public class Rule { 
protected String ruleId; 
protected String effect; 
//getters and setters methods will follow. 
} 
To tell the class, and how to marshall it into the desired XML format, Java annotations are used 
as specified in JAXB. Since we want both the ruleId and effect to be attributes of the <Rule> 
element, we simply ‘annotated’ them as @XMLAttribute 
public class Rule { 
@XmlAttribute(name = "RuleId") 
protected String ruleId; 
@XmlAttribute(name = "Effect") 
protected String effect; 
//getters and setters methods will follow} 
After creating the Rule object the values for the attributes need to be provided. Intermediate 
                                                 
9 Some <whitespace> (<wp>) elements have been removed from the produced output for readability.  




XML contains all the needed values. We have used ‘XPath’ to fetch the interested values. For 
example, From intermediate.xml we read the ruleId by the following code:       String ruleId = 
inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-id/STRING/text()"); 
"/rule-definition/rule-id/STRING/” defines the path in intermediate.xml where ruleId is 
specified. Table 5.12 is showing some example source code of stage 2 of the XACMLConverter. 
Table 5.12: Example source code of stage2 of XACMLConverter 
// Create a policy object, which will be converted to xml using JAXB 
Policy policy = factory.createPolicy(); 
// get ruleId using XPath 
String ruleId = inputHelper.getNodeValue("//rule-definition/rule-id/STRING/text()"); 
// Set ruleId to policy 
Rule rule = factory.createRule(); 
rule.setRuleId(ruleId); 
policy.setRule(rule); 
// prepare marshaling to xml 
JAXBContext jaxbContext = JAXBContext.newInstance(Policy.class); 
Marshaller jaxbMarshaller = jaxbContext.createMarshaller(); 
// write to file 
File file = new File(convertedFile); 
jaxbMarshaller.marshal(policy, file); 
5.3.4 Implementation of the conflict resolution rules 
All the ACRs are also converted into CRRs. While converting the ACR into CRR the <effect> 
of XACML is always “permit” and the <Obligation> of XACML becomes “permit-overrides” 
or “deny-overrides” depending on the value of <GrantOrDeny> of the ABNF (see Section 
4.5.6).  
The conversion of a CRR presented according to the ABNF grammar of Section 4.4 to an 
XACML / PERMIS policy follows the steps similar to the conversion of an ACR. However, 
the new element DCR becomes an <obligation> in XACML.  
 
In XACMLv2 the smallest element on which the <Obligation> can be applied is <Policy>. 
Hence in XACML the Conflict Resolution Rules are implemented as separate <Policy> 
elements inside a <PolicySet> element. The <Obligation> returns the DCA to use (as 
described in Chapter 3 and 4). In PERMIS each CRR is written as a separate Target Access 
Rules (TAR) with an obligation to use a DCA. As an example of conversion we use the 
same Legal rule mentioned in Section 5.3.1 (i.e. the data subject can submit a policy for 
his/her personal data, where the data subject can be identified by either an {E-mailAddress}, or 
a {NHS Number}) as a CRR to convert into XACML v2. This is shown in Table 5.13.  
Table 5.13: Implementation of a CRR in XACML v2 and PERMIS 
 
----------------Implementation of a CRR in XACML v2----------------- 
 
<Policy PolicyId="3" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
    <Target></Target> 
    <Rule RuleId="3" Effect="Permit"> 




       <Description> ACR 4: If the Subject:Email:string is equal to the resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string OR the 
Subject:NHSNumber:string is equal to the Resource:DataSubject'sNHSNumber:string then Grant the SubmitPolicy for 
PersonalData. </Description> 
        <Target/> 
        <Condition>   
         <Apply FunctionId="X:and">   
     <Apply FunctionId="X:or"> 
                 <Apply FunctionId="X:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
         <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-mail" DataType="Y#string" /> 
         <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="Y#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="X:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
          <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" DataType="Y#string" /> 
          <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="X#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
          </Apply> 
          <Apply FunctionId="X:any-of"> 
              <Function FunctionId="X:string-equal"/> 
                  <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="Y#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
                <AttributeValue DataType="Y#string">SubmitPolicy</AttributeValue> 
             </Apply> 
             <Apply FunctionId="X:any-of"> 
                 <Function FunctionId="X:string-equal"/> 
                      <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="Y#string" AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
                     <AttributeValue DataType="Y#string">PersonalData</AttributeValue> 
                 </Apply> 
             </Apply> 
        </Condition> 
       </Rule> 
       <Obligations>          
           <Obligation ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/permit-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/>   
       </Obligations>    
</Policy> 
Here X= urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function and Y= http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema 
----------------Implementation of a CRR in PERMIS----------------- 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicyv1"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14"> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 




    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
  <TargetPolicy> 
    <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
      <Include URL=""/>  
      <ObjectClass Name="PersonalData"/> 
    </TargetDomainSpec>  
  </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="SubmitPolicy" ID="SubmitPolicy"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action> 
   </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
       <!-- DataSubject can SubmitPolicy for his/her personal data.   
     --> 
    <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList> 
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target> 
          <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
          <AllowedAction ID="SubmitPolicy"/> 
        </Target>       
      </TargetList> 
      <IF> 
 <OR> 
               <EQ> 
           <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="DataSubject’sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
       </EQ> 
       <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
        </EQ> 
    </OR>  
 </IF>  
 <Obligations> 
   <Obligation ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/permit-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
 </Obligations> 
    </TargetAccess> 
  </TargetAccessPolicy> 
</X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy> 
 
5.4 Validation of the Legal Rules 
The aim of the validation tests of the Legal policy rules is to evaluate whether the rules give 
the desired responses or not. Martin et al. (Martin, et al. 2008) proposed an approach for 
determining a set of properties with which policies can be verified. It creates mutant policies 
(e.g. by altering the effects of policies) and tests against the properties of original policies. If 
the mutant policy still holds the properties of original then the quality of the properties is not 
sufficient. The number of properties of the original policy that is not held by the mutant policy 
determines the quality of the properties for verifying a policy. Xiao et al. (Xiao, et al. 2012) used 
a validation process which evaluates the extracted access requests from NL functional 




requirements against extracted policies from software documents which is helpful for finding 
name inconsistency (i.e. the same user is defined with different names in the policy). However 
this process is not rigorous enough to use for our validation purpose. Fisler et al. (Fisler, et al. 
2005) used a decision-diagram based presentation of an access control policy for analysing it in 
software called Margrave10 (Nelson 2010). This software provides functions to answer queries 
about properties of a policy. Although Margrave can handle the core XACML its current 
implementation suffers from some limitations, such as, it cannot support XACML functions 
other than string equality, and it cannot handle obligations. Hence this tool cannot be used for 
validation testing of our extracted rules. However our test cases used a similar approach of 
Fisler for analysing the rules. Our approach is to methodologically test each rule by forming a 
request context with the various combinations of the rule’s attributes. 
We constructed a set of test cases based on evaluating each rule one by one. Each Legal rule is 
a combination of conditions and each condition consists of either an attribute-attribute pair or 
attribute-value pair and their relationship. Each condition can evaluate to true or false. A 
condition is related to other conditions by a binary operator (AND, OR). Exhaustive test cases 
have been generated based on each condition where each condition in each rule had two test 
cases created for it, one where the condition was known to be true and one where the 
condition was known to be false. For generating the test cases a MTBDD (Multi-terminal binary 
decision diagram) can be generated where each condition becomes a node in the binary tree. 
Figure 5-4 shows the MTBDD of the test cases shown in Table 5.14.  
 
 
                                                 
10 http://www.margrave-tool.org/ 





Figure 5-4. Presentation of rule in the form of MTBDD where the results form 
terminal nodes and each condition becomes a decision node. 
A request context has been prepared for each text case. For each request context the 
responses of the Legal access control and conflict resolution PDPs are compared with the 
desired outcomes. For performing the validation tests the system is first configured with only 
the Legal Conflict Resolution PDP and the decisions are obtained like any normal PDP 
decisions. The DCA is obtained as a part of the returned obligation. Then the system is 
configured with only the Legal Access Control PDP to see the response. The same set of tests 
is conducted for it as well. Table 5.14 shows the responses of both the Legal Access Control 
PDP and the Legal Conflict Resolution PDP for one Legal rule. Similar test cases have been 
generated for all the Legal rules. More than 100 test cases were generated in total and they are 
presented in Appendix 1. The PHP PEP and the SoapUI11 both are used for the validation tests.  









1.  Purpose of collection= 
[X] purpose (current 
purpose)= [X]  
DCA = N/A 
Decision = 
N/A 
DCA = N/A 
Decision = 
N/A 
These tests are verifying 
the NL Legal rule “If the 
requested purpose of 
processing does not match 
with the original purpose of 
2.  Purpose of collection = 





                                                 
11 http://www.soapui.org/ 
 




purpose)= [Y, where Y≠ 
X and Y≠"historical 
purpose" / Y≠ "statistical 
purpose" / Y≠"scientific 





collection or is not for a 
historical 
purpose/statistical purpose 
/ scientific purpose then 
Deny the request.” Which 
formed the CNL “If the 
Action:Purpose:string is not 
the 
Resource:PurposesOfCollec
tion:string OR the 
Action:Purpose:string is not 
a "historical purpose" / 
"statistical purpose" / 
"scientific purpose" then 
Deny the Access to the 
PersonalData.” 
 
It is notable that this rule 
does not Grant access if the 
purpose of collection 
matches the purpose of 
processing or the purpose 
of processing is a historical 
purpose/statistical purpose 
/ scientific purpose so that 
the decision is left for the 
other PDPs 
3.   Purpose of collection 
=[X] purpose (current 
purpose)= [Y, where Y≠ 
X, Y=scientific purpose , 
Y≠"historical purpose" / 





4.  The purpose of 
collection = [X] purpose 
(current purpose) = [Y, 
where Y≠ X and Y= 
“statistical purpose”, Y≠ 
"historical purpose" , Y≠ 





5.  Purpose of collection 
=[X] purpose (current 
purpose)= [Y, where Y≠ 
X and Y=historical 
purpose, Y≠ “statistical 






5.5 Validation of the System 
Once we have validated that the Legal PDP gives the correct decisions, we next tested the 
complete system using a set of PDPs (Legal, data subject’s, controller’s PDP). We developed a 
set of use case scenarios for the validation tests based on the following objectives:  
i) Show that the Legal PDP decisions get priority over that of data subject and 
controller. 
ii) Show that the privileged access right provided to certain stakeholders by the 
Legal PDP (e.g. Medical Professional, data subject) is enforced.  
iii) Show that the data subject’s PDP decisions get preferences over that of the 
controller.  
iv) Show how contract based access to personal data is enforced.  
v) Show access scenario to both very sensitive personal data (e.g. medical data) and 
less sensitive personal data (e.g. CV). 
vi) Demonstrate that the important functional properties of the system are correctly 
integrated together, namely: 
(1) Sticky policy enforcement  
(2) Support for multiple languages 




(3) Support for obligation combination 
(4) Distributed policy enforcement 
5.5.1 Use case scenario1 (access to medical data) 
This use case shows access control scenario of a health care centre which deals with very 
sensitive personal data such as medical data. The validation tests based on this scenario verify 
the access rights of the data subject and others such as Medical Professionals, researcher or 
other organisational roles such as administrative officers or financial officers are being 
executed as expected by our system.  
 
A patient Mr. M registers with the Kent Health Centre and fills out a registration form. He is 
also given a form where he mentions his policy about who can access his medical record. This 
is a form mainly of tick boxes so that the patient does not need to know the complex policy 
languages. The patient’s preference is translated into the machine executable policies using a 
policy language.  
 
The CRRs of the law, issuer, data subject, controller and default one are placed in order. The 
Legal CRRs are mentioned in Table A 1.3 of Appendix 1.  
Let the Issuer’s CRRs be  
1. If the ResourceType is medical data and the requester is a Medical Professional 
DCA=GrantOverrides. 
2. If the ResourceType is prescription, DCA=GrantOverrides. 
3. If the ResourceType is medical data and the requester is not a Medical 
Professional DCA=DenyOverrides. 
The Data subject’s CRR is 
 If the request is for my personal data DCA=DenyOverrides. 
The Controller’s is  
 If the request is for any data DCA=GrantOverrides. 
The Default CRR is 
 DCA=DenyOverrides  
The policies in the system are the Legal Policy, Issuer’s Policy, Data subject’s Policy, 
Controller’s Policy. The Legal Policy is presented in table A1.3 of Appendix1. 
The Issuer’s policy for this case is-  
 Medical Professional can change the value of MedicalObjection attribute of the 
medical data or of each medical record in the medical data separately for the purpose 
of saving the vital interest of the data subject. 
The DataSubject’s Policy rules are –  
 Dr. D of Kent Health Centre can READ and WRITE my medical data.  
 Researchers are allowed to READ the medical data if the data can be anonymised. 
The Controller’s Policy rules are 
 Administrative Officers can READ and WRITE administrative data (such as the contact 
information of patients, and which doctor is treating which patient etc.) but 
cannot access the medical data.  
  Financial Officers can READ the billing and payment information but cannot READ the 
medical data or administrative data.  




  Medical Professionals cannot access the billing and payment information or the 
patient’s financial information. 
All the policies and Request Context (RC) used for the tests are presented in Appendix 5. Mr. 
M gets some problem with his lungs and his treating doctor Dr. D tries to Read the medical 
data of Mr. M at the “Kent Health Centre”, the request of Dr. D is granted by the system. (How 
to determine whether a requester is a treating doctor is discussed in Chapter 4.) 













1.   Dr. D of Kent Health 
Canter wants to 
READ the medical 




Grant N/A Grant N/A Grant 
Mr. M then has an X-ray. Dr. D enters the preliminary results into Mr. M’s record as the Write 
request is granted for Dr. D. 













2.  Dr. D of Kent Health 
Canter wants to 
WRITE the medical 




Grant N/A Grant N/A Grant 
Dr. D suggests Mr. M to consult a specialised doctor. Mr. M goes to a Medical Consultant Dr. S 
at London Hospital and Dr. S of London Hospital tries to access the data at the “Kent Health 
Centre” and gets a ‘BTG’ response. 













3.  Dr. S of London 
Hospital wants to 
READ the medical 






BTG N/A N/A N/A BTG 
Dr. S at London Hospital suggests the patient changes his policy to allow him access or he 
would need to break the glass every time. The patient contacts the Kent Health Centre and 
tries to change his policy to allow Dr. S of London Hospital to READ/WRITE on his data which is 
granted by Legal policy. 
 

















4.  Mr. M wants to 
UpdatePolicy of the 
medical data of Mr. 





Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
So the Data Subject’s PDP now has policy rules – 
 Dr. D of Kent Health Centre can READ and WRITE my medical data.  
 Researchers are allowed to READ the medical data if the data can be anonymised. 
 Dr. S of London Hospital can READ and WRITE my medical data. 
Now Dr. S of London Hospital tries to read Mr. M’s medical record at Kent Health Organisation.  













5. Dr. S of London 
Hospital wants to 
READ the medical 




BTG N/A Grant N/A Grant 
 
Now Dr. S can read the medical data of Mr. M at Kent Health Centre. Dr. S wants to write 
about the treatment he is offering in that record which is now granted by the data subject’s 
PDP. 













6. Dr. S of London 
Hospital wants to 
WRITE the medical 





BTG N/A  Grant N/A Grant 
Mr. M is suspected to have a severe problem in his lungs and at the moment knowing this 
would be harmful for his mental condition since he is a patient with chronic depression as well. 
Dr. S at the London Medical Centre tries to change the value of the MedicalObjection attribute 
of Mr. M.’s medical record (in the Mr. M’s medical data) containing this report to “true”.  













7. Dr. S of London 
Hospital wants to 
WRITE the 
MedicalObjection 
attribute of one of Mr. 
M’s Medical Record (at 






N/A Grant  N/A N/A Grant 




Now Mr. M requests to view his medical data. The PEP first requests the PDP to see if the 
requester is allowed to READ the medical data at all. When the request is granted then the PEP 
calls the PDPs with the requests for each medical record separately. Mr. M’s medical record 
containing record of lungs problem will have the value of the resource attribute 
MedicalObjection to be “true” and this resource attribute will be expanded with the request 
context automatically by the PEP. 















8. Mr. M wants to READ 
the MedicalRecord X 
of Mr. M (at Kent 






Deny N/A N/A N/A Deny 
For all the medical record other than the medical record with MedicalObjection = true he is 
granted access.  













9. Mr. M wants to READ 
the medical record Y 
of Mr. M (at Kent 




Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
So Mr. M does not know that the severe lungs problem record exists. When the Deny decision 
is obtained the PEP simply skips this record and proceeds to the next one.  
Dr. D gently tells him about the lung condition. The report directly on screen might scare the 
patient and could cause harm to his mental state. But he needs to be treated. So Dr. D gently 
informs the patient about the condition and explains to him the situation. When the doctor 
finds that Mr. M is mentally strong enough and can handle the situation he requests to change 
the resource attribute of this medical data record to have MedicalObjection=false. For the 
medical record issued by Dr. S the issuer’s policy and CRR will be provided by Dr. S. Let us 
assume that Dr. S did not specify any CRR or policy.  













10. Dr. D wants to 
WRITE on the 
MedicalObjection 
attribute of one of 





Grant  N/A N/A N/A Grant 
Mr. M now tries to access the medical data and none of the medical records have 




MedicalObjection = true. Hence like case 9 Mr. M gets access to all the records. 
When the administrator at the Kent Health Centre wants to access the medical data and is 
denied by the controller PDP. 













11. Administrator of 
Kent Health Centre 
wants to READ the 






N/A N/A N/A Deny Deny 
A Medical Professional wants to access the billing data of Mr. M and is denied by the controller 
PDP. 













12. Dr. L of Kent 
Health Centre 
wants to READ the 






N/A N/A N/A Deny Deny 
A friend of Mr. M wants to access the medical data of Mr. M and gets a NotApplicable decision. 













13. A friend of Mr. M 
wants to READ the 





N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The NotApplicable decision is turned into a Deny by the application PEP which denies access to 
all requests that are not explicitly granted.  
Mr. M suddenly faces an accident while he is on a holiday. He is taken to the nearest hospital H. 
The doctor of that hospital needs to treat him and they need to know his medical history to 
treat him properly. From his accompanying friend the doctor came to know that the Kent 
Health centre is his regular medical service provider. Dr. T of Hospital H tries to access the 
medical data of Mr. M at the Kent Health Centre and gets a BTG response.  














14. Dr. T of Hospital H 
wants to READ the 
medical data of Mr. 





BTG N/A N/A N/A BTG 




Since it is an emergency situation Dr. T decides to BTG at the Kent Health Centre.  














15. Dr. T of Hospital H 
wants to BTG the 
medical data of Mr. 





Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
As the glass has been broken all the activities on Mr. M's record are monitored and an email is 
sent to the Kent Health Centre's authority about the BTG. Now Dr. T wants to READ the 
medical data of Mr. M at the Kent Health Centre which is now granted. 














16. Dr. T of Hospital H 
wants to READ the 
medical data of Mr. 
M (at the Kent 





Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
Dr. T of Hospital H wants to write on the medical data of Mr. M at the Kent Health Centre 
which is now granted. 














17. Dr. T of Hospital H 
wants to WRITE on 
the medical data of 
Mr. M (at Kent 





Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
A friend of Mr. M tries to READ the medical data of Mr. M at the Kent Health Centre when the 
glass is broken. The friend is still denied access by the application PEP because the glass was 
only broken for Dr. T to have access. 













18. A friend of Mr. M 
wants to READ the 
medical data of Mr. 





N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 




A Researcher wants to access the medical data and gets response of Grant if the data can be 
anonymised. 













19. Researcher of 
University of Kent 
wants to READ the 
medical data of Mr. 











e the data  







Mr. M relocates to Germany and registers with G Health Centre. G Health Centre tries to 
transfer the medical record of Mr. M from the Kent Health Centre and gets a NotApplicable 
response. 













20. G Health Centre 
wants to Transfer 
the medical data 
of Mr. M to 
Germany. 
DenyOverri
des by the 
Legal CRR 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The Kent Health Centre contacts Mr. M for his consent about the transfer and Mr. M provides 
the consent to transfer to = G Health Centre. Now G Health Centre tries to transfer the medical 
record of Mr. M from the Kent Health Centre which is now granted. 














21. G Health Centre wants 
to Transfer the 
medical data of Mr. M 





des by the 
Legal CRR 

















5.5.2 Use case scenario2 (contract based access to personal data) 
Here three different use case scenarios of accessing personal data based on contracts are 
presented.  
 5.5.2.1 Health centre and pharmacy contract 
There is a contract between the Kent Health Centre and each of the registered pharmacies to 
access the prescriptions of patients for providing medicines. The <ResourceType> element 
contains the value “prescription” to indicate what resource is being allowed to access by this 
contract. An authority of the Kent Health Centre and an authority of a registered pharmacy B 
sign the contract with their Distinguished Names (DNs). These are mentioned in the 
<SignerOfContract> elements of the <PartyOfContract> elements. Each <PartyOfContract> 
element also has an element called <OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> which contains the 
other identifying attributes of the signers. The name and address of Kent Health Centre and 
that of pharmacy B are mentioned in the <IdentifyingAttributesOfParty> elements of the 
<PartyOfContract> elements. The <AuthorisedRequester> element has the <role>= 
“Employee” and the <organisation>=“pharmacy B” elements. The <role> element contains the 
role the requester must hold and the <organisation> element contains the name of the 
organisation to which the role holder must belong. This means that anyone holding the 
“Employee” role of “pharmacy B” is allowed to access the “prescriptions” of the “Kent Health 
Centre”. The Kent Health Centre stores the contract information in a contract repository after 
validating the contract. The stored information comprises contract’s identifier, validity time, 
resource type and the identifying information of the authorised requester and parties of the 
contract. 
 
Mr. M is prescribed some medicines which he needs to buy from a registered pharmacy. Mr. M 
goes to a registered pharmacy B and asks for the medicine saying that his prescription belongs 
to the Kent Health Centre. The employee of the pharmacy B asks at the Kent Health Centre to 
transfer Mr. M’s prescription based on the contract identifier. The application PEP of the 
health centre looks up the contract with the provided contract identifier from the repository 
and passes the validity time, resource type and the identifying attributes of the authorised 
requester and parties of the contract to the request context. The application PEP also 
maintains a table of resource attributes where each column represents a resource attribute 
and each row represents the resource attributes of a resource (distinguished by the RID). 
When a request to access a resource arrives it passes all the resource attributes (such as 
identifying attributes of the data subject of the resource, resource type and so on) of the 
requested resource to the request context. The legal PDP then matches the resource type 
added to the request context from the resource attributes (named ResourceType) with that 
obtained from the contract (named ContractResourceType) and the identifying attributes of 
the subject (as presented by the requester) with the identifying attributes of the authorised 
requester (as obtained from the contract) and the request time (passed by the PEP as an 
environment attribute) with the validity time (obtained from the contract) to grant the 
transfer. Legal PDP also checks whether the controller is a party of the contract as mentioned 
in Section 3.3.3. Let’s assume that the CRRs and the policies are the same as mentioned in the 
previous section. 
 

















22. An employee of 
pharmacy B wants to 
TRASNFER Mr. M’s 
prescription from the 
Kent Health Centre to 



















When the data are transferred to the Pharmacy B’s system the policies of the issuer and the 
data subject are also passed and PDPs are started at the pharmacy’s site. 
A researcher wants to access Mr. M’s data at the pharmacy B’s site. 













23. Researcher wants 
to READ the 
prescription of Mr. 
M (at the 











e the data  







After the validity time of the contract is over the value of the <end time> element becomes 
less than the request time and if a transfer is requested again by the Pharmacy B (in the UK) 
the Legal PDP replies N/A for that. (This is because the request for transfer is to a country in 
the EU. For a transfer request to a non EU country a Deny would be returned for such a case). 















24. An employee of 
pharmacy B wants to 
TRANSFER Mr. M’s 
prescription from the 
Kent Health Centre to 
the pharmacy B (in the 
UK) and the request 







N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
5.5.2.2 Personal contract with a health insurance company 
Mr. M signs a contract with a health insurance company named HIC for covering the cost of 
treatment at the dental clinic D. In the contract the mentioned resource types are 




SummaryOfGivenTreatment and BillingInformation. The <SubjectOfContract> element of the 
contract document has the identity attributes of Mr. M and the <AuthorisedRequester> 
element has the <role>= “Employee” and <organisation>= “HIC”. Both the officer of HIC and 
Mr. M sign the contract and their DNs are mentioned as the <SignerOfContract> elements of 
the <PartyOfContract> elements. The <OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> elements have 
the other identifying attributes of Mr. M and that of the signer who signed the contract of 
behalf of HIC. The name and address of HIC is mentioned in the <IdentifyingAttributesOfParty> 
element.  
Let us assume that the CRRs and the policies for the medical data at the dental clinic D are the 
same as the Kent Health Centre. One employee of HIC asks at the dental clinic D to access the 
billingInformation of Mr. M and presents the contract of Mr. M and HIC. The dental clinic D 
validates the contract by the ConVS and the ConVS returns the validity time of the contract, 
resource type and identifying attributes of the subject of contract, authorised requester and 
the parties of the contract which are added to the request context. The PEP passes the 
resource attributes such as the identifying attributes of the data subject, resource type and so 
on to the request context. The legal PDP matches the attributes of the request context 
obtained from the resource attributes of the resource with that obtained from the contract as 
mentioned earlier in Section 5.5.2.1.  















22. Employee of HIC wants 
to READ the 
BillingInformation of 
Mr. M at the dental 



















5.5.2.3 Outsourcing contract  
In order to provide another example for contract based access to personal data let us consider 
a scenario where a university U outsources the employee details to a bank B for paying the 
salaries to the employees. There is a contract between the university and the bank where both 
of them are parties of the contract. An administrator of the university and an administrator of 
the bank B actually sign the contract and the DNs of the signers are mentioned in the contract 
as <SignerOfContract> of the <PartyOfcontract> elements and the 
<OtherIdentifyingAttributesOfSigner> elements contain the identifying attributes of the signer 
other than the DNs. The <IdentifyingAttributesOfParty> elements contain the name and 
address of the university U and bank B to indicate that these organisations are the parties of 
the contract. The <ResourceType>s mentioned in the contract are the “bank details” and 
“salary amount" of the employees. The <role>= “Employee” and the 
<organisation>=“University U” are mentioned in the <SubjectOfContract> element. The 
<role>=“SeniorOfficer” and the <organisation>=“Bank B” are mentioned in the 
<AuthorisedRequester> element, which means that only the <role>= “SeniorOfficer” of the 
<organisation>=“Bank B” can access the <ResourceType>= “bank details” and “salary 
amount” of the <role>=“Employee” of the <organisation> =“University U”. A 




<role>=“SeniorOfficer” of the <organisation>=“Bank B” asks for the information (bank details 
and salary amount) of an employee (or a number of employees one by one) at the university’s 
site and mentions the unique identifier of the contract. As the university is also a party of the 
contract the university should have a copy of the contract stored in the contract repository 
(after validating it). The PEP of the university gets the contract with the unique contract 
identifier from the repository and passes the validity time, resource type and the identifying 
attributes of the subject of contract, authorised requester, and parties of the contract to the 
request context. The PEP passes all the resource attributes of the requested resource such as 
the identifying attributes (including the <role> = “Employee” of the <organisation> = 
“University U”) of the data subject of the requested resource and so on to the request 
context. The legal PDP matches the attributes of the request context obtained from the 
resource attributes of the resource with that obtained from the contract as mentioned earlier 
in Section 5.5.2.1.  
Let us assume that there is no policy by the issuer/ data subject or the controller (but if there 
were they could not override the Legal PDP’s decision) and the default CRR is DenyOverrides.  













26. A Senior Officer of 
Bank B requests to 
TRANSFER Mr. M’s 
bank details from the 
university U to the 


















When the data are transferred the policies and resource attributes (such as the identifying 
attributes of the data subject, resource type etc.) are transferred with that. The data, resource 
attributes and policies are stored and PDPs are started at the receiving site with the received 
policies. The data subject Mr. M wants to READ his bank details at the Bank B. The legal PDP 
returns Grant as the data subject is requesting to read his data and the identifying attributes of 
the subject (requester) matches the data subject’s identifying attributes.  
 













27. Mr. M wants to READ 
his bank details at 




Grant N/A N/A N/A Grant 
A <role>=“Junior Officer” of the <organisation>= “Bank B” asks for the information (bank 
details) of an employee at the university’s site and mentions the unique identifier of the 
contract. As the <role>= “Junior Officer” is not mentioned as an authorised requester, the 
request cannot be granted based on the contract.  
 


















28. A Junior Officer of 
Bank B requests to 
TRANSFER Mr. M’s 
bank details from the 
university U to the 






N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
The obtained NotApplicable decision is turned into a Deny by the PEP. 
5.5.3 Use case scenario 3 (access to CV and degree certificate) 
This use case shows access control scenario of an employment agency which deals with 
personal data like CV. 
Mr. M is looking for a job and wants to get a service from an employment agency jobs.com. 
Jobs.com only allows members of the agency to apply for jobs or upload their CVs. Mr. M joins 
as a member. Mr. M, the Data Subject, is the Issuer of his CV. Mr. M is presented with a list of 
potential employers and he can choose from the list who he wants to share his CV with. From 
his choice an Issuer policy is created. Suppose that Mr. M chooses to share his CV with 
Companies C and D.  
Legal CRR- as before. 
Issuer’s CRR/ DataSubject’s CRR- DCA= DenyOverrides 
Controller’s CRR- DCA=GrantOverrides 
Default CRR- DCA=DenyOverrides 
Legal Policy- as before. 
Issuer’s policies/ DataSubject’s policies 
1. Only Company C and D can read and transfer my CV. 
2. Only Data subject can update / write/read his data. 
Controller’s policies 
1. Member can upload CV 
2. Member can apply for job 
3. Any staff of jobs.com can read any CV 
 
After Mr. M registers with jobs.com one of the staff of jobs.com asks to read the CV of Mr. M 










NO  Request 
Context 









29. Staff of 
jobs.com 
wants to READ 





N/A N/A Grant Grant 
Now the staff member gets to know about the educational information of Mr. M from his CV 
and knows that Mr. M has a degree from University U. The staff member of jobs.com (located 
in the UK) asks the University U for a copy of the degree certificate. At the site of the 
university the issuer (university) has a CRR saying if the request is for a degree certificate 
DCA=DenyOverrides and has a policy saying “Only the issuer can write or update degree 
certificate”. The data subject Mr. M has no CRR but a policy saying “if the request is to transfer 
my degree certificate then deny the request with an obligation to ask for consent.” Let us 
assume that as a controller the university does not have any policy or CRR and the default CRR 
is DenyOverrides.  
Hence at the university U’s site  
Legal CRR- as before. 
Issuer’s CRR- if the request is for a degree certificate DCA=DenyOverrides 
Default CRR- DCA=DenyOverrides 
Legal Policy- as before. 
Issuer’s policy – Only the issuer can write or update degree certificate. Issuer and data subject 
can read degree certificate. 
DataSubject’s policy- if the request is to transfer my degree certificate then deny the request 
with an obligation to ask for consent.  
 









30. Staff of jobs.com 
(located in the UK) 
wants to TRANSFER 
the degree 
certificate of Mr. M.  
DenyOverrides 
by Issuer CRR 
N/A N/A Deny with 
an 
obligation 
to ask for 
consent 




After getting the decision the PEP of University U requests for consent of Mr. M to transfer the 
degree certificate to jobs.com. When the data subject Mr. M consents to the transfer the PEP 
of University U adds that consent as a resource attribute SubjectConsentsToTransfer = 
jobs.com. Jobs.com is informed either by the University U or the data subject that the consent 
of data subject has been updated. The staff of jobs.com requests to transfer the degree 
certificate of Mr. M again. This time the PEP of University U appends the resource attribute 
SubjectConsentsToTransfer with the request context and the request is granted. 
 




NO  Request 
Context 
































N/A Deny with 
an 
obligation 
to ask for 
consent 






Along with the degree certificates the policies of the data subject and the policies of the issuer 
are sent as sticky policies and PDPs are started at the jobs.com’s site with those policies.  
 
Mr. M requests to read his degree certificate at jobs.com. 
NO  Request 
Context 













32. Mr. M wants 






Grant Grant N/A N/A Grant 
Mr. M request to update his degree certificate at the jobs.com. Although the policy of Mr. M 
allows updating his data by himself that decision is overridden by the Issuer PDP decision. 
NO  Request 
Context 






















N/A Deny Grant N/A Deny 
A request comes from the Company B to view the CV of Mr. M 
NO  Request 
Context 









34. Company B 
wants to READ 






N/A Deny N/A Deny 
 




A staff of jobs.com tries to write the CV of Mr. M which is denied by the Issuer PDP. 









35. Staff of jobs.com 
wants to WRITE 




N/A Deny N/A Deny 
A staff of jobs.com tries to Update the CV of Mr. M. 










36. Staff of jobs.com 
wants to Update 




N/A Deny N/A Deny 
A request comes from Company C to read the CV of Mr. M which is granted. 










37. Company C wants 
to READ the CV of 




N/A Grant N/A Grant 
Company C is interested in Mr. M. So it asks to transfer the CV of Mr. M to its system.  









38. Company C wants 
to TRANSFER the 
CV of Mr. M to 


















When the CV of Mr. M is transferred to Company C the policy of Mr. M also goes with it and a 
PDP is started with those policies.  
Company C wants to work in collaboration with Company X. Company C wants to share the CV 
of Mr. M with company X and company X sends a request to the system of Company C to READ 
the CV of Mr. M’s CV. Let us assume that company C has a policy to let the company X read a 
CV. In this case the Controller’s Grant decision is overridden by the Data subject’s Deny 
decision. 














39. Company X 
wants to READ 




N/A Deny Grant Deny 
   Mr. M wants to READ his CV at the Company C’s site which is granted by the Legal PDP. 










40. Mr. M wants to READ 
his CV. 
GrantOverrides 
by Legal CRR 
Grant N/A N/A Grant 
Mr. M tries to update his CV which is granted by Issuer’s PDP 











41. Mr. M wants to 
Update his CV. 
GrantOverrides 
by Issuer CRR 
N/A Grant N/A Grant 
 
Company C tries to update the CV of Mr. M which is denied by the Issuer’s PDP. 










42. Company C wants to 
Update CV of Mr. M.  
DenyOverrides 
by issuerCRR 
N/A Deny N/A Deny 
 
Company C requests to transfer the degree certificate of Mr. M from jobs.com which is denied. 
NO  Request 
Context 

























N/A Deny with 
an 
obligation 
to ask for 
consent 
After getting the decision the PEP of jobs.com asks for consent from Mr. M. He refuses to give 
consent and so the resource attribute SubjectConsentsToTransfer is not updated and the 
decision is not changed if the company C requests again.  
5.5.4 Use case scenario 4 (testing system properties) 
Here a simple use case is used where a controller allows its members to submit data (e.g. class 
notes) and share with his/her friends. The objective of this use case is to demonstrate that 
various functional properties of the system are integrated correctly together, namely:  




(1) Sticky policy enforcement  
(2) Support for multiple languages 
(3) Support for obligation combination 
(4) Distributed policy enforcement 
The aim of this use case is to provide some simple tests so that it is easily possible for anyone 
to repeat them to examine P-PAAS system properties.  
i) For this use case the XACML Legal PDP remains as it is and the system is configured 
with the controller policy saying “1. Member can SUBMIT policy 2. Member can 
TRANSFER sticky policy” (as presented in Appendix 4.6.1).   
ii) A request is sent by MyFriend role to Read a personal data having RID value “rid-1”. 
The request context is presented in Appendix 4.6.2. A “NotApplicable” response in 
obtained. The Read request is sent before the data subject submits a sticky policy and 
hence gets this response.  
iii) A member sends a SUBMIT request with an XACML policy saying that “MyFriend Role 
can Read my data with an obligation to LogTheRequest” for RID= “rid-1” and 
PolicyID="sticky-policy-1" as presented in Appendix 4.6.3. This will mean to instruct the 
system that this PolicyID is stuck with this RID and the policy identified by this PolicyID 
will be evaluated for the access requests for the resource identified by this RID. [This  
demonstrates the submission of sticky policy with the authorisation request] 
iv) The request context of Appendix 4.6.2, representing a request by MyFriend role to 
Read a personal data having RID value “rid-1”, is sent again and this time it replies 
Grant with obligation to LogTheRequest. This is demonstrating that the policy coming 
as a XACML sticky policy is being stored and evaluated for access request for the 
resource (identified by RID). [ This demonstrates the enforcement of the sticky policy 
which was submitted in step (iii) above] 
v) A SUBMIT request is sent by member with a PERMIS policy saying “MyFriend can Write 
my data with an obligation to Send e-mail” for the same RID (“rid-1”) with 
PolicyID="sticky-policy-2"as presented in Appendix 4.6.4. [This demonstrates the 
submission of sticky policy with multiple policy languages, in this case a PERMIS policy 
is submitted and in step (iii) an XACML policy was submitted.] 
vi) A Write request by MyFriend is submitted (as presented in Appendix 4.6.5) which 
evaluates the PERMIS policy and gets a Grant response. [This demonstrates that the 
system evaluates policies of multiple policy languages, XACML and PERMIS.] 
vii) A TRANSFER request is sent by the member for “rid-1” as provided in Appendix 4.6.6. 
All the policies that were submitted for “rid-1” are transferred as sticky policies. 
Appendix 4.6.7 is showing the response obtained after sending the request presented 
in Appendix 4.6.6 which contains the previously submitted sticky policies. [Since the 
system can receive sticky policies coming with the request context and can also send 
sticky policies with the response, this ensures that the system can be used for 
distributed enforcement of sticky policies.] 




viii) The member sends another SUBMIT request for “rid-1” with an XACML policy same as 
the policy presented in Appendix 4.6.3 with a different obligation “SendE-mail”. Note 
that the PolicyID will have the value "sticky-policy-3" in this case to make it 
distinguished from the previous policy.  
ix) The request context presented in Appendix 4.6.2, representing a request by MyFriend 
role to Read a personal data having RID value “rid-1”, is sent again and this time the 
response is obtained with two obligations, “LogTheRequest” and “SendE-mail” as 
presented in 4.6.8. [This demonstrates that the system can combine obligations from 
two different policies.] 
 5.6 Performance Tests of the Authorisation Service 
In this section we present performance tests of the prototype implementation of the P-PAAS 
authorisation system. 
5.6.1 Performance tests in a single machine 
The authorisation service was installed in a single machine whose configuration was: dual core 
processors each with cpu speed = 2.99 GHz; cache=2 MB; the total memory size was 2 GB and 
the machine was running Ubuntu 10.04. The configuration of the client machine: Dual core 
processor with 2.53 GHz CPU speed and memory size was 2.98 GB and was running Windows 
XP. As client software the SOAPUI12 was used. The client was operating across a local area 
network. Two series of tests were performed. The first set tested how long it took for the 
authorisation system to store and retrieve a user’s sticky policy and make an authorisation 
decision. The second set tested the reduction in performance for an increasing number of 
embedded PDPs running inside the authorisation system. All the embedded PDPs in this case 
were XACML PDPs, which we know from previous research (Chadwick, Su and Laborde 2008) 
is not the fastest of PDPs. Hence, these figures can be improved upon by using faster PDPs 
(such as PERMIS). 
5.6.1.1 Making authorisation decisions by the authorisation server 
For the first set of tests, the legal PDP had 1 rule in it and the data controller’s PDP had 1 rule in 
it. The user’s sticky policy also had 1 rule in it and this policy was added in test 2 and transferred 
in test 4.  
Test 1 was a request to read personal information when only the Legal and controller’s PDP 
were running. Test 2 was to store personal information along with a sticky policy. Two policies 
were evaluated (Legal and controller’s) and the request was granted and the user’s policy was 
then stored by the authorisation system. Test 3 was a request by a third party to read the 
user’s personal information. Three policies (user’s, Legal and controller’s) were interrogated 
and the decision was granted. Test 4 was a request to move the user’s personal data to 
another system. Three policies were interrogated, the request was granted, and the user’s 
sticky policy was returned with the decision. 
Each test was run sequentially 500 times and then the mean time and standard deviation were 
calculated. Any results that varied over 3 times the standard deviation from the mean time 




were removed as outliers. This resulted in 2.25% of the results being discarded on average. The 
results are presented in Table 5.15.  
Table 5.15: Time (in ms) to make an authorisation decision and/or store/retrieve a 
sticky policy 
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded 
1. Authz decision with 2 PDPs 6.34 0.74 2.47 
2. Request to store personal data and 
sticky policy 
15.02 2.04 3.4 
3. Authz decision with 3 PDPs 14.82 1.47 2 
4. Request to transfer data (and 
retrieve sticky policy) 
28.81 2.12 2.6 
From the results one can see that: 
- the time taken to store personal data and a sticky policy was approximately 2.5 times the time 
taken to make the authorisation decision  
- the time taken to retrieve a sticky policy for transfer is approximately 14 ms twice the time 
taken to store it, and that approximately half of this time is on decision making using 3 PDPs. 
5.6.1.2 Increasing the number of PDPs embedded in the authorisation 
server 
In this second series of tests the authorisation server was configured with an increasing 
number of policies/PDPs, each containing 1 rule. In the first test the authorisation server only 
had 1 policy configured into it (the legal PDP with 1 rule). In the second test the authorisation 
server was configured with the Legal policy and the data controller’s policy (with 1 rule). In the 
third test the authorisation server had 3 policies: the user’s sticky policy (with 1 rule), and the 
legal and controller’s configured policies. In the subsequent tests an additional sticky policy 
was added. The number of rules in each additional PDP is kept the same for this set of tests so 
that the results are not affected by different numbers of rules in different PDPs.  
In each case we measured the time taken for an authorisation decision to be made when a 
third party asked to read a record, and a Grant decision was obtained. This necessitated all 
configured policies being interrogated and the Master PDP determining the overall decision, 
using a GrantOverrides combining rule. The results are shown in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16: Time (in ms) to make an authorisation decision for different number of 
PDPs 
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded Mean PDPi – 
MeanPDPi-1 
1 PDP 5.27 0.51 4.07  
2 PDPs 6.34 0.74 2.47 1.07 
3 PDPs 14.82 1.47 2 8.48 
4 PDPs 22.64 1.53 2 7.82 
5 PDPs 30.37 1.9 1.4 7.73 
6 PDPs 38.30 1.99 1.6 7.93 
                                                                                                                                             
12 http://www.soapui.org/ 




7 PDPs 46.47 2.32 1.2 8.17 
8 PDPs 54.26 2.28 2.4 7.79 
9 PDPs 62.51 2.59 0.8 8.25 
10 PDPs 69.61 2.55 1.2 7.1 
From the results one can observe that the time taken to make an authorisation decision 
increases linearly with the number of sticky policy PDPs, and for this configuration, each PDP 
adds approximately 8ms. The reason the 2nd PDP added only a small amount of time (approx. 1 
ms) is that it is a built in PDP and not a sticky policy PDP. Figure 5-5 shows the response time 
vs. the number of PDPs. 
 
Figure 5-5. Response time as number of PDPs is increased incrementally. 
5.6.2 Performance tests in a cloud 
The P-PAAS can be used by an IaaS provider as a part of the infrastructure offering to platform 
and application developers. The latter may then use this to further develop privacy preserving 
applications. Our authorisation infrastructure does not obviate the need for trust, but rather is 
built on the assumption that cloud providers can be trusted to the extent that they wish to 
provide an automated infrastructure that can easily enforce each other’s policies reliably and 
automatically. If they cannot support an incoming sticky policy they should inform the sender 
of the fact. Our system provides IaaS providers with an application independent authorisation 
infrastructure that makes it easy for them to enforce users’ privacy policies without having to 
write a significant amount of new code themselves. Furthermore the user has the potential for 
more complete control over his/her privacy than now, in that the infrastructure allows the user 
to specify a complete privacy policy along with obligations.  
A cloud provider can use the P-PAAS infrastructure as a service for its users to allow them to 
set their own privacy policies, thereby guaranteeing no unauthorised access to their data. The 
infrastructure ensures that these privacy policies are stuck to the users’ data and access to the 
data is controlled by the relevant policies even if the data is transferred between cloud 




providers or services. The authorisation system has been installed in a private cloud server to 
test its applicability and performance in the cloud.  
 
The authorisation infrastructure was up and running on a small cloud server, whose 
configuration was: 2 CPUs each with 4 core and each core with hyper-threading support 
(equivalent to 16 core) with each core's speed being 2.53 GHz; cache size for each core is 12 
MB; memory is 25 GB in total. The configuration for each Virtual Machine inside the cloud is: 
cpu speed= 2.53 GHz; cache=4 MB; memory=~256MB. We ran the authorisation infrastructure 
as one VM.  
The configuration of the client machine, which performed the role of the cloud medical 
application running in a different cloud was: cpu speed = 2.99 GHz; cache=2 MB; memory= 2 
GB. Note that there was no underlying medical application, as all the client machine did was 
make authorisation decisions requests across a LAN and receive authorisation decisions. 
Because the client was operating across a local area network we realise that the results will be 
slower than if the client was running inside another VM of the same cloud service, but they will 
be faster than if the cloud application was being run by a different cloud provider accessing 
the storage service over the Internet. 
Two series of tests were performed. The first set tested how long it took for the authorisation 
system to store and retrieve a user’s sticky policy and make an authorisation decision. The 
second set tested the reduction in performance for an increasing number of PDPs running 
inside the authorisation system. 
5.6.2.1 Making authorisation decisions by the authorisation server 
The same sets of policies were used as mentioned in Section 5.6.1.1.  
Each test was run sequentially 500 times and then the mean time and standard deviation were 
calculated. Any results that varied over 3 times the standard deviation from the mean time 
were removed as outliners. This resulted in 2.27% of the results being discarded on average. 
The results are presented in Table 5.17.  
Table 5.17: Time (in ms) to make an authorisation decision and/or store/retrieve a 
sticky policy 
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded 
1. Authz decision with 2 PDPs 5.40 0.73 3.8 





3. Authz decision with 3 PDPs 7.41 0.82 1.2 
4. Request to transfer data (and 
retrieve sticky policy) 
11.38 0.9 3.0 
From the results one can see that: 
- the time to retrieve a sticky policy for transfer is approximately the same as the time to store 
it along with personal data. 
- the cloud service performs faster than the single machine due to its greater CPU power and 
memory. In particular, adding a third PDP does not slow the cloud service down significantly. 
 




5.6.2.2 Increasing the number of PDPs embedded in the authorisation 
server 
The setting of PDP and policies are same a mentioned in Section 5.6.1.2.  
The results are shown in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: Time (in ms) to make an authorisation decision for different number of 
PDPs 
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded Mean PDPi – 
MeanPDPi-1 
1 PDP 4.11 0.31 5.4   
2 PDPs 5.40 0.73 3.8 1.29 
3 PDPs 7.19 1.35 5.8 1.79 
4 PDPs 10.17 0.49 5.6 2.98 
5 PDPs 13.06 0.95 0.8 2.89 
6 PDPs 15.63 1.11 1.0 2.57 
7 PDPs 18.57 1.08 2.12 2.94 
8 PDPs 21.34 1.2 1.9 2.77 
9 PDPs 23.93 1.4 0.79 2.59 
10 PDPs 25.54 1.5 1.0 1.61 
From the results one can observe that there is a linear increase in time as the number of PDPs 
increases, and for this particular configuration, each PDP adds an additional 2.6 ms.  
 
Figure 5-6. Response time as number of PDPs is increased incrementally. 
5.6.3 Performance tests for increasing number of rules 
A series of tests are conducted to see when the number of rules in a policy is increased 
whether the overhead of increasing the number of PDPs becomes insignificant or not. The 
performance of the authorisation service is tested using only one embedded PDP in a single 




machine set up as discussed in Section 5.6.1. The PDP was set at the configuration time so that 
it does not add any overhead for starting a PDP with a sticky policy. The number of rules is 
increased at each test and the time to get a response for a request is measured. The results are 
shown in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.19: Time (in ms) to make an authorisation decision for different number of 
rules 
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded Time per rule 
1 Rule 5.9 0.7 5.2 5.9 
10 Rules 15.58 0.9 5.2 1.56 
100 Rules 69.26 1.59 4.2 0.69 
1000 Rules 581.19 8.12 0.98 0.58 
We can see that as the number of rules increases, the time to reach a decision increases. There 
is an overhead in the operation of the authorisation service and to a first approximation we 
may assume this is fixed. Hence, as the number of rules increases, the overhead per rule 
decreases until eventually it will become negligible per rule. If one assumes the time for 1 rule 
approximately equals the overhead, and subtract this time from the other measurements, we 
can still see that the time per rule for 100 rules (without overhead) (0.634 ms) is still more than 
the time per rule for 1000 rules even when the latter includes the overhead (0.581 ms). It can 
be observed from Figure 5-7 that time taken to evaluate a single rule decreases as the number 
of rules increases and for the existing configuration we reach nearly a steady state of 
approximately 0.576 ms per rule for 999 rules. So there is still something else which is causing 
the time taken per rule to decrease as the number of rules increase. This could be the Java 
machine optimisation code that is continually refining the optimisation.  
It can further be observed from Table 5.16 and 5.19 that the mean time to get a decision from 1 
PDP with 100 rules (69.26 ms) is equivalent to getting a decision from 10 PDPs each having 1 
rule (69.61 ms) in the tested configuration.  
 
  
Figure 5-7. Per rule evaluation time with increasing number of rules. 






In this chapter the implementations of the authorisation service and the components (such as, 
ConVS and PEP) and the implementation of the Legal access control and conflict resolution 
policies are discussed. Above 100 test cases have been performed for the validation of the 
Legal rules. Examples of the validation tests of one of the Legal policy rules are presented 
here. The rest of the test cases are presented in Appendix 1. The validation tests of the overall 
system are performed based on a number of use case scenarios. For the validation tests the 
authorisation decisions returned by the system are matched against the expected decisions. 
The request context for each of the test case is presented in Appendix 5. The results of the 
performance tests of the system in a single computer and in a cloud computer are also 
presented here. The performance results show that in both cases, adding an additional sticky 
policy PDP increases the processing time of the authorisation server linearly, so that the 
system scales well. They also show that increasing the number of rules in a single PDP 
increases the processing time, but the time per rule decreases logarithmically until a steady 







This chapter concludes the thesis. The contributions and limitations of the research are 
discussed here. The research avenues that have been stimulated by our research are revealed 
in this chapter as well.  
6.1 Research Contributions 
The privacy of personal data has been endangered to a great extent due to the widespread 
increase and use of modern computers and high speed internet connections. The goal of this 
research was to design an authorisation system that provides privacy of personal data based 
on the privacy and access control policies from multiple authorities, such as the law, data 
subject as well as the issuer and controller of the data. The net result is the design, testing and 
validation of the Privacy-Protecting Advanced Authorisation System (P-PAAS). The 
contributions of this research are as follows: 
 
- The P-PAAS system accommodates policies written in multiple policy languages, as 
demonstrated by building a system comprising both PERMIS PDPs and XACML PDPs; 
- The P-PAAS system supports independent policies written by multiple autonomous 
authorities, specifically the law, data subject, data controller and data issuer; 
- The P-PAAS system has a strategy for dynamically resolving conflicts among the 
decisions returned by multiple policies obtained from various independent authorities, 
by determining which conflict resolution rule to use based on the current request 
context; 
- The P-PAAS system provides a mechanism for the distributed enforcement of a data 
subject’s privacy policy by using sticky policies and obligations to ensure that a remote 
system can either enforce the subject’s policy or will refuse to accept the subject’s 
personal data; 
- Overall the P-PAAS system has more functional features than any other authorisation 
system. Besides the functionalities described above, the system also comprises some 
other components such as the CVS for validating credentials, the application 
independent obligations service for evaluating “before” type obligations, and the 
ConVS for validating contracts to allow access to and transfer of personal data based 
on signed contracts. 
- Finally, we have developed a methodology for the semi-automatic extraction of access 
control rules from legislation, have demonstrated this by extracting access control 
rules from the EU DPD in both the XACML and PERMIS policy languages, and have 
written a program for the automatic conversion of controlled natural language (CNL) 
rules to XACML rules. 






6.2 Comparison of P-PAAS With Other Systems 
Table 6.1 provides a summary and comparison of the features (mentioned in Section 2.3.1) of 
the reviewed privacy protecting authorisation systems (presented in Sections 2.3.2, 2.2.9 and 
2.2.10) with that of our proposed system P-PAAS. The first row of the table presents the names 
of the models and the corresponding section numbers containing the description of that. In 
this table ‘y’ represents ‘yes’, ‘n’ represents ‘no’ and ‘l’ represents ‘limited’. It can be observed 
from the table that none of the tools except the P-PAAS addressed the requirements of 
privileged access by certain parties to personal data, the conditions to be met for transferring 
data, contract based access to personal data, multiple policy language enforcement and 
inclusion of Legal policies with the highest priority. Among the eighteen requirements of a 
privacy protecting authorisation system, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1, fourteen requirements 
were satisfied by our system which was not done by any other system. None of the systems’ 
design was based on the thorough examination of the EU DPD, hence they are poor in 

























































































































































































































































y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y 
2) Consent 
specification 
y y y y y y l y y n y y l l l y 
3) Limited Collection n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
4) Limited Use and 
Limited Disclosure 
y y y y n y l l l y y y y y y y 
5) Limited Retention l l l y n l y n n y n l l l l l 
6) Accuracy n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
7) Safety n n n l n l n n n n n n y n n n 
8) Openness l l l l n n n n n y n n n n n y 
9) Compliance l n n l l n n n n n n n n n n n 
10) User’s control y y y y n y l l l n y y y y y y 
11) Enforcing privacy 
obligation 
y y y y n y y n l l n y y y y y 
12) Privileged access n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n y 
13) Transferring data n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n y 
14) Contract based 
access  
n n n n n n n n n  n n n n n n y 
15) Simple user 
interaction 
y l l y y y n n n n n n n n n y 
16) Multiple policy 
language support 
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n y 
17) Distributed 
enforcement 
y n y y n y n n n y n n n n n y 
18) Inclusion of Legal 
policy with the 
highest priority 
n n n l n n n n n n n n n n n y 




6.3 Research Limitations  
This section discusses the limitations of our current research.  
1. 100% extraction of the authorisation rules from the EU DPD was not possible due to the 
fuzzy nature of the legislative language, some rules depend upon or can be overridden by 
national legislations and some rules require human judgements. Full realisation of 
automated access control rules from the EU DPD may not be possible until fully 
deterministic explanation of certain  legal rules can be obtained.  
2. Among the eighteen requirements of privacy protecting authorisation systems, as 
mentioned in Section 2.3.1, fourteen requirements were satisfied by our system and the 
four other requirements (limited collection, accuracy, safety and compliance) were not 
possible to satisfy by our system. Further research is needed to ensure the requirements to 
collect only the necessary data and not more than that, or data are stored accurately and 
safely, or to verify the compliance of the privacy protection offered by the data controller 
with the rules of law. 
3. The sticky policy(/ies) has only one signature element. It is assumed that the controller of 
the sending system would pack the data and policies together and sign the contents 
before sending that over to the receiving system.  
4. The current implementation of the authorisation system is not capable of including the 
conflict resolution policies dynamically from sticky policies and instead of having a single 
conflict resolution PDP it has separate conflict resolution PDPs for the law and the 
controller, which are executed sequentially. However, it is possible to implement conflict 
resolution PDPs from sticky conflict resolution policies by using the similar approach used 
for sticky access control policies and call them dynamically based on the request. 
Furthermore, it does not evaluate the user’s sticky policy when a data item is first received. 
However, it can store the sticky policies and the subsequent requests to access the data 
item are evaluated using the stored sticky policies. The current implementation only 
supports the FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides and GrantOverrides DCA. The current 
implementation can combine obligations from the configured PDPs or from the sticky 
policy PDPs, but not from all the PDPs together.  
5. The current design also assumes that other systems would be using the P-PAAS compliant 
architecture and would operate in a trustworthy manner by not violating the protocols. 
Although the model ensures the distributed enforcement when the protocols are 
maintained properly but it does not detect any violation of protocols.    
6.4 Recommendations and Future Work 
This work has stimulated further research in the following areas- 
1. The method that we used to extract authorisation rules from the EU DPD can be used 
on other legislation (for example, the country specific implementation of the EU DPD, 
such as, Data Protection Act 1998 of United Kingdom) to verify whether the 
methodology works or not.  
2. Although some other previous works, which attempted to get requirements from 
legal texts, are highly dependent on the representation of the legislative language and 
may not be suitable for the texts of other legislation (Breaux and Anton 2008), an 




experiment can be performed by applying those methodologies on the EU DPD to 
show how fit those methodologies are in extracting the access control rules from the 
EU DPD.  
3. With the P-PAAS it is possible to accommodate authorisation policies from legislation 
of two different jurisdictions by having two Legal PDPs. More research on 
international laws needs to be done to make sure which Legal PDP policy should be 
applicable in what situation.  
4. More research can be done on the 9 rules out of the 53 rules that are discarded as no 
deterministic rules are possible to make out of them. There might be a possibility of 
creating an alert or obligation to require human intervention while an access case is 
encountered for which these rules might have an issue. 
5. Further research needs to be done on the monitoring and auditing of privacy 
protection provided by an authorisation system, for example, whether the obligations 
are being enforced or the privacy policies are being evaluated with appropriate 
priorities and so on.  
6. More research needs to be done on the usability of a privacy preserving system. A 
system may become useless if the user cannot use the system comfortably.  
7. Contracts are deemed to be confidential only among the parties. More research can 
be done on protecting confidentiality based on anonymity. The digital contract that is 
presented in this thesis contains the identity information of the parties and the data 
subject which are all personal data. Although it is assumed that the parties would 
make the contract available only between themselves it would be much better with 
respect to confidentiality and privacy protection if an anonymity or pseudo- 
anonymity based protection can be given to these data.  
8. Further research is needed on obligation combination. XACML has possibility of 
ignoring some obligations which is solved by our system, as it combines all the 
obligations of all the PDPs having similar effects. Our design was for the situation 
when a policy says (e.g. controller) to permit with an obligation to write on the log 
and another policy says (e.g. data subject) to permit with an obligation to e-mail, then 
both will be enforced. However, this may create a problem for situations when the 
police officer is allowed to access the data of a person and the person’s policy also 
says allow the access with an obligation to e-mail him the details. The enforcement of 
such an obligation by the data subject may not be allowed by the law. Different kinds 
of obligation enforcement might be needed for such situations to determine any 
conflict with the Legal obligations and perhaps autonomous priority needs to be given 
to Legal obligations. Further research is needed in conflict resolution among 
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Appendix 1: Conversion of Legal Policies 
 
Table A 1. 1: Extracting Legal authorisation rules 
No Legal rules  Access Control rule / Comments 
1.  Article 6.1(a): personal data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully; 
This rule is related to authorisation as it mentions 
an action (processing) on personal data but it is 
not capable of saying, based on which specific 
condition, the action is allowed and so it is 
discarded. 
2.  Article 6.1(b): personal data must be collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes. Further processing of data for historical, 
statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered 
as incompatible provided that Member States provide 
appropriate safeguards.  
The system structure of P-PAAS helps to ensure 
that the personal data are collected for specified, 
explicit purposes and those purposes of collection 
have become parts of a resource attribute of the 
personal data that are being collected. To ensure 
the enforcement of this Legal rule the following 
authorisation rule is formed, “If the requested 
purpose of processing does not match with any of 
the original purposes of collection or is not for a 
historical purpose/ statistical purpose/ scientific 
purpose then deny the request “. It should be 
mentioned that it does not grant access only if the 
purposes match rather it denies access if the 
purposes don’t match. The data subject and the 
other authority’s PDPs may have detailed policies 
about by whom and for what purposes the 
processing is allowed and those policies will allow 
the access.  
3.  Article 6.1(c): personal data must be adequate, relevant 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which 
they are collected and/or further processed; 
It is not feasible to ensure the adequacy or 
relevance or excessiveness of data in relation to a 
purpose by an access control rule. So this rule 
can’t form an access control rule. Our system has a 
RID for each personal data item. Request to access 
a data item is made by referencing the RID and the 
decision is returned only for that requested RID. 
RIDs can be specified for any granularity of the 
data. Furthermore within the same RID more 
granularities can be provided based on some 
resource attributes such as resource type. Hence, 
the system provides a mechanism to control 
access only to adequate, relevant data items. 
4.  Article 6.1(d): personal data must be accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must 
be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or 
It is not practical to ensure the accuracy of data by 
an authorisation rule. The authorisation rule, “A 






incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which 
they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified. 
an obligation to log the request” will ensure that 
the data subject can send an update request if s/he 
finds that the data are not accurate or not up-to-
date. This request will notify the controller about 
the condition of the data and the controller can 
take reasonable steps by justifying the request to 
erase or rectify the data.  
5.  Article 6.1(e): personal data must be kept in a form which 
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than 
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were 
collected or for which they are further processed. 
Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards 
for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, 
statistical or scientific use. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “If the validity 
time of data is earlier than the requested time i.e. 
the request is made after the validity time of the 
data is over then deny the request.” The second 
part of the Legal rule allows longer validity time 
for certain purposes but that extended validity 
time will depend on the national implementation 
of the rule. 
6.  Article 7.(a): personal data may be processed if the data 
subject has unambiguously given his consent.  
Since our authorisation system is capable of having 
detailed policies from the data subject specifying 
who for what purposes are allowed to access 
his/her personal data, those policies from the data 
subject work as consents of the data subject. 
Hence, the authorisation policy saying, “A data 
subject can submit a policy / update a policy” 
ensures that by submitting and updating a policy 
the data subject can give, update or revoke 
consents. 
7.  Article 7.(b): personal data may be processed if 
processing is necessary for the performance of a 
contract to which the data subject is party or in order to 
take steps at the request of the data subject prior to 
entering into a contract; or 
The first part of this Legal rule forms an 
authorisation rule, “When the purpose is 
performance of a contract and a party of the 
contract is the data subject and the requester is 
mentioned as an authorised requester of the 
contract then grant access to the resource 
mentioned in the contract”. To be able to access a 
personal data item the requester must be 
mentioned as an authorised requester of the 
contract. This constraint was added to the rule to 
make sure that not anyone can have access to a 
personal data item just by showing a contract 
where the data subject is a party. Furthermore, the 
contract should permit access to the resource for 
which the contract was signed. How the access 
based on a contract would be authorised is 
mentioned in details in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
The second part of the Legal rule makes an 
authorisation rule “When the purpose is entering 
into a contract and the data subject requested to 
process the resource then grant the access”.  






processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject 
can be accessed when there is a data access 
mandate.” 
9.  Article 7.(d) personal data may be processed if 
processing is necessary in order to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject; 
Saving the life of a data subject in the case of an 
emergency is an example of protecting the vital 
interests of the data subject. An authorisation rule 
is formed saying, “Medical Professionals can Break 
the Glass to Read or Write medical data.“ Break 
the glass is the ability to override access controls in 
the case of emergency in order to gain access to 
the data which is normally denied to the requester. 
This rule is an example of accessing personal data 
to save the vital interest of the data subject. There 
can be more such examples which will need to be 
added by the controller depending on the data it 
handles and the national implementation of the EU 
DPD.  
10.  Article 7.(e) personal data may be processed if 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller or in a third 
party to whom the data are disclosed; 
An authorisation rule is formed, “Entities with a 
specific role (e.g. social security authority) can 
access a specific resource type (e.g., personal data 
related to pensions) and if the purpose is the 
performance of a task of public interest (e.g., 
social security administration) or an exercise of the 
official authority.” This rule is an example of 
allowing access to personal data to satisfy public 
interest. The controller can add more such rules 
depending on the data it handles and the national 
implementation of the EU DPD.  
11. Article 7.(f) personal data may be processed if processing 
is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties 
to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1 (1). 
The balance of interest is not feasible to present in 
one single policy, so it does not form an access 
control rule. 
12.  Article 8.1: Member States shall prohibit the processing 
of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning 
health or sex life. 
As the rule provides restrictions on processing 
sensitive personal data this forms a conflict 
resolution rule with a DenyOverrides DCA but no 
access control rule (i.e. the decision of the Legal 
access control PDP will be NotApplicable) when a 
request comes for accessing sensitive personal 
data (as discussed in 4.4.2). The rule “If the 
request is for a sensitive personal data then 
DCA=DenyOverrides” makes sure that a Deny 
decision will get priority over any other decisions.  
13.  Article 8.2.(a): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply 
where: the data subject has given his explicit consent to 
The 1st part of this Legal rule does not form any 






the processing of those data, except where the laws of 
the Member State provide that the prohibition referred 
to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject's 
giving his consent; 
this case the assumption is that the data subject 
will provide conflict resolution rules and thus the 
data subject’s choices will override the controller’s 
choices. Consequently the access to personal data 
will be protected by the data subject’s consent 
when there is no decision or DCA from the legal 
PDP. The 2nd part of the rule could form an access 
control rule such as - if the resource type is X then 
deny access where X is configurable. However, the 
value of X depends on the national 
implementations of the law which may also have 
more conditions imposed on it and those would 
also need to be added. Since it requires 
examination of national implementations of the 
EU DPD it is not possible to form a complete 
access control rule from it at the moment. When 
there is no national law in place to prohibit access 
to personal data when there is a consent from the 
data subject, then the access decision will be 
denied or granted by the data subject’s policy 
maintained in his/her PDP  
14.  Article 8.2.(b): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply 
where processing is necessary for the purposes of 
carrying out the obligations and specific rights of the 
controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is 
authorised by national law providing for adequate 
safeguards; 
There is not enough information in this paragraph 
to form an authorisation rule feasibly as it requires 
examining national laws.  
15.  Article 8.2.(c): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply 
where processing is necessary to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject or of another person where 
the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving 
his consent 
Similar to the rule obtained from article 7.(d)an 
authorisation rule is formed saying, “Medical 
Professionals can Break the Glass to Read or Write 
on medical data.“  
16.  Article 8.2.(d): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply 
where processing is carried out in the course of its 
legitimate activities with appropriate guarantees by a 
foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking 
body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-
union aim and on condition that the processing relates 
solely to the members of the body or to persons who 
have regular contact with it in connection with its 
purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third 
party without the consent of the data subjects; 
This forms the rule “Organisation X (e.g. 
Temple/Church) can access the personal data of 
type Y (where Y is related to X) (e.g. Cast 
information) of the subjects who are the members 
of X.” This rule needs to be configured by the 
controller depending on the national 
implementations of the law. Another example can 
be- “The Labour party can access the information 
of trade union membership of its members” and 
so on. 
17.  Article 8.2.(e): Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply 
where the processing relates to data which are 
manifestly made public by the data subject or is 
necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of 
legal claims. 
It forms an authorisation rule, “Personal data can 
be accessed or processed when there is a data 
access mandate.” In order to establish, exercise 
and defend a legal claim a data access mandate 






procedures. Note that the procedure of obtaining 
a data access mandate requires human 
interactions.  
18.  Article 8.3: Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) shall not apply where 
processing of the data is required for the purposes of 
preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of 
care or treatment or the management of health-care 
services, and where those data are processed by a health 
professional subject under national law or rules 
established by national competent bodies to the 
obligation of professional secrecy or by another person 
also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “Treating Medical 
professionals can process or access personal data 
for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical 
diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or 
the management of health-care services.” 
19.  Article 8.4: Subject to the provision of suitable 
safeguards, Member States may, for reasons of 
substantial public interest, lay down exemptions in 
addition to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by 
national law or by decision of the supervisory authority. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “Personal data 
can be processed when there is a data access 
mandate”. In order to satisfy substantial public 
interest a data access mandate can be provided 
following the appropriate legal procedures which 
requires human interactions.  
20.  Article 8.5: Processing of data relating to offences, 
criminal convictions or security measures may be carried 
out only under the control of official authority, or if 
suitable specific safeguards are provided under national 
law, subject to derogations which may be granted by the 
Member State under national provisions providing 
suitable specific safeguards. However, a complete 
register of criminal convictions may be kept only under 
the control of official authority. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “Role X (e.g. 
Police Officer) can read the register of criminal 
convictions.” The controller will need to put the 
exact value of X depending on the application and 
the national implementation of the EU DPD. 
21.  Article 8.6: Derogations from Paragraph 1 (Article 8.1) 
provided for in paragraphs 4(Article 8.4) and 5 (Article 
8.5) shall be notified to the Commission. 
This can’t form an access control / authorisation 
rule. This is a guideline. 
22.  Article 8.7: Member States shall determine the 
conditions under which a national identification number 
or any other identifier of general application may be 
processed. 
This is a guideline and does not specifically say for 
what conditions those personal data can be 
processed.  
23.  Article 9: Member States shall provide for exemptions or 
derogations from the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter 
IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data 
carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose 
of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary 
to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression.  
This rule requires examination of national 
implementations of the EU DPD and the balance of 
interests is too critical to form an authorisation 
rule.  
24.  Article 10: Information in cases of collection of data from 
the data subject. Member States shall provide that the 
controller or his representative must provide a data 
The rules in this article can’t form separate access 
control/ authorisation rules as they don’t say based 






subject from whom data relating to himself are collected 
with at least the following information, except where he 
already has it:  
(a) the identity of the controller and of his 
representative, if any;  
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are 
intended;  
(c) any further information such as  
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,  
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or 
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure 
to reply,  
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to 
rectify the data concerning him  
in so far as such further information is necessary, having 
regard to the specific circumstances in which the data 
are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of 
the data subject. 
or processed. These rules specify what information 
to be given to the data subject when the data have 
been obtained from the data subject. A solution to 
the enforcement of this legal requirement is to 
have an obligation policy inside an Obligation PDP 
to notify the data subject when the personal data 
are stored or accessed. This Obligation PDP will be 
called by the Master PDP so that the obligation is 
always executed.  
25.  Article 11  
Information where the data have not been obtained 
from the data subject  
1. Where the data have not been obtained from the data 
subject, Member States shall provide that the controller 
or his representative must at the time of undertaking the 
recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third 
party is envisaged, no later than the time when the data 
are first disclosed provide the data subject with at least 
the following information, except where he already has 
it:  
(a) the identity of the controller and of his 
representative, if any;  
(b) the purposes of the processing; 
(c) any further information such as  
- the categories of data concerned,  
- the recipients or categories of recipients,  
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to 
rectify the data concerning him  
in so far as such further information is necessary, having 
regard to the specific circumstances in which the data 
are processed, to guarantee fair processing in respect of 
the data subject. 
The rules in this article can’t form separate access 
control/ authorisation rules as they don’t say based 
on what condition personal data can be accessed 
or processed. These rules specify what information 
is to be given to the data subject when the data 
have not been obtained from the data subject. A 
solution to this is to use an Obligation PDP which 
will be called by the Master PDP after it gets a 
grant decision from the Access Control PDPs and 
the Obligation PDP will add the obligations to 
notify the data subject.  
26.  Article 11.2: Paragraph 1(Article 11.1) shall not apply 
where, in particular for processing for statistical 
purposes or for the purposes of historical or scientific 
The 1st part of the rule can add conditions to the 
rules obtained from the article 11.1 to specify when 






research, the provision of such information proves 
impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or 
if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law. In 
these cases Member States shall provide appropriate 
safeguards. 
purpose or historical or scientific research purpose 
the obligation to notify the data subject applies. 
However, the other conditions mentioned in this 
rule require human judgement and so those can’t 
be converted into deterministic conditions. 
27.  Article 12: Right of access  
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the 
right to obtain from the controller:  
(a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and 
without excessive delay or expense:  
- confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him 
are being processed and information at least as to the 
purposes of the processing, the categories of data 
concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients 
to whom the data are disclosed,  
- communication to him in an intelligible form of the data 
undergoing processing and of any available information 
as to their source,  
- knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic 
processing of data concerning him at least in the case of 
the automated decisions referred to in Article 15 (1) 
The authorisation rule, “the data subject can Read 
his/her personal data”, would ensure the access 
right of the data subject. For the other conditions 
the solution is to have an obligation PDP called by 
the Master PDP. The Obligation PDP provides in its 
policy the obligation to notify the data subject 
when the data are processed. This obligation will 
ensure that if his/her personal data are processed 
the data subject gets notification. However, it 
requires human judgement to determine an 
intelligible form to inform the data subject or to 
determine the knowledge of any logic involved in 
any automatic processing. Hence, it is not possible 
to have an access control rule in the legal PDP for 
ensuring those.  
 
28.  Article 12. (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or 
blocking of data the processing of which does not 
comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular 
because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the 
data 
It requires human judgement to determine 
whether the processing does not comply with the 
provisions of the directive, or whether the data are 
incomplete or irregular. The authorisation policy 
“A data subject can object to processing with an 
obligation to log the request” will ensure that if a 
data subject finds that his/her personal data are 
not processed lawfully can object to that. When a 
data subject objects to a processing a log is 
created with that information and the controller 
will determine how to handle the objection 
depending on the cases.  
29.  Article 12.(c) notification to third parties to whom the 
data have been disclosed of any rectification, erasure or 
blocking carried out in compliance with (b), unless this 
proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort. 
This can’t form an access control rule rather an 
update mechanism would be appropriate to satisfy 
the rule.  
30.  Article 13  
Exemptions and restrictions  
1. Member States may adopt legislative measures to 
restrict the scope of the obligations and rights provided 
for in Articles 6 (1), 10, 11 (1), 12 and 21 when such a 
restriction constitutes a necessary measures to 
safeguard:  
(a) national security;  
This article mentions when the exemption to data 
access right of the data subject is applied and 
when the notification should not be provided to 
data subject for accessing his/her personal data. 
Hence this article leads to the construction of the 
following authorisation rules, “Data subject is 
denied to access personal data if there is a national 
security issue. 
 Data subject is denied to access personal data if 






(b) defence;  
(c) public security;  
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics 
for regulated professions;  
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a 
Member State or of the European Union, including 
monetary, budgetary and taxation matters;  
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function 
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of 
official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e);  
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Data subject is denied to access personal data if 
there is an important economic or financial issue. 
The data subject is denied access to his/her 
medical record if there is a medical objection 
provided by a Medical Professional in cases s/he 
thinks that seeing the record might cause serious 
harm to the physical or mental health condition of 
the data subject.” 
Furthermore, based on the national laws there 
needs to be rules in the Legal PDP to say who are 
authorised to set a national security issue, a legal 
objection, an important economic or financial issue 
or a medical objection. Hence a rule is formed 
saying, “Authority X (e.g. Medical Professional) 
can issue Y (e.g. Medical Objection) to Z type of 
data (e.g. Medical Data) for the purpose P (e.g. 
protecting harm to the data subject).” 
31.  Article 13. 2.Subject to adequate legal safeguards, in 
particular that the data are not used for taking measures 
or decisions regarding any particular individual, Member 
States may, where there is clearly no risk of breaching 
the privacy of the data subject, restrict by a legislative 
measure the rights provided for in Article 12 when data 
are processed solely for purposes of scientific research 
or are kept in personal form for a period which does not 
exceed the period necessary for the sole purpose of 
creating statistics. 
This rule is limiting a data subject’s access right. 
However, it requires examination of national laws 
and also requires human judgement to determine 
whether the data are being used for taking 
measure or decisions regarding any particular 
individual or not. Hence, it does not form any 
authorisation rule. 
32.  Article 14 : 
The data subject's right to object  
Member States shall grant the data subject the right:  
(a) at least in the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (f), 
to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds 
relating to his particular situation to the processing of 
data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by 
national legislation. Where there is a justified objection, 
the processing instigated by the controller may no longer 
involve those data;  
(b) to object, on request and free of charge, to the 
processing of personal data relating to him which the 
controller anticipates being processed for the purposes 
of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal 
data are disclosed for the first time to third parties or 
used on their behalf for the purposes of direct 
marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to 
object free of charge to such disclosures or uses. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “A data subject 
can send Object to Processing with an obligation 
to log the request”. However, when the “Object 
To Processing“ is sent by a data subject to the 
system the objection is placed in a log. The 
controller checks the log and determines (by 







33.  Article 15 :Automated individual decisions  
1. Member States shall grant the right to every person 
not to be subject to a decision which produces legal 
effects concerning him or significantly affects him and 
which is based solely on automated processing of data 
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, 
reliability, conduct, etc.  
This rule is talking about the right of a data subject 
not to be a subject of a decision but does not talk 
about any authorisation, i.e. it does not say based 
on what condition an action on a personal data 
item can be performed. Hence this Legal rule does 
not form an access control rule.  
 
34.  Article 15.2: Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, 
Member States shall provide that a person may be 
subjected to a decision of the kind referred to in 
paragraph 1 if that decision:  
(a) is taken in the course of the entering into or 
performance of a contract, provided the request for the 
entering into or the performance of the contract, lodged 
by the data subject, has been satisfied or that there are 
suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate interests, 
such as arrangements allowing him to put his point of 
view; or  
Similar to the previous rule this rule is talking 
about the right of a data subject not to be a 
subject of a decision but does not talk about any 
authorisation, i.e. it does not say based on what 
condition an action on a personal data item can be 
performed. Hence this Legal rule does not form an 






(b) is authorised by a law which also lays down measures 
to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests. 
This requires to examine other laws and can’t form 
an access control rule 
35.  Article 17. 1. Member States shall provide that the 
controller must implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to protect personal data against 
accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, 
alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access, in 
particular where the processing involves the 
transmission of data over a network, and against all 
other unlawful forms of processing.  
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their 
implementation, such measures shall ensure a level of 
security appropriate to the risks represented by the 
processing and the nature of the data to be protected.  
This rule is related to access control but it is only a 







36.  Article 17.2: The Member States shall provide that the 
controller must, where processing is carried out on his 
behalf, choose a processor providing sufficient 
guarantees in respect of the technical security measures 
and organisational measures governing the processing 
to be carried out, and must ensure compliance with 
those measures.  
This rule is related to access control but it is only a 
guideline / instruction and can’t form an access 
control rule. 
37.  
Article 17.3: The carrying out of processing by way of a 
processor must be governed by a contract or legal act 
binding the processor to the controller and stipulating in 
particular that:  
- the processor shall act only on instructions from the 
controller,  
- the obligations set out in paragraph 1, as defined by the 
law of the Member State in which the processor is 
established, shall also be incumbent on the processor.  
This rule is related to access control but it is only a 
guideline / instruction and can’t form an access 
control rule. 
38.  Article 25.1: The Member States shall provide that the 
transfer to a third country of personal data which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing 
after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to 
compliance with the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the 
third country in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection.  
This can’t form an access control rule to allow the 
transfer of personal data only because of the 
request is coming from a country that has an 
adequate level of protection. Many other factors 
may be involved in forming a decision on whether 
the transfer should be allowed or not. So this does 






39.  Article 25.2: The adequacy of the level of protection 
afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light 
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer 
operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, 
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation or operations, the country of origin and 
country of final destination, the rules of law, both 
general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security 
measures which are complied with in that country.  
This is an instruction for determining whether 
there is an adequate level of protection. This does 
not form an authorisation rule. 
40.  Article 25.3: The Member States and the Commission 
shall inform each other of cases where they consider 
that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2. 
This is an instruction only and does not form an 
access control rule. 
41.   Article 25.4: Where the Commission finds, under the 
procedure provided for in Article 31 (2), that a third 
country does not ensure an adequate level of protection 
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, 
Member States shall take the measures necessary to 
prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the 
third country in question. 
This forms an authorisation rule, “Deny a transfer 
of personal data when the transfer is requested to 
one of the countries that does not have an 
adequate level of protection13.” 
42.  Article 25.5: At the appropriate time, the Commission 
shall enter into negotiations with a view to remedying 
the situation resulting from the finding made pursuant to 
paragraph 4.  
This is an instruction only and does not form an 
access control rule. 
                                                 







43.  Article 25.6: The Commission may find, in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 31 (2), that a 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection 
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by 
reason of its domestic law or of the international 
commitments it has entered into, particularly upon 
conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 
5, for the protection of the private lives and basic 
freedoms and rights of individuals.  
Member States shall take the measures necessary to 
comply with the Commission's decision. 
This is also an instruction to find out whether the 
3rd country has an adequate level of protection. 
44.  Article 26.1: By way of derogation from Article 25 and 
save where otherwise provided by domestic law 
governing particular cases, Member States shall provide 
that a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a 
third country which does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2) may take 
place on condition that:  
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously 
to the proposed transfer; or  
This forms an authorisation rule, “Personal data 
can be transferred to any country if the data 
subject has given consent to the transfer. “ 
45.  Article 26.1.(b) the transfer is necessary for the 
performance of a contract between the data subject and 
the controller or the implementation of pre contractual 
measures taken in response to the data subject's 
request; or  
The first part forms an authorisation rule, “When 
the purpose is performance of a contract and the 
data subject and the controller are the parties of 
the contract and the requester is mentioned as an 
authorised requester then grant the transfer of 
the personal data mentioned in the contract.” The 
second part of the Legal rule makes an 
authorisation rule “When the purpose is 
implementation of the pre contractual measures 
and the data subject requested to process the 
resource then grant the access”. 
46.  Article 26.1.(c) the transfer is necessary for the 
conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in 
the interest of the data subject between the controller 
and a third party; or  
This forms an authorisation rule, “When the 
purpose is performance of a contract / conclusion 
of a contract and a party of the contract is the 
controller and the subject of the contract is the 







authorised requester of the contract then grant 
the transfer of the personal data mentioned in the 
contract” (An assumption is made that the 
controller is a trusted party and so when the 
controller signs a contract with a third party it puts 
the identifying attributes of the data subject as a 
subject of the contract after making sure that the 
data subject will be benefitted from the contract. ) 
47.  Article 26.1.(d) the transfer is necessary or legally 
required on important public interest grounds, or for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or  
 
This forms an authorisation rule, “When there is a 
data transfer mandate the transfer of the personal 
data is allowed.” The controller can add rules 
depending on the data it holds and depending on 
the national rule to allow the transfer of personal 
data to satisfy an important public interest.  
48.  Article 26.1.(e) the transfer is necessary in order to 
protect the vital interests of the data subject; or  
 This forms an authorisation rule, “Medical 
Professionals can BTG to transfer medical data.” 
49.  Article 26.1.(f) the transfer is made from a register which 
according to laws or regulations is intended to provide 
information to the public and which is open to 
consultation either by the public in general or by any 
person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the 
extent that the conditions laid down in law for 
consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.  
The conditions in the rule are not feasible to be 
presented in an access control rule. It depends on 
national laws as well. Furthermore, public 
information is already available and hence there is 
no need to control access to that. Hence it does 
not form an access control rule. 
50.  Article 26. 2: Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member 
State may authorise a transfer or a set of transfers of 
personal data to a third country which does not ensure 
an adequate level of protection within the meaning of 
Article 25 (2), where the controller adduces adequate 
safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy 
and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and 
as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; such 
safeguards may in particular result from appropriate 
contractual clauses.  
This forms an authorisation rule, “Personal data 
can be transferred to a country not having an 
adequate level of protection when there is a 
contract between the controllers (data sender and 
receiver controllers) to ensure an adequate 
safeguard.” 
51.  
Article 26. 3: The Member State shall inform the 
Commission and the other Member States of the 
authorisations it grants pursuant to paragraph 2.  
If a Member State or the Commission objects on justified 
grounds involving the protection of the privacy and 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the 
Commission shall take appropriate measures in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 
(2).  
Member States shall take the necessary measures to 
comply with the Commission's decision. 
This rule is a guideline for the member states and 






52.  Article 28.3: Each authority shall in particular be 
endowed with:  
- investigative powers, such as powers of access to data 
forming the subject-matter of processing operations and 
powers to collect all the information necessary for the 
performance of its supervisory duties. 
This forms the authorisation rules, “The 
Supervisory Authority can access and collect 




- effective powers of intervention, such as, for example, 
that of delivering opinions before processing operations 
are carried out, in accordance with Article 20, and 
ensuring appropriate publication of such opinions, of 
ordering the blocking, erasure or destruction of data, of 
imposing a temporary or definitive ban on processing, of 
warning or admonishing the controller, or that of 
referring the matter to national parliaments or other 
political institutions,  
This forms an authorisation rule “The Supervisory 
Authority can order the blocking/ erasing 
/destruction of data, or impose a temporary ban 




- the power to engage in legal proceedings where the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive 
have been violated or to bring these violations to the 
attention of the judicial authorities.  
Decisions by the supervisory authority which give rise to 
complaints may be appealed against through the courts. 
This rule does not mention any action to be 
performed on personal data on a particular 
condition and so does not form any authorisation 
rule. 
53.  Article 28.4: Each supervisory authority shall hear claims 
lodged by any person, or by an association representing 
that person, concerning the protection of his rights and 
freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data. 
The person concerned shall be informed of the outcome 
of the claim.  
Each supervisory authority shall, in particular, hear claims 
for checks on the lawfulness of data processing lodged 
by any person when the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to Article 13 of this Directive apply. The person 
shall at any rate be informed that a check has taken 
place. 
This rule does not mention any action to be 
performed on personal data on a particular 








Table A 1. 2: Authorisation rules in natural language 
Policy 
No. 
Articles Legal Natural Language Policies  
1.  Article 6.1 (b) If the requested purpose of processing does not match with any of the original 
purposes of collection or is not for a historical purpose/statistical purpose / scientific 
purpose deny the request.  
2.  Article 6.1 (d). The data subject can send a data update request with an obligation to log the 
request.  
3.  Article 6.1 (e). If the validity time of the data is earlier than the request time i.e. the request is made 
after the validity time of the data has expired, then deny the request.  
4.  Articles 7 (a) 
and 8. 2 (a) 
A data subject can submit a policy / update a policy.  
5.  Article 7 (b). When the purpose is performance of a contract or entering into a contract and a 
party of the contract is the data subject and the requester is an authorised requester 
of the contract then grant access to the resource mentioned in the contract.  
6.  Article 7 (b). When the purpose is entering into a contract and the data subject requested to 
process the resource then grant the access.  
7.  Articles 7 (c), 
8.2 (e) and 8.4 
Personal data can be accessed when there is a data access mandate.  
8.  Articles 7 (d) 
and 8.2 (c) 
Medical Professionals can Break the Glass to Read or Write on medical data.  
9.  Article 7 (e). Entities with a specific role X (e.g. social security authority) can access a specific 
resource type Y (e.g., personal data related to pensions) and if the purpose is the 
performance of a task of public interest (e.g. social security administration) or an 
exercise of the official authority.  
10.  Article 8.1. If the request is for a sensitive personal data then DCA=DenyOverrides. This rule only 
forms a CRR not an ACR.  
11.  Article 8.2 (d). Organisation X (e.g. Temple/Church) can access personal data of type Y (where Y is 
related to X) (e.g., Cast information) of the subjects who are the members of X.  
12.  Article 8.3. The treating Medical Professional can Read/Write on personal data for the purpose 
of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, provision of care or treatment or the 
management of the health care service.  
13.  Article 8.5. Role X (e.g. policeman) can access the register of criminal record. The actual values 
of X needs to be configured by the controller depending on the application and 






14.  Article 12 A data subject can Read his/her own personal data.  
15.  Articles 12 (b), 
14 (b). 
A data subject can send "Object to Processing" with an obligation to log the request.  
16.  Articles 13.1 
(a),(b),(c)(d),(e
)(g). 
A data subject is denied access to his/her personal data if there is a national security 
issue, legal objection, important economic and financial issue or medical objection. 
17.  Articles 13.1 
(a),(b),(c)(d),(e
)(g). 
Authority X (e.g. Medical Professional) can Write Y (e.g. Medical Objection) to Z type 
of data (e.g. medical data) for the purpose P (e.g. protecting harm to the data 
subject).  
18.  Article 26.1 (a). Personal data can be transferred to a non EU country or to countries not having an 
adequate level of protection when the data subject has given consent to the 
transfer. 
19.  Article 26.1.(b). When the purpose is performance of a contract and the data subject and the 
controller are the parties of the contract and the requester is one of the authorised 
party of the contract then grant the transfer of the personal data mentioned in the 
contract.  
20.  Article 26.1 (c). When the purpose is performance of a contract / conclusion of a contract and a party 
of contract is the controller and the data subject is benefitted by the contract and 
the requester is mentioned as an authorised requester in the contract, then grant 
the transfer of the personal data mentioned in the contract.  
21.  Article 26.1 (c). When the purpose is implementation of pre contractual measures and there is a 
consent from the data subject requested to transfer the resource then grant the 
transfer.  
22.  Article 26.1 (d). Personal data can be transferred to a non EU country or to a country not having an 
adequate level of protection when there is a data transfer mandate.  
23.  Article 26.1(e). Medical Professionals can BTG to transfer medical data to a non EU country or to a 
country not having an adequate level of protection.  
24.  Article 26.2. Personal data can be transferred to a non EU country or to a country not having an 
adequate level of protection when there is a contract between the controllers (data 
sender and receiver controllers) to ensure an adequate safeguard.  
25.  Article 25.4. Personal data are denied to transfer to a non EU country or to a country not having 
an adequate level of protection when none of the conditions of the rules 18-25 is 
satisfied.  
26.  Article 28 .3. The Supervisory Authority can access and collect personal data for the performance 
of supervisory duties.  
27.  Article 28 .3. The Supervisory Authority can order the blocking/erasing /destruction of personal 








Table A 1. 3: Controlled natural language rules 
No. of 
rule 
Controlled Natural Language Rule in ABNF 
1. ACR 1: If the Action:Purpose:string is not the Resource:PurposesOfCollection:string OR the 
Action:Purpose:string is not a "historical purpose" / "statistical purpose" / "scientific purpose" then Deny 
the Access to the PersonalData.  
2. ACR 2: If the Subject:E-mail:string is equal to the Resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string OR the 
Subject:NHSNumber:string is equal to the Resource:DataSubject'sNHSNumber:string then Grant the 
SendDataUpdateRequests for the PersonalData with obligations to LogTheRequest. 
3. ACR 3: If the Environment:RequestTime:date is less than Resource:ValidityTime:date then Deny the 
Access to the PersonalData. 
4. ACR 4: If the Subject:Email:string is equal to the resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string OR the 
Subject:NHSNumber:string is equal to the Resource:DataSubject'sNHSNumber:string then Grant the 
SubmitPolicy / UpdatePolicy for PersonalData. 
5. ACR 5: If the Action:Purpose:string is a "Performance of a contract" AND the 
Environment:RequestTime:date is less than the Environment:EndTimeOfContract:date AND the 
Environment:RequestTime:date is greater than the Environment:StartTimeOfContract:date AND ( the 
Resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string is equal to Environment:ContractParty'sE-mail:string OR the 
Resource:DataSubject'sNHSNumber:string is equal to Environment:ContractParty'sNHSNumber:string) 
Subject:RoleAndOrganisation:string is equal to 
Environment:AuthorisedRequester'sRoleAndOrganisation:string AND the Resource:ResourceType:string 
is equal to Environment:ContractReosurceType:string then Grant the Access.  
6. ACR 6: If the Action:Purpose:string is "entering into a contract" AND the 
Environment:SubjectRequestedToProcess:string is Resource:ResourceType:string AND ( the 
Subject:RoleAndOrganisation:string is equal to Environment:AllowedParty'sRoleAndOrganisation:string 
OR Subject:E-mail:string is equal to Environment:AllowedParty'sE-mail:string ) then Grant the Access to 
PersonalData. 
7. ACR 7: If there is a DataAccessManadate then Grant the Access to the PersonalData. 
8. ACR 8: If the Subject:Role:string is "MedicalProfessional" AND the Action:Purpose:string is "medical 
diagnosis" / "the provision of care and treatment" / "preventive medicine" then BreakTheGlass to Read / 
Write on MedicalData. 
9. ACR 9: If the Subject:Role:string is "Social Security Officer" AND the Action:Purpose:string is "social 
security administration" / "exercise of the official authority" then Grant the Access to the 
PersonalDataRelatedToPension. 
10. ACR 10: If the Subject:Role:string is the "AuthorityOfTemple" and the 
Resource:DataSubject'sNameAndAddress:string is equal to 
Environment:Member'sNameAndAddress:string then Grant Read to CastInformation. 
11. ACR 11: If the Subject:PhysicianID:string is equal to Resource:TreatingPhysicianID:string AND the 
Action:Purpose:string is "preventive medicine" / "medical diagnosis" / "provision of care and treatment" / 
"management of health care service" then Grant Read / Write to the MedicalData. 
12. ACR 12: If the Subject:Role:string is the "PoliceOfficer" then Grant Read / Write to 
RegisterOfCriminalRecord. 
13. ACR 13: If the Subject:E-mail:string is equal to Resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string then Grant 
ObjectToProcessing to PersonalData with an obligation to LogTheRequest. 
14. ACR 14a: If the Subject:E-mail:string is equal to Resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string AND there is a 
Environment:MedicalObjection:boolean / Environment:LegalObjection:boolean / 
Environment:NationalSecurityIssue:boolean / Environment:EconomicOrFinancialIssue:boolean then Deny 







ACR 14b: If the Subject:E-mail:string is equal to Resource:DataSubject'sE-mail:string then Grant Read to 
PersonalData. 
15. ACR 15: If the Subject:Role:string is "MedicalProfessional" AND the Action:Purpose:string is "protecting 
harm to the data subject" then Grant WriteMedicalObjection to the MedicalData. 
16. ACR 16a: If the Environment:SubjectConsentsTo'sNameAndAddress:string is equal to 
Subject:Subject'sNameAndAddress:string then Grant the TRANSFER with an obligation to Transfer the 
sticky policy. 
 
ACR 16b: If the Action:Purpose:string is "performance of a contract"  
 
AND the Resource:ResourceType:string is equal to the Environment:ContractResourceType:string 
 




( the Environment:ContractSignerOne'sNameAndAdderess:string is equal to the 
Resource:DataSubject'sNameAndAddress:string 




( the Environment:ContractSignerOne'sNameAndAdderess:string is equal to the 
Environment:ControllerRepresentative'sNameAndAddress:string  




Environment:AuthorisedRequester'sNameAndAddres:string is equal to Subject:NameAndAddress:string 
 
AND Environment:requestTime:date is less than Environment:EndTimeOfContract:date  
 
AND Environment:requestTime:date is greater than the Environment:StartTimeOfContract:date  
 
then Grant the TRANSFER with an obligation to TRANSFER sticky policy. 
ACR 16c:If the Resource:ResourceType:string is equal to Environment:ContractResourceType:string AND 
Environment:SubjectOfContract’sNameAndAddress:string is equal to Resource:Data Subject’s 
NameAndAddress:string 
Action:Purpose:string is “performance of a contract” AND 
(ContractSignerOne’sNameAndAdderess is equal to ControllerRepresentative’s 
NameAndAddress  
OR Environment:ContractSingerTwo’s NameAndAddress:string is equal to 
Environment:ControllerRepresentative’s NameAndAddress:string ) 
AND AuthorisedRequester’s NameAndAddres is equal to Subject:NameAndAddress:string 
AND Environment:requestTime:date is less than Environment:EndTimeOfContract:date AND 
Environment:requestTime:date is greater than Environment:StartTimeOfContract:date  






ACR 16d: If the Resource:ResourceType:string is “Personal Data” AND 
Action:Purpose:string is “entering into a contract” AND 
Environment:SubjectRequesterToTransfer:string is equal to Resource:ResourceType:string AND 
Environment: AllowedPartyToTransferData:string is equal to  
Subject:NameAndAddress:string then Grant the Transfer the personal data with an obligation to 
TRANSFER sticky policy. 
ACR 16e:If the Resource:ResourceType:string is “Personal Data” AND 
there is a Environment:DataTransferMandate:boolean then Grant the Transfer the personal data 
with an obligation to TRANSFER sticky policy. 
ACR16f: If Subject:Role:string is MedicalProfessional AND Action:Purpose:string is “protecting harm to 
the data subject” then BTG to Transfer Medical Data with an obligation to TRANSFER sticky policy. 
 
ACR 16g:If the Resource:ResourceType:string is “Personal Data” AND there is a 
Environment:AdequateSafeguard:boolean then Grant the Transfer the personal data with an obligation 
to TRANSFER sticky policy. 
ACR 16h:f Resource:ResourceType:string is “Personal Data” AND Action:TransferToCountry:string is not 
equal to X then Deny the transfer.  
[X= the list of EU countries and the countries having adequate protection.] 
17. ACR 17: If Subject:Role:string is SupervisoryAuthority AND Action:Purpose:string is “performance of 
supervisory duties” then Grant the access/collect PersonalData. 
 
18. ACR 18: If Subject:Role:string is SupervisoryAuthority then Grant the Order to block/Order to erase /Order 
to destruct/ Impose temporary ban/ Impose definitive ban on PersonalData. 
 

















Table A 2. 1: Validation Tests of Legal Access Control and Conflict Resolution Policy 
Test case 
No. 
Request Context Expected result Obtained result Comments 
1.  Purpose of collection= [X], Purpose (current 
purpose)= [X]  
DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
These tests are testing 
the Legal rule “If the 
requested purpose of 
processing does not 
match with the original 
purpose of collection or 
is not for a historical 
purpose/statistical 
purpose / scientific 




2.  Purpose of collection = [X], Purpose (current 
purpose)= [Y, where Y≠ X and Y≠"historical 
purpose" / Y≠ "statistical purpose" / Y≠"scientific 







3.  Purpose of collection =[X], Purpose (current 






4.  Purpose of collection = [X], Purpose (current 








5.  Purpose of collection= [X], Purpose (current 
purpose)= [Y, where Y≠ X and Y= scientific 
purpose ]  
DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
6.  The request time is less than the[validity time] DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
DCA = N/A 
Decision = N/A 
These tests are testing 
the Legal rule “If the 
validity time of the data 
is earlier than the 










8.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 




nt with obligation 




nt with obligation 
to log the 
request 
These tests are testing 
the Legal rule saying 
that “the data subject 
can send a data update 
request.”A data subject 
is determined by a set 
of identifying attributes 
(such as name and 
address, e-mail address, 
NHS number). The 
identifying attributes 
are provided by the 
data subject during 
registration or while 
uploading the personal 
data and these are 
stored as resource 
attributes and passed 
to the request context. 
The legal PDP matches 
the identifying 
attributes of the 
requester with the 
identifying attributes 
obtained from the 
resource attributes to 
identify the requester 
as the data subject.  
9.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 






10.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 
Subject ( Identified by Name and Address 




with obligation to 




with obligation to 
log the request 
11.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 






12.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 





with obligation to 




with obligation to 
log the request 
13.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 






14.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is NOT 

















rule “the data subject 
can submit a policy / 
update a policy.” 
 
Similar to the previous 
rule the data subject is 
identified by a set of 
attributes 
16.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 








17.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 
Subject ( Identified by Name and Address 







18.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 
Subject ( Identified by Name and Address 







19.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 








20.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is Data 








21.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Requester is NOT 





22.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = Data Subject’s IDA, 
Purpose =processing of contract, requester’s 
IDA= one of the AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, one 
of party of contract = Data Subject, Action-








Here testing the Legal 
rule , “When the 
purpose is performance 
of a contract and the 
contract is valid at the 
time the request is 
made, a party of 
contract is the data 
subject and the 
requester is mentioned 
as an 
AuthorisedRequester of 
the contract then grant 
access to the resource 
mentioned in the 
contract.” 
23.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = Data Subject’s IDA, 
Purpose =collecting data, requester’s IDA=one of 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, one of party of 
contract = Data Subject, Action-id = Read, 





24.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOfContract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, 
Purpose = processing of contract, requester’s 
IDA≠one of AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, one of 
party of contract = Data Subject, Action-id=Read, 





25.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResource = PersonalData, SubjectOf 
Contract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, Purpose = 
processing of contract, requester’s IDA=one of 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, one of party of 
contract = Data Subject, Action-id=Read, request 





26.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, 
Purpose = processing of contract, requester’s 
IDA=one AuthorisedRequster’s IDA, one of party 
of contract’s= Data Subject, Action-id=Write, 





27.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 










Contract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, Purpose = 
processing of contract, requester’s IDA=one of 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, Data Subject ≠one of 
party of contract, Action-id=Read, request time is 
within the contract’s validity time. 
28.  Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA≠ Data subject’s IDA, 
Purpose = processing of contract, requester’s 
IDA=one of AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, one of 
party of contract = Data Subject, Action-id=Read, 





29.  Requested Purpose = entering into contract, 
SubjectRequestedToProcess= ResourceType [X], 
requested ResourceType = [X], 
AllowedPartyToProcessData= IDA of the Subject 







Testing the rule “When 
the purpose is entering 
into a contract and the 
data subject requested 
to process the resource 
then grant the access.” 30.  Requested Purpose = entering into contract, 
SubjectRequestedToProcess= ResourceType [X], 
requested ResourceType = [Y], 
AllowedPartyToProcessData= IDA of the Subject 





31.  Requested Purpose = entering into contract, 
SubjectRequestedToProcess= ResourceType [X], 
requested ResourceType = [Y], 
AllowedPartyToProcessData≠ IDA of the Subject 





32.  Requested Purpose ≠ entering into contract, 
SubjectRequestedToProcess= ResourceType [X], 
requested ResourceType = [Y], 
AllowedPartyToProcessData= IDA of the Subject 





33.  ResourceType=PersonalDataRelatedToPension, 
Subject’s (Requester’s) Role = 








Testing the rule 
“Entities with a specific 
role (e.g. social security 
authority) can access a 
specific resource type 
(e.g., personal data 
related to pensions) 
and if the purpose is 
the performance of a 
task of public interest 
(e.g., social security 
administration) or an 
exercise of official 
authority.” 
34.  ResourceType= PersonalDataRelatedToPension, 
Subject’s (Requester’s) Role = 









35.  ResourceType= PersonalDataRelatedToPension, 
Subject’s (Requester’s) Role = 
InsuranceAuthority 






36.  ResourceType= PersonalDataRelatedToPension, 
Subject’s (Requester’s) Role = 






37.  ResourceType= PersonalDataRelatedToPension, 
Subject’s (Requester’s) Role = 







38.  ResourceType=PersonalData, Subject’s 
(Requester’s) Role = SocialSecurityAuthority, 























Testing the rule 
“Personal data can be 
accessed when there is 









41.  Requester=PoliceOfficer assigned by 




























data for the purpose of 
preventive medicine, 
medical diagnosis, 
provision of care or 
treatment or the 
management of the 
health care service.” 
44.  Requester=TreatingMedicalProfessional,Resourc
































Testing rule, “Medical 
Professional can Break 
the Glass to Read or 






































53.  Requester=Authority of temple X, resourceType 
= Religion’s cast information, data subject= one 








“Organisation X (e.g. 
Temple/Church) can 
access personal data of 
type Y (where Y is 
related to X) (e.g., Cast 
information) of the 
subjects who are 
members of X.” 
54.  Requester=Authority of temple X, resourceType 
= Religion’s cast information, data subject≠ one 





55.  Requester=PolicyOfficer , 
Action-id=read, 







Testing rule “Role X 
(e.g. police officer) can 
access the register of 
criminal record.” 56.  Requester=PolicyOfficer, 
Action-id=read, 






















Testing rule “The data 
subject can send 
"Object to Processing" 
with an obligation to 
log the request”. Data 
subject is always 
identified by a set of 
attributes as explained 
earlier which is not 
shown again for 
simplicity. 














Testing rule, “A data 
subject can read 
his/her personal data if 
there is no medical 
objection, legal 
objection, no national 
security issue and no 
economic or financial 
issue.”It is mentionable 
that the data subject is 
identified based on the 
identity attributes as 
before which is not 
shown again for 
simplicity. 





























































MedicalData, Purpose=protect harm to data 







Testing rule “Authority 
X (e.g. Medical 
Professional) can issue 
Y (e.g. Medical 
Objection) to Z type of 
data (e.g. Medical Data) 
for the purpose P (e.g. 
protecting harm to the 
data subject). 
68.  Requester=MedicalProfessional,ResourceType=
MedicalData, Purpose=medical diagnosis, 












Testing rule “Personal 
data can be transferred 
to a non EU country or 
to a country not having 
an adequate level of 
protection if  
a. the subject consents 
to the transfer OR  
b. the purpose is 
performance of a 
contract or entering 
into a contract and the 
parties of the contract 
are the data subject 
and the controller and 
70.  Requester=anyone, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
TransferToCountry=UK, Action=Transfer, 








71.  Requester=anyone, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
TransferToCountry=UK, Action=Transfer 


















SubjectConsentsToTransferTo = IDA of the 
requester 
Decision=Grant Decision=Grant the requester is an 
authorised requester 
and the contract is 
valid at the time the 
request is made OR 
c. the purpose is 
performance of a 
contract or conclusion 
of a contract, the 
contract is valid when 
the request is made, the 
parties of the contract 
are the controller and 
the third party and 
contract’s beneficiary 
(i.e. SubjectOfContract) 
is the data subject and 
the requester an 
authorised requester 
OR  
d. When the purpose is 
implementation of pre 
contractual measures 
and the data subject 
requested to transfer 
the resource then grant 
the transfer. 
e. there is a data 
transfer mandate OR  
f. there is an adequate 
safeguard provided by 
the requester 
controller; otherwise  
g. deny the transfer.”  
73.  Requester=anyone, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
TransferToCountry=Ghana, Action=Transfer 








74.  TransferToCountry=Ghana, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract=DataSubject, 
one of PartyOfContract =Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s) IDA= 
one of AuthorisedParty’s IDA, request time is 







75.  TransferToCountry=Italy, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract=DataSubject, 
one of PartyOfContract =Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 







76.  TransferToCountry=Ghana, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract ≠DataSubject, 
one of PartyOfContract =Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA ≠ 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 







77.  TransferToCountry=Ghana, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract=DataSubject, 
one of PartyOfContract ≠Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 








78.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract=DataSubject, 
one of PartyOfContract ≠Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = Data Subject’s IDA, 
Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 





79.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract≠DataSubject, 











ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA ≠ 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 
within the validity time of contract 
80.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=collecting data, one of 
PartyOfContract=DataSubject, one of 
PartyOfContract =Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 





81.  TransferToCountry=China, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=collecting data, one of 
PartyOfContract=DataSubject, one of 
PartyOfContract =Controller, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOfContract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, 
Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 







82.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract Controller, 
Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContracrtResourceType = PersonalData, 
SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = Data subject’s IDA, 
Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 







83.  TransferToCountry=China, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract=Controller, 
Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 







84.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract Controller, 
SubjectOfContract≠DataSubject,Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, Subject’s 
(requester’s)IDA = AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, 






85.  Requester=anyone, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData 
TransferToCountry=India, Action=Transfer, 
Purpose=performance of a contract, One Of 
PartyOfContract= Controller, 
SubjectOfContract≠DataSubject, Subject’s 












request time is within the validity time of 
contract 
86.  TransferToCountry=UK, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract≠ Controller, 
SubjectOfContract=DataSubject, Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOf Contract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA = 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 





87.  TransferToCountry=India, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract≠ Controller, 
SubjectOfContract’s IDA=DataSubject’s 
IDA,Requested ResourceType=PersonalData, 
ContractResourceType = PersonalData, 







88.  TransferToCountry=China, 
Action=Transfer,Purpose=performance of a 
contract, one of PartyOfContract= Controller, 
Requested 
ResourceType=PersonalData,ContractResourceT
ype = PersonalData, SubjectOfContract’sIDA = 
Data Subject’s IDA, Subject’s (requester’s)IDA ≠ 
AuthorisedRequester’s IDA, request time is 



















































































Testing rule “Medical 
Professional can BTG to 
transfer medical data to 
a non EU country or to 












Action=Transfer Decision=BTG Decision=BTG adequate level of 




























101.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 








Testing rule “The 
Supervisory Authority 
can access and collect 
personal data for the 
performance of 
supervisory duties.” 
102.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, Purpose=data 





103.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 








104.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 






105.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
Purpose=Performance of supervisory Duty, 




with obligation to 




with obligation to 
Log The Order. 
Testing rule “The 
Supervisory Authority 
can order the 
blocking/erasing 
/destruction of personal 
data, or impose a 
temporary ban on the 
processing or impose a 
definitive ban on 
processing.” 
106.  requester =SupervisoryAuthority, 
ResourceType=PersonalData, 
Purpose=Performance of supervisory Duty, 













Testing rule “If the 
request is for accessing 
sensitive personal data 
then 
DCA=DenyOverrides.” 









Appendix 3: Extracted Legal ACR in 
XACML 
 










<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 





<Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"></Target>  
 <Policy PolicyId="LawPolicyNo1" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-
overrides"> 
 <Description>If the requested purpose of processing does not match with the original purpose of data 
collection or is not for a historical purpose/statistical purpose / scientific purpose OR the validity time of data is earlier than 
the requested time then deny the request.</Description> 
  <Target></Target> 
  <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo1Rule1" Effect="Deny"> 
   <Description>If the requested purpose of processing does not match with the original purpose of 
data collection or is not for a historical purpose/statistical purpose / scientific purpose OR the validity time of data is earlier 
than the requested time then deny the request </Description> 
   <Target/> 
   <Condition> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:not"> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">historical purpose</AttributeValue> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">statistical purpose</AttributeValue> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">performance of contract</AttributeValue> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">entering into contract</AttributeValue>   
     
        </Apply> 
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="PurposeOfDataCollection" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Purpose" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply>                                   
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-less-than"> 
         <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-
and-only"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="currentDateTime" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-and-only"> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Validity" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 






     </Apply> 
    </Condition> 




   <Target></Target> 
   <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo4Rule1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>If the purpose of data processing is performance of a contract and data 
subject is a subject of contract and party of the contract, requester is mentioned as an authorised requester in the 
contract and the request time is within the validity time then grant access to the resource mentioned in the contract 
</Description> 
    <Target/> 
    <Condition> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">performance of contract</AttributeValue> 
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ContractResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ResourceType" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      <!-- checking that the data subject is a subject of the contract --> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="SubjectOfContract’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject'sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="SubjectOfContract’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject'sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />  
       
      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and" 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="SubjectOfContract’sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 






 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject'sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="SubjectOfContract'sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject'sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or">       
  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="SubjectOfContract'sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject'sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="SubjectOfContract'sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject'sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
       
      <!-- checking that the data subject is one of the party of contract --> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 






      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        







         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyOne'sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ContractPartyTwo'sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubject’sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
        <!-- cheking that the requester is an Authorised Requester -->  
      
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 






mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="NHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" />   
      
      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and" 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester’sRole" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester'sOrganisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or">       
  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester'sName" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
          <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        
 <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="AuthorisedRequester'sAddress" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        
 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Address" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
         </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
        <!--checking the contract is still valid --> 






      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-less-than"> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-and-only"> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="StartDate" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-and-only"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="CurrentDate" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
      </Apply>  
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-less-than"> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-and-only"> 
        <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="CurrentDate" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:date-one-and-only"> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="EndDate" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date"/>  
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
    </Condition>    




  <Description>The treating Medical Professional can Read/Write personal data for the purpose of preventive 
medicine, medical diagnosis, provision of care or treatment or the management of health care service. </Description> 
  <Target></Target> 
 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo8Rule1l" Effect="Permit"> 
   <Description>The treating Medical Professional can Read/Write personal data for the purpose of 
preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, provision of care or treatment or the management of health care service. 
</Description> 
   <Target/> 
   <Condition> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
    </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue> 
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="Role"/> 






    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">medical diagnosis</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">provision of care and treatment</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">preventive medicine</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">management of health care service</AttributeValue>  
      </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="PhysicianID" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="TreatingPhysicianID" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     </Apply> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">WRITE</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply> 
     </Apply>   
     </Apply> 
   </Condition>    




  <Target></Target> 
 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo9Rule1" Effect="Deny"> 
 <Description>Medical professionals can BTG (break the glass) to medical data for purpose of medical diagnosis/ 
the provision of care and treatment / preventive medicine.</Description> 
 <Target/>  
 <Condition> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
     <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
    <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
   </Apply>  
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
      <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue> 







   </Apply> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">medical diagnosis</AttributeValue> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">provision of care and treatment</AttributeValue> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">preventive medicine</AttributeValue> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">management of health care service</AttributeValue> 
    </Apply> 
   </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function: string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">WRITE</AttributeValue> 
    </Apply> 
    <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
    </Apply>    
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
    <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal"/> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">false</AttributeValue> 
      <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="BTG:(Role(S),ResourceType(R),urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id(A))" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" MustBePresent="false"/> 
     </Apply>  
  </Apply> 
 </Condition>    
  </Rule> 
 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo9Rule2" Effect="Permit"> 
   <Description>Medical professionals can BTG (break the glass) to medical data for purpose of medical 
diagnosis/ the provision of care and treatment / preventive medicine. </Description> 
    <Target/> 
    <Condition> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
     </Apply>  
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="Role"/> 
     </Apply> 







       <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">medical diagnosis</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">provision of care and treatment</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">preventive medicine</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">management of health care service</AttributeValue>  
       </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
         <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function: string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">WRITE</AttributeValue> 
       </Apply> 
        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
         </Apply>    
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
     </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal"/> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue> 
      <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="BTG:(Role(S),ResourceType(R),urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id(A))" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" MustBePresent="false"/> 
         </Apply>   
      </Apply> 
    </Condition>    
   </Rule> 
   <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo9Rule3" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Medical professionals can BTG (break the glass) to medical data for purpose 
of medical diagnosis/ the provision of care and treatment / preventive medicine. </Description> 
    <Target/> 
    <Condition> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">BreakTheGlass</AttributeValue> 







    </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="ResourceType"/> 
    </Apply>  
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue> 
     </Apply>   
     </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Purpose" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">medical diagnosis</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">provision of care and treatment</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">preventive medicine</AttributeValue> 
       <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">management of health care service</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
  </Condition>    
  </Rule> 
  <Obligations> 
   <Obligation ObligationId="BreakTheGlassObligation" FulfillOn="Permit">        
    <AttributeAssignment AttributeId="BTG:(Role(S),ResourceType(R),urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-
id(A))" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
    </Obligation>  





  <Target></Target> 
  <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo11ARule1" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Description>Role X (e.g. policeman) can access the register of criminal record providing role X is assigned by 
the authority Y (e.g. policy authority). </Description> 
   <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject> 
    <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">PoliceOfficer</AttributeValue> 
         <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"/> 
       </SubjectMatch> 






  </Subjects> 
     <Actions> 
        <Action> 
         <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
          </ActionMatch> 
        </Action> 
      </Actions>  
   </Target> 






 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicy11BRule1" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
     <Subject> 
      <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:x500Name-match"> 
       <AttributeValue DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-
type:x500Name">CN=PoliceAuthority,OU=Police,O=UKC,ST=Some-State,C=GB</AttributeValue> 
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" 
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:x500Name"/> 
      </SubjectMatch> 
     </Subject> 
    </Subjects> 
    <Actions> 
      <Action> 
        <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal"> 
         <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">Assign</AttributeValue> 
         <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"/> 
        </ActionMatch> 
        <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal"> 
         <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">PoliceOfficer</AttributeValue> 
         <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"/> 
        </ActionMatch> 
      </Action> 
    </Actions> 
  </Target> 






 <Description>A data subject can read his/her personal data if there is no legal objection, no national security 
issue and no economic or financial issue or no Medical Objection.</Description> 
 <Target></Target> 
  <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo7Rule1" Effect="Deny"> 
   <Description>IF Requester is Data Subject, Identified by {E-mail} OR {NHSNumber} OR {Name and 
Address} Attribute, AND legalObjection=true, Effect= Deny </Description> 
   <Target></Target> 
   <Condition> 






     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-mail" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     </Apply> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Address" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sAddress" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal"/> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" AttributeId="LegalObjection"/> 
     </Apply> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
        <Function 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
     </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
    </Condition>    
   </Rule> 
 
   <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo7Rule2" Effect="Deny"> 
   <Description>IF Requester is Data Subject, Identified by {E-mail} OR {NHSNumber} OR {Name and 
Address} Attribute, AND NationalSecurityIssue=true, Effect= Deny </Description> 
   <Target></Target> 
   <Condition> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">   






       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-mail" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
     </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Address" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sAddress" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      </Apply> 
       </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" AttributeId="NationalSecurityIssue"/> 
    </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue>  
     <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
    </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
    </Condition>    
   </Rule> 
  <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo7Rule3" Effect="Deny"> 
    <Description>IF Requester is Data Subject, Identified by {E-mail} OR {NHSNumber} OR 
{Name and Address} Attribute, AND EconomicOrFinancialIssue=true, Effect= Deny </Description> 
    <Target>      
    </Target> 
    <Condition> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">   
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 







       <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-
mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="NHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
         <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Address" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sAddress" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
        </Apply> 
       </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" AttributeId="EconomicOrFinancialIssue"/> 
    </Apply> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
       <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
     <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
    </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
   </Condition>    
  </Rule> 
 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo7Rule2" Effect="Deny"> 
   <Description>IF Requester is Data Subject, Identified by {E-mail} OR {NHSNumber} OR {Name and 
Address} Attribute, AND MedicalObjection=true, Effect= Deny </Description> 
   <Target> 
   </Target> 
   <Condition> 
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">   
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 







      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="E-mail" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sE-mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubject’sName" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Address" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubjectAddress" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
     </Apply> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
      <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:boolean-equal"/> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</AttributeValue> 
    <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" AttributeId="MedicalObjection"/> 
   </Apply> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
      <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
    <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
   </Apply> 
    </Apply> 
 </Condition>    
  </Rule> 
 <Rule RuleId="LawPolicyNo7Rule5" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Description>IF Requester is Data Subject, Identified by {E-mail} OR {NHSNumber} OR {Name and 
Address} Attribute, Effect= Permit </Description> 
  <Target> 
  </Target> 
  <Condition> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:or"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 







      <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="DataSubjectE-
mail" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
       <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="NHSNumber" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubjectNHSNumber" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Name" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubjectName" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
        <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
       <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Address" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="DataSubjectAddress" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
       </Apply> 
     </Apply>   
      </Apply> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:any-of"> 
      <Function FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"/> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">READ</AttributeValue> 
     <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
   </Apply> 
   </Apply> 






Appendix 4: Extracted Legal ACR in 
PERMIS 
Here some examples of implementation of Legal access control rules in PERMIS 
are presented. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy1" DenyBased="true" EnableNotApplicable="false"> 
<SubjectPolicy> 
 <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 

















   <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
    <RoleList>   
    </RoleList> 
   <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
   <SOA ID="anyone"/> 




  <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="PersonalData"/> 
  </TargetDomainSpec>  
 </TargetPolicy> 
 <ActionPolicy> 
  <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
    <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
  </Action>  
 </ActionPolicy> 
 <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    
<!-- If the requested purpose of processing does not match with the original purpose of data collection or is not for a 
historical purpose/statistical purpose / scientific purpose OR the validity time of data is earlier than the requested time then 
deny the request 
     --> 
 <TargetAccess> 
   <RoleList>   
   </RoleList> 
   <TargetList> 
    <Target> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
     <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
    </Target>       
   </TargetList> 
   <IF> 
   <NOT> 
  <OR> 
                    <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="historical purpose" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="statistical purpose" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="performance of contract" Type="String" /> 






  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="entering into contract" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="PurposeOfDataCollection" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <GT> 
  <Environment Parameter="ValidityTime" Type="Time" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="CurrentTime" Type="Time" /> 
  </GT> 
  </OR> 
  </NOT> 
  </IF>  






<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy4" EnableNotApplicable="true"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14">  
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList>   
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
 <TargetPolicy> 
  <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="PersonalData"/> 
  </TargetDomainSpec>  
 </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action>  
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    






    data subject is a subject or contract and party of the contract, requester is mentioned  
    as a authorised requester in the contract and the request time is within  
    the validity time then grant the access. -->  
 
 <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList>       
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target> 
          <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
          <AllowedAction ID="READ"/> 
        </Target>       
      </TargetList> 
      <IF> 
 <AND> 
  <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="Performance of a contract" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   <!-- checking that the data subject is one of the parties --> 
  <OR>  
             <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectE-mail" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ> 
    <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ> 
    <AND> 
     <EQ> 
              <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sName" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectName" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ> 
  </AND> 
          <AND> 
           <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sRole" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectRole" Type="String" /> 
          </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyOne'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
   </AND> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   <AND> 






   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sName" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sName" Type="String" /> 
           </EQ> 
            <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
            </EQ> 
      </AND> 
      <AND> 
            <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sRole" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sRole" Type="String" /> 
           </EQ> 
            <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractPartyTwo'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
           </EQ> 
      </AND> 
  </OR> 
  <!-- checking that the data subject is a subject of the contract --> 
        <OR>  
   <AND> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sRole" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sRole" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ>  
   </AND> 
   <AND> 
    <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sName" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sName" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ> 
    <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ>  
   </AND> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="DataSubject'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="SubjectOfContract'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
    </OR> 
    <!-- checking that the requester is an authorised requester --> 
    <OR> 
  <AND> 
    <EQ> 
    <Environment Parameter="Subject'sName" Type="String" /> 
    <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sName" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ> 
    <EQ> 






    <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sAddress" Type="String" /> 
    </EQ>  
 </AND> 
 <AND> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="Subject'sRole" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sRole" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="Subject'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
     <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sOrganisation" Type="String" /> 
     </EQ>  
  </AND> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="Subject'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sE-mail" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="Subject'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="AuthorisedRequester'sNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
    </OR> 
   <GT> 
   <Environment Parameter="EndTime" Type="Time" /> 
            <Environment Parameter="CurrentTime" Type="Time" /> 
   </GT> 
            <LT> 
    <Environment Parameter="StartTime" Type="Time" /> 
             <Environment Parameter="CurrentTime" Type="Time" /> 
   </LT> 
   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="ResourceType" Type="String" /> 
   <Environment Parameter="ContractResourceType" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
   </AND> 






<!--this rule to to deny access, another white list policy is used to allow access when the requester is a data subject and no 
other denying condition is true"// this line needs to be deleted to run the policy//--> 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy7" DenyBased="true" EnableNotApplicable="true"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14"> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 






    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
 <TargetPolicy> 
  <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="PersonalData"/> 
  </TargetDomainSpec>  
 </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action> 
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    
 <!-- Data Subject can READ his/her personal data if there is no legal Objection -->  
 
 <TargetAccess> 
   <RoleList> 
   </RoleList> 
    <TargetList> 
     <Target> 
      <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
      <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
     </Target>       
    </TargetList> 
    <IF> 
 <AND> 
 <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="LegalObjection" Type="Boolean" /> 
  <Constant Value="True" Type="Boolean" /> 
  </EQ> 
     <OR>  
      <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectE-mail" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
                    <AND> 
       <EQ> 
       <Environment Parameter="Name" Type="String" /> 
       <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectName" Type="String" /> 
       </EQ> 
       <EQ> 
       <Environment Parameter="Address" Type="String" /> 
       <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
       </EQ> 
           </AND> 






          </AND> 
  </IF>  
  </TargetAccess> 
 <!-- Data Subject can READ his/her personal data if there is no national security issue -->  
 
 <TargetAccess> 
  <RoleList>   
  </RoleList> 
   <TargetList> 
     <Target> 
      <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
       <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
     </Target>       
   </TargetList> 
   <IF> 
   <AND> 
     <EQ> 
     <Environment Parameter="NationalSecurityIssue" Type="Boolean" /> 
     <Constant Value="True" Type="Boolean" /> 
    </EQ> 
                  <OR> 
      <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectE-mail" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
      <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
      <AND> 
                    <EQ> 
                    <Environment Parameter="Name" Type="String" /> 
           <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectName" Type="String" /> 
           </EQ> 
           <EQ> 
           <Environment Parameter="Address" Type="String" /> 
           <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
          </EQ> 
      </AND> 
         </OR> 
      </AND> 
   </IF>  
 </TargetAccess> 
 <!-- Data Subject can READ his/her personal data if there is no economic or financial issue -->  
 <TargetAccess> 
   <RoleList>     
   </RoleList> 
    <TargetList> 
      <Target> 
       <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
       <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
      </Target>       
    </TargetList> 
    <IF> 
     <AND> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="EconomicOrFinancialIssue" Type="Boolean" /> 
 <Constant Value="True" Type="Boolean" /> 






      <OR><EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectE-mail" Type="String" /> 
       </EQ> 
      <EQ> 
       <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
       <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
  <AND> 
       <EQ> 
       <Environment Parameter="Name" Type="String" /> 
       <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectName" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
       <EQ> 
       <Environment Parameter="Address" Type="String" /> 
       <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
     </AND> 
        </OR> 
           </AND> 
   </IF>  
  </TargetAccess> 
 <!-- Data Subject can READ his/her personal data if there is no medical Objection -->  
 <TargetAccess> 
   <RoleList> 
   </RoleList> 
    <TargetList> 
      <Target> 
       <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
       <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
      </Target>       
    </TargetList> 
    <IF> 
     <AND> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="MedicalObjection" Type="Boolean" /> 
 <Constant Value="True" Type="Boolean" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <OR><EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="E-mail" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectE-mail" Type="String" /> 
               </EQ> 
      <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="NHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectNHSNumber" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
     <AND> 
      <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="Name" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectName" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
      <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="Address" Type="String" /> 
      <Environment Parameter="DataSubjectAddress" Type="String" /> 
      </EQ> 
     </AND> 
 </OR> 
       </AND> 










<!-- this policy is used as a white list policy to allow the data subject read his/her policy if no other denying condition is true--> 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy1" DenyBased="true" EnableNotApplicable="false"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14">  
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
 <TargetPolicy> 
  <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="PersonalData"/> 
  </TargetDomainSpec>  
 </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action> 
   </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
   <!-- DataSubject can READ his/her personal data. --> 
  <TargetAccess> 
   <RoleList> 
   </RoleList> 
   <TargetList> 
    <Target> 
      <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
      <DeniedAction ID="READ"/> 
    </Target>       
   </TargetList> 
   <IF> 
       <NOT> 
     <OR> <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
           <Constant Value="historical purpose" Type="String" /> 






   <EQ> 
   <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
   <Constant Value="statistical purpose" Type="String" /> 
   </EQ> 
           <EQ> 
      <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="performance of contract" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="entering into contract" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Environment Parameter="PurposeOfDataCollection" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ> 
   <GT> 
  <Environment Parameter="ValidityTime" Type="Time" /> 
                      <Environment Parameter="CurrentTime" Type="Time" /> 
                  </GT> 
   </OR> 
 </NOT> 






<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy8" EnableNotApplicable="true"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14"> 
     <SupRole Value="MedicalProfessional"/> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
   <TargetPolicy> 
  <TargetDomainSpec ID="MedicalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="MedicalData"/> 







  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/>      
    </Action> 
    <Action Name="Update" ID="Update"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/> 
    </Action> 
    <Action Name="UpdateRequest" ID="UpdateRequest"> 
      <TargetDomain ID="MediclaData"/> 
    </Action>        
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    
    <!-- DataSubject can READ his/her personal data.        
     --> 
   <TargetAccess> 
    <RoleList> 
     <Role Type="permisRole" Value="MedicalProfessional"/> 
    </RoleList> 
     <TargetList> 
       <Target> 
        <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/> 
        <AllowedAction ID="READ"/> 
       </Target>       
     </TargetList> 
     <IF> 
      <AND>   
       <OR>   
         <EQ> 
         <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
         <Constant Value="medical diagnosis" Type="String" /> 
         </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="provision of care and treatment" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="preventive medicine" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="management of health care service" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Environment Parameter="PurposeOfDataCollection" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ>    
          </OR> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="PhysicianID" Type="String" /> 
 <Environment Parameter="TreatingPhysicianID" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
      </AND> 
    </IF>  
   </TargetAccess> 









<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<X.509_PMI_RBAC_Policy OID="LawPolicy9" EnableNotApplicable="false"> 
  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14"> 
       <SupRole Value="MedicalProfessional"/> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
  <TargetPolicy> 
  <TargetDomainSpec ID="MedicalData"> 
    <Include URL=""/> 
    <ObjectClass Name="MedicalData"/> 
  </TargetDomainSpec>  
 </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="READ" ID="READ"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/>      
    </Action> 
    <Action Name="WRITE" ID="WRITE"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/> 
    </Action> 
    <Action Name="BreakTheGlass" ID="BreakTheGlass"> 
      <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/> 
    </Action>        
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    
    <!-- DataSubject can READ his/her personal data.        
     --> 
  <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole" Value="MedicalProfessional"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target>          
          <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/>          
          <AllowedAction ID="BreakTheGlass"/> 
        </Target>       






      <IF> 
       <OR> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="medical diagnosis" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="provision of care and treatment" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="preventive medicine" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="management of health care service" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
      </OR>                 
      </IF> 
      <Obligations>        
        <Obligation ObligationId="BreakTheGlassObligation" FulfillOn="Permit"> 
          <AttributeAssignment AttributeId="BTG:(Role(S),ResourceType(R),urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id(A))" 
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"></AttributeAssignment> 
        </Obligation> 
      </Obligations>       
    </TargetAccess> 
   <TargetAccess> 
    <RoleList> 
     <Role Type="permisRole" Value="MedicalProfessional"/> 
    </RoleList> 
    <TargetList> 
      <Target> 
       <TargetDomain ID="MedicalData"/> 
        <AllowedAction ID="READ"/> 
        <AllowedAction ID="WRITE"/> 
      </Target> 
      </TargetList> 
      <IF> 
       <AND> 
         <EQ> 
          <Environment Parameter="BTG:(Role(S),ResourceType(R),urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id(A))" 
Type="Boolean"/> 
          <Constant Type="Boolean" Value="true"/> 
        </EQ> 
       <OR> 
 <EQ> 
          <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="medical diagnosis" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
 <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="provision of care and treatment" Type="String" /> 
 </EQ> 
  <EQ> 
  <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
  <Constant Value="preventive medicine" Type="String" /> 







 <Environment Parameter="Purpose" Type="String" /> 
 <Constant Value="management of health care service" Type="String" /> 
  </EQ>  
       </OR> 
    </AND>   
   </IF> 






Appendix 5: Example Policies and Request 
Context for Validation Tests 
 
Policies for use case scenario 1 presented in Section 5.5.1 
 
Appendix 4.1: CRP constructed with Isseur’s CRR, DataSubject’s CRR, 
Controller’s CRR and the default CRR. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 






 <Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
  <Subjects/><Resources/><Actions/>      
 </Target> 
 <Policy PolicyId="IssuerCRR1" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="IssuerCRR1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>If the ResourceType is MedicalData and the requester is a 
MedicalProfessional DCA=grantOverrides.</Description>  
    <Target> 
<Subjects> 
 <Subject> 
  <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue>  
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Role" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
  </SubjectMatch> 
 </Subject> 
</Subjects>          
<Resources> 
 <Resource> 
  <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue>  




















  <Rule RuleId="IssuerCRR2" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>If the ResourceType is MedicalData and the requester is a 
MedicalProfessional DCA=grantOverrides.</Description>  
   <Target><Subjects/> 




        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
  </ResourceMatch></Resource> </Resources> 
  <Actions/> 
 </Target> 
  </Rule> 
   <Obligations><Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/permit-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/></Obligations>   
   </Policy> 
   <Policy PolicyId="IssuerCRR" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
 <Rule RuleId="IssuerCRR" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>If the ResourceType is MedicalData and the requester is a 
MedicalProfessional DCA=grantOverrides.</Description>  
  <Target><Subjects/>      
      <Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue>  
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </ResourceMatch></Resource> </Resources> 
    <Actions/> 
   </Target> 
  <Condition> <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:not">  
     <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
   <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
         <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
bag"> 
    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue> 
    </Apply></Apply></Apply> 
    </Condition> 
  </Rule> 







FulfillOn="Permit"/></Obligations>   
 </Policy> 
 <Policy PolicyId="DataSubjectCRR" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/> 
  <Rule RuleId="DataSubjectCRR" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Description>If the ResourceType is MedicalData DCA=denyOverrides.</Description>  
   <Target> <Subjects></Subjects>    
   <Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue>  
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </ResourceMatch> </Resource></Resources> 
   <Actions/>      
   </Target>     
  </Rule> 
   <Obligations><Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/deny-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
   </Obligations>       
 </Policy>  
 <Policy PolicyId="ControllerCRR" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/> 
   <Rule RuleId="ControllerCRR" Effect="Permit"><Description>If the ResourceType 
is MedicalData DCA=denyOverrides.</Description>  
     <Target/> 
   </Rule> 
   <Obligations> 
     <Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/permit-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
   </Obligations>   
  </Policy>  
  <Policy PolicyId="DefaultCRR" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/> 
  
   <Rule RuleId="DefaultCRR" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>If the ResourceType is MedicalData 
DCA=denyOverrides.</Description>  
    <Target/  
   </Rule> 
   <Obligations> 
     <Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/masterpdp/conflictresolution/permit-overrides" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
   </Obligations>   





Appendix 4.2: ACP of Issuer for use case 1 of Section 5.5.1  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 











 <Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
  <Subjects/><Resources/><Actions/>      
 </Target> 
 <Policy PolicyId="IssuerPolicy1" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="IssuerRule1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>MedicalProfessional can change the value of 
MedicalObjection attribute of the Medical Data or of each Medical Records in the Medical Data 
separately for the purpose of saving the vital interest of the data subject.</Description>  
    <Target> 
<Subjects><Subject><SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue>  
  <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
</SubjectMatch></Subject></Subjects>          
<Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-
equal"> 
  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalObligation</AttributeValue>  




  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue>  





Appendix 4.3: ACP of DataSubject for use case 1 of Section 5.5.1  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 






 <Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
  <Subjects/><Resources/><Actions/>      
 </Target> 
 <Policy PolicyId="DataSubjectPolicy1" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="DataSubjectRule1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Dr. D of Kent Health Center can READ /WRITE my 
MedicalData.</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalProfessional</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 






     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Dr. D</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Name" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue>  
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ResourceType" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </ResourceMatch></Resource></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 
    <Condition> <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:not">  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply></Apply> 
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
  </Policy> 
 <Policy PolicyId="DataSubjectPolicy2" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="DataSubjectRule2" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>• Researchers are allowed to view the Medical Data and 
Prescription if the data can be anonymised.</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Researcher</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 







       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Prescription</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply> 
      </Apply> 
      </Condition> 
  </Rule> 
   <Obligations><Obligation ObligationId="Anonymise data" 
FulfillOn="Permit"/> 





Appendix 4.4: ACP of Controller for use case 1 of Section 5.5.1  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 






 <Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
  <Subjects/><Resources/><Actions/>      
 </Target> 
 <Policy PolicyId="ControllerPolicy1" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="ControllerRule1" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Administrative Officers can read and write administrative 
data. </Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">AdministrativeOfficer</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 







     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">AdministrativeData</AttributeValue>  
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ResourceType" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </ResourceMatch></Resource></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 
    <Condition>  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply> 
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
    <Rule RuleId="ControllerRule2" Effect="Deny"> 
    <Description>Administrative Officers can’t access the medical data. 
</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">AdministrativeOfficer</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources><Resource><ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue>  
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ResourceType" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </ResourceMatch></Resource></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 






       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
     </Apply></Apply> 
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
   <Rule RuleId="ControllerRule3" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Financial Officers can access the billing and payment 
information</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">FinancialOfficer</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 
    <Condition>  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply> 
      <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">BillingInformation</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">PaymentInformation</AttributeValue> 






   
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
   <Rule RuleId="ControllerRule4" Effect="Deny"> 
    <Description>Financial Officers can’t access the medical data or 
administrative data.</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">FinancialOfficer</AttributeValue>  
      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 
    <Condition>  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
     </Apply></Apply> 
     <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MedicalData</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">AdministrativeData</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply></Apply>  
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
   <Rule RuleId="ControllerRule4" Effect="Deny"> 
    <Description>Medical professionals can’t access the billing and payment 
information or the patient’s financial information.</Description>  
    <Target> 
   <Subjects> 
    <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 







      <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
     <Subject><SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">KentHealthCenter</AttributeValue>  
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Organisation" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
     </SubjectMatch></Subject> 
   </Subjects>          
   <Resources></Resources> 
   <Actions></Actions> 
   </Target> 
    <Condition>  
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Write</AttributeValue> 
     </Apply></Apply> 
     <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-member-of"> 
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="ResourceType" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">BillingInformation</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">FinancialInformation</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Patient'sFinancialInformation</AttributeValu
e> 
     </Apply></Apply>  
      </Condition> 
   </Rule> 
    
   </Policy> 
     
</PolicySet> 
 
Appendix 4.5: Request Contexts (RC) 
RC No. Request Contexts 











































































































































































5.  Same as RC3. 
6.  Same as RC3 except the value of action-id will be “Write” instead of “Read”.  
















































































































9.  Same as RC 8 removing MedicalObjection attribute 












































































































































































































































































16.  Same as RC 14 since the BTG variable is handled by the software it does not need to be 
in the RC. 
17.  Same as RC 16 expect the value of action-id will be “Write”. 
18.  Same as RC 13 since the BTG variable is handled by the software it does not need to be 
in the RC. 





















































































































































































































Note: This RC is sent to PEP which then added the contract related information with 
the Contract-id. 
23.  Same as RC19 except the value of ResourceType is “Prescription”.  

































































Note: PEP adds the contract related information with the Contract-id. 






















































Note: PEP adds the contract related information with the Contract-id. 

























































Note: PEP adds the contract related information with the Contract-id. 





















































Note: PEP adds the contract related information with the Contract-id. 
28.  Same as RC26 except that the value of Role is “Junior Officer”. 



































































































































































33.  Same as RC32 except that the value of action-id will be “Update”. 





















































35.  Same as RC29 except that the value of action-id is “Write”. 
36.  Same as RC29 except that the value of action-id is “Update”. 
37.  Same as RC34 except that the value of Organisation is “companyC”. 

























































39.  Same as RC34 except that the value of Organisation is “CompanyX”. 





















































41.  Same as RC40 except that the value of action-id is “Update”. 
42.  Same as RC36 except that the value of Organisation is “CompanyC”. 
43.  Same as RC30 except that the value of Organisation is “CompanyC”. 
 
Appendix 4.6: Policies and Request Contexts of Section 5.5.4 
Appendix 4.6.1 Controller Policy of the system for use case scenario 4  
 
--Controller PDP Policy for use case scenario 4-- 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 






 <Target xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
 </Target> 
 <Policy PolicyId="MemberSubmit" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
   <Target/>  
   <Rule RuleId="MemberSubmit" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Anyone with Member role can submit policy </Description>  
    <Target><Subjects><Subject> 
       <SubjectMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">member</AttributeValue>  
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Role" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       </SubjectMatch> 
     </Subject></Subjects>      
    <Resources/> 
    <Actions><Action> 
       <ActionMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">SUBMIT</AttributeValue>  
        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/>  
       </ActionMatch> 
    </Action></Actions>      
    </Target> 
   </Rule> 
 </Policy>  
 <Policy PolicyId="MemberTransfer" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
  <Target/> 
   <Rule RuleId="MemberTransfer" Effect="Permit"> 
    <Description>Anyone with member Role can TRANSFER policy </Description>  
    <Target> 
     <Subjects> 
      <Subject> 







        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">member</AttributeValue>  
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="Role" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
       </SubjectMatch> 
      </Subject> 
     </Subjects>       
     <Resources/> 
     <Actions><Action> 
       <ActionMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">TRANSFER</AttributeValue>  
        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/>  
       </ActionMatch> 
     </Action></Actions>      
    </Target>     
   </Rule> 
   <Obligations> 
     <Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/obligations/AttachStickyPolicy" FulfillOn="Permit">       
     
      </Obligation>  
    </Obligations> 









































































































 <Policy PolicyId="Policy1" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
 <Target></Target> 
 <Rule RuleId="Mypolicy" Effect="Permit"> 
 <Description>MyFriend can Read </Description> 
 <Target>       
 </Target> 
 <Condition> 
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">   
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
   <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="Role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
   <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">MyFriend</AttributeValue> 
  </Apply></Apply>     
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least-one-
member-of"> 
   <ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
  <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Read</AttributeValue> 
  </Apply></Apply> 
  </Apply> 
 </Condition>    
 </Rule><Obligations> 
 <Obligation ObligationId="LogTheRequest" FulfillOn="Permit"></Obligation>  































































  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec Type="permisRole" OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14"> 
      <SupRole Value="MyFriend"/> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
  <TargetPolicy> 
    <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 






    </TargetDomainSpec>  
  </TargetPolicy> 
  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action Name="Write" ID="Write"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action>       
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole" Value="MyFriend"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target> 
          <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
          <AllowedAction ID="Write"/>           
        </Target> 
      </TargetList> 
     <Obligations> 
   <Obligation ObligationId="SendE-mail" FulfillOn="Permit"></Obligation>  
     </Obligations> 
    </TargetAccess> 





























































































Appendix 4.6.7 Response obtained with a Grant to TRANSFER sticky policy 
containing all the policies for “rid-1” 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <soapenv:Body> 










  <urn:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> 
 </urn:Status> 
 <urn1:Assertion IssueInstant="2013-06-25T00:13:21.300+01:00" 
ID="_66e06da0a5776ed30f0ee540bce72c5b"  
Version="2.0" xmlns:urn1="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> 
 <urn1:Statement xsi:type="urn:XACMLAuthzDecisionStatementType"  
xmlns:urn="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:profile:saml2.0:v2:schema:assertion:cd-01"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
  <xacml-context:Response xmlns:xacml-context="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"> 
  <xacml-context:Result ResourceId="ou=some,o=service,c=gb"> 
  <xacml-context:Decision>Permit</xacml-context:Decision> 
  <xacml-context:Status> 
  <xacml-context:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
  </xacml-context:Status> 
  <xacml:Obligations xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
   <xacml:Obligation 
ObligationId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/obligations/stickypolicyobligation"> 
   <xacml:AttributeAssignment  
AttributeId="http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/obligations/stickypolicyobligation/stickypolicy"  
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
<![CDATA[<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 









  <SubjectPolicy> 
    <SubjectDomainSpec ID="everywhere"> 
      <Include LDAPDN=""/> 
    </SubjectDomainSpec> 
  </SubjectPolicy> 
  <RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
    <RoleSpec OID="1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.14" Type="permisRole"> 
      <SupRole Value="MyFriend"/> 
    </RoleSpec> 
  </RoleHierarchyPolicy> 
  <SOAPolicy> 
    <SOASpec ID="anyone" LDAPDN=""/> 
  </SOAPolicy> 
  <RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
      <SubjectDomain ID="everywhere"/> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="anyone"/> 
      <Validity/> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
  </RoleAssignmentPolicy> 
  <TargetPolicy> 
    <TargetDomainSpec ID="PersonalData"> 
      <Include URL="http://records.kent.ac.uk/PersonalData/"/> 
    </TargetDomainSpec>  






  <ActionPolicy> 
    <Action ID="Write" Name="Write"> 
     <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/>      
    </Action>       
  </ActionPolicy> 
  <TargetAccessPolicy> 
    <TargetAccess> 
      <RoleList> 
        <Role Type="permisRole" Value="MyFriend"/> 
      </RoleList> 
      <TargetList> 
        <Target> 
          <TargetDomain ID="PersonalData"/> 
          <AllowedAction ID="Write"/>           
        </Target> 
      </TargetList> 
      <Obligations> 
   <Obligation ObligationId="SendE-mail" FulfillOn="Permit"></Obligation>  
     </Obligations> 
    </TargetAccess> 






<![CDATA[<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 














 <Policy PolicyId="Policy1" 
 RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
<Target/> 
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Mypolicy"> 
<Description>myfriend can Read </Description> 
<Target>   
</Target> 
<Condition> 





















</Condition>    
</Rule><Obligations> 
 <Obligation ObligationId="LogTheRequest" FulfillOn="Permit"></Obligation>  




            </xacml:Obligation> 
          </xacml:Obligations> 
         </xacml-context:Result> 
       </xacml-context:Response> 
      </urn1:Statement> 
    </urn1:Assertion> 
   </urn:Response> 
 </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
Appendix 4.6.8 Response obtained with combined obligations 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <soapenv:Body> 
   <urn:Response IssueInstant="2013-06-25T17:26:03.230+01:00" 
ID="_411dbd7174a948240c26ee6864c9cf15" Version="2.0" InResponseTo="A2010-12-13T12.58.12" 
xmlns:urn="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
    <urn:Status> 
      <urn:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> 
    </urn:Status> 
    <urn1:Assertion IssueInstant="2013-06-25T17:26:03.230+01:00" 
ID="_42c220ccd62fdbaf2ba46f95f5a92a71" Version="2.0" 
xmlns:urn1="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> 
      <urn1:Statement xsi:type="urn:XACMLAuthzDecisionStatementType" 
xmlns:urn="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:profile:saml2.0:v2:schema:assertion:cd-01" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
       <xacml-context:Response xmlns:xacml-
context="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"> 
         <xacml-context:Result ResourceId="ou=some,o=service,c=gb"> 
          <xacml-context:Decision>Permit</xacml-context:Decision> 
          <xacml-context:Status> 
            <xacml-context:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
          </xacml-context:Status> 
          <xacml:Obligations xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"> 
            <xacml:Obligation ObligationId="LogTheRequest" FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
            <xacml:Obligation ObligationId="SendE-mail" FulfillOn="Permit"/> 
          </xacml:Obligations> 
         </xacml-context:Result> 
       </xacml-context:Response> 
      </urn1:Statement> 
    </urn1:Assertion> 











The wsdl of ConVS is presented here.  
 
<wsdl:definitions xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:ns1="http://org.apache.axis2/xsd" 
xmlns:ns="http://ws.apache.org/axis2" xmlns:wsaw="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl" 




























































<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="args0" nillable="true" type="xs:string"/> 



































<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="cause" nillable="true" type="xs:anyType"/> 
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="exception" nillable="true"/> 








<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:ValidateContract"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="ValidateContractResponse"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:ValidateContractResponse"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="ParserConfigurationException"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:ParserConfigurationException"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="SAXException"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:SAXException"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="IOException"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:IOException"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="IllegalArgumentException"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:IllegalArgumentException"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="MarshalException"> 
<wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:MarshalException"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
<wsdl:message name="XMLSignatureException"> 




<wsdl:input message="ns:ValidateContractRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContract"/> 
<wsdl:output message="ns:ValidateContractResponse" wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContractResponse"/> 







<wsdl:fault message="ns:SAXException" name="SAXException" wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContractSAXException"/> 
<wsdl:fault message="ns:IOException" name="IOException" wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContractIOException"/> 
<wsdl:fault message="ns:IllegalArgumentException" name="IllegalArgumentException" 
wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContractIllegalArgumentException"/> 
<wsdl:fault message="ns:MarshalException" name="MarshalException" wsaw:Action="urn:ValidateContractMarshalException"/> 




<wsdl:binding name="ConVSSoap11Binding" type="ns:ConVSPortType"> 
<soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
<wsdl:operation name="ValidateContract"> 








<soap:fault use="literal" name="MarshalException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="IllegalArgumentException"> 
<soap:fault use="literal" name="IllegalArgumentException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="IOException"> 
<soap:fault use="literal" name="IOException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="SAXException"> 
<soap:fault use="literal" name="SAXException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="XMLSignatureException"> 
<soap:fault use="literal" name="XMLSignatureException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="ParserConfigurationException"> 




<wsdl:binding name="ConVSSoap12Binding" type="ns:ConVSPortType"> 
<soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
<wsdl:operation name="ValidateContract"> 








<soap12:fault use="literal" name="MarshalException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="IllegalArgumentException"> 
<soap12:fault use="literal" name="IllegalArgumentException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="IOException"> 
<soap12:fault use="literal" name="IOException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="SAXException"> 
<soap12:fault use="literal" name="SAXException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="XMLSignatureException"> 
<soap12:fault use="literal" name="XMLSignatureException"/> 
</wsdl:fault> 
<wsdl:fault name="ParserConfigurationException"> 














<mime:content type="text/xml" part="ValidateContract"/> 
</wsdl:input> 
<wsdl:output> 





<wsdl:port name="ConVSHttpSoap11Endpoint" binding="ns:ConVSSoap11Binding"> 
<soap:address location="http://localhost:8080/axis2/services/ConVS.ConVSHttpSoap11Endpoint/"/> 
</wsdl:port> 
<wsdl:port name="ConVSHttpSoap12Endpoint" binding="ns:ConVSSoap12Binding"> 
<soap12:address location="http://localhost:8080/axis2/services/ConVS.ConVSHttpSoap12Endpoint/"/> 
</wsdl:port> 





Appendix 7: PEP and ConVS 
Communication 
 
The PHD PEP code that calls the ConVS and extends the request context based on the 





$client = new SoapClient(null, array( 
   'location' => urldecode($location), 
   'uri'   => urldecode($uri),  
   'trace'  => 1 )); 





//calling ConVS functions 
 
try { 
  $result = $client->__soapCall("ValidateContract", 
            array 
            ( 
                new SoapParam($str1,"Signature_file1"), 
                new SoapParam($str2,"Signature_file2") 
            ) 
             
        ); 










echo "I found this as a returned value."; 
echo $result; 
echo "........."; 
$string = $result; 
 //$string = 'NameOfSubjectOfContract: kaniz;AddressOfSubjectOfContract: 
canterbury;ResourceType: cv of kaniz;NameOfPartyOne: O2;AddressOfPartyOne:canterbury; 
NameOfPartyTwo: D; AddressOfPartyTwo: kent'; 
 //Splitting the attbutes and values. Attribute and values are separated by : and the 
pairs are separated by ;. 
 $array = preg_split("/[\s]*[;][\s]*/", $string); 
 print_r($array); 
  
//Constructing XACML elemnet from the result.  
 $mkelement = ""; 
 for ($i=0; $i <= 6; $i++) { 
  $element = preg_split("/[\s]*[:][\s]*/", $array[$i]); 
  
  $mkelement .= '<xacml-context:Attribute AttributeId="' .      $element[0]. '" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">' . "\n" . '<xacml-context:AttributeValue>'; 
  $mkelement .= $element[1]; 
  $mkelement .= '</xacml-context:AttributeValue>'. "\n" . '</xacml-
context:Attribute>'; 
  
  echo $mkelement; 
 } 
//writing the result into a file which can be used for tesing purpose 
 $fd = fopen("myfile5.xml", "w"); 
 fwrite($fd, $mkelement); 
 fclose($fd); 
 
//reading the file containing Request Context to put the XACML elements made from the response 
from ConVS 
 $contents = file("RequestByO2ExtendedMetaData.xml"); 
 $newcontents = ""; 
 foreach($contents as $line) { 
  echo $line; 
  echo "\r"; 
 
//extending the request context with the XACML elements made from the response from ConVS 
  
if(rtrim(ltrim($line)) !="</xacml-context:Environment>") { 
  
   $newcontents .= $line; 
  } 
  else { 
  
   $newcontents .= $mkelement . "\n"; // don't add the newline if you've 
already added it in $newthread before 
   $newcontents .= $line; 
  } 
 } 
  
//Writing the extented request context to a file which can be sent to AuthorisationSystem 
directly by PHP client code or SOAP UI client  
 $fd = fopen("RequestByO2ExtendedContract.xml", "w"); 












































































































































Appendix 8: Automation of CNL to 
XACML 





















public class XMLConverter { 
 




 public void convert(String inputFile, String convertedFile) throws ParserConfigurationException, SAXException, 
IOException, XPathExpressionException, JAXBException { 
 
  // create helper classes 
  XMLInputHelper inputHelper = new XMLInputHelper(inputFile); 
  XMLPolicyFactory factory = new XMLPolicyFactory(); 
 
  // start creating policy 
  Policy policy = factory.createPolicy(); 
 
  // get ruleId 
  String ruleId = inputHelper.getNodeValue("//rule-definition/rule-id/STRING/text()"); 
  System.out.println("RuleId = " + ruleId); 
 
  Rule rule = factory.createRule(); 
  rule.setRuleId(ruleId); 
  policy.setRule(rule); 
   
  String grantOrDeny = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-statement/GrantOrDeny/text()"); 
  assertTrue(grantOrDeny != null, "We always expect grant or deny"); 
  rule.setEffect(grantOrDeny); 
   
  Condition condition = new Condition(); 
  rule.setCondition(condition); 






   
  //all rules start with 'and' 
  Apply conditionStartApply = factory.createApplyForFunction("and"); 
  condition.setApply(conditionStartApply); 
   
  //now check if there is any 'operator' 
  String[] operatorList = inputHelper.getNodeValueList("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/conditions/operator/text()"); 
   
  Apply operatorApply = null; 
  if (operatorList.length > 0) { 
   //we assume they are all 'or' or all 'and'... so a quick check on that! 
   for (int i = 0; i < operatorList.length - 1; i++) { 
    if ( ! operatorList[i].equalsIgnoreCase(operatorList[i + 1])) { 
     this.notifyNotImplemented("We don't expect different kinds of operators. 
We expected all operators to be same"); 
    } 
   } 
   operatorApply = factory.createApplyForFunction(operatorList[0].toLowerCase()); 
  } else { 
   //if there is no opeator, it means we will add stuffs to first 'and' 
   operatorApply = conditionStartApply; 
  } 
   
  boolean alreadyFoundNegativeRelOperator = false;//once we find a negative rel operator (like is-not-equal-
to), we expect all other rel operator will be negative as well. 
   
  for (int iCondition = 0; iCondition < operatorList.length + 1; iCondition++) { // + 1 coz even if there is no 
operator, it means there is one condition. for one 'or' there will be two coditions 
   //now possible options: 
   // 1) With 'relational operator' : If the Subject:E-mail:string is equal to the 
resource:DataSubject’sE-mail:string  
   // 2) 'there is' booleanAttribute : If there is a DataAccessManadate  
    
   //Lets look for relational operator 
   //we first need to build the xpath: if we are in the second part of the operator (such OR), we will 
have more /conditions/ in xpath 
   String conditionsChain = ""; 
   for (int iConditionBuilder = 0; iConditionBuilder < iCondition; iConditionBuilder++ ) { 
    conditionsChain += "conditions/"; 
   } 
   String relationalOperator = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "/condition/relationalOperator/text()"); 
   if (relationalOperator != null) { 
    String relOpFunctionName = ""; 
    if ("is equal to".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator)) { 
     if (alreadyFoundNegativeRelOperator) { 
      throw new IllegalStateException("We already found a negative 
relational operator, cannot apply " + relationalOperator); 
     } 
     relOpFunctionName = "string-at-least-one-member-of"; 
    } else if ("is less than".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator)) { 
     if (alreadyFoundNegativeRelOperator) { 
      throw new IllegalStateException("We already found a negative 
relational operator, cannot apply " + relationalOperator); 
     } 
     relOpFunctionName = "date-less-than"; 
    } else if ("is not the".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator) ||"is not 
a".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator) || 
      "is not equal to".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator) ||"is not 
the".equalsIgnoreCase(relationalOperator)) { 
     alreadyFoundNegativeRelOperator = true; 






    } else { 
     this.notifyNotImplemented("relational operator = " + relationalOperator); 
    } 
    Apply relationalOperatorApply = 
factory.createApplyForFunction(relOpFunctionName); 
     
    //now check if it contains attribute or value or reservedAttribute 
    int relOperandCount = 2;//is-equal-to, is-not-the etc has 2 operators. 
    for (int iRelOperand = 0; iRelOperand < relOperandCount; iRelOperand++) { 
     boolean hasAttribute = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "/condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + "]/attribute/category/text()") != null; 
     boolean hasValue = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "/condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + "]/values/value/STRING/text()") != 
null; 
     if (hasAttribute) { 
      String firstAttrId = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-
definition/rule-statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + 
"]/attribute/name/STRING/text()"); 
      String firstCategoryId = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-
definition/rule-statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + 
"]/attribute/category/text()"); 
      String firstAttrType = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-
definition/rule-statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + "]/attribute/type/text()"); 
       
      assertTrue(firstAttrId != null, "Condition must have name"); 
      assertTrue(firstCategoryId != null, "Condition must have 
category"); 
      assertTrue(firstAttrType != null, "Condition must have subject 
type"); 
  
      factory.addAttributeDesignator(relationalOperatorApply, 
firstCategoryId, firstAttrId, firstAttrType); 
     } else if (hasValue) { 
      int valueCount = inputHelper.getNodeCount("/rule-
definition/rule-statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "/condition/attributes[" + (iRelOperand + 1) + "]/values/value"); 
      Vector<String> valueList = new Vector<String>(); 
      for (int iValue = 0; iValue < valueCount; iValue++) { 
       String value = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-
definition/rule-statement/conditions/" + conditionsChain + "/condition/attributes/values/value[" + (iValue + 1) + 
"]/STRING/text()"); 
       valueList.add(value); 
      } 
      Apply valueBag = factory.createStringBagApply(valueList); 
      relationalOperatorApply.getApply().add(valueBag); 
     } else { 
      this.notifyNotImplemented("only attribute / value ... not 
reservedAttribute"); 
     } 
    } 
     
    operatorApply.getApply().add(relationalOperatorApply); 
     
     
   } else { 
    //now we will look for 'there is' 
    this.notifyNotImplemented("different relational operator in condition = " + 
relationalOperator); 
   } 
    
  }//for loop for conditions 
   
   






  int actionCount = inputHelper.getNodeCount("/rule-definition/rule-statement/actions/action"); 
   
  Vector<String> actionList = new Vector<String>(); 
  for (int iAction = 0; iAction < actionCount; iAction++) { 
   String actionName = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-statement/actions/action[" 
+ (iAction + 1) + "]/word/text()"); 
   actionList.add(actionName); 
  } 
  Apply actionApply = factory.createAction(actionList); 
   
  //now finally let's handle operator apply (and special case with NOT) 
  if (operatorApply != conditionStartApply) { 
   if (alreadyFoundNegativeRelOperator) { 
    Apply notApply = factory.createApplyForFunction("not"); 
    notApply.getApply().add(operatorApply); 
    conditionStartApply.getApply().add(notApply); 
   } else { 
    conditionStartApply.getApply().add(operatorApply); 
   } 
  } 
  conditionStartApply.getApply().add(actionApply); 
 
  //resourceType 
  int resourceTypeCount = inputHelper.getNodeCount("/rule-definition/rule-statement/ResourceType"); 
  if (resourceTypeCount > 0) { 
   Vector<String> resourceTypeList = new Vector<String>(); 
   for (int iResType = 0; iResType < resourceTypeCount; iResType++) { 
    String resourceTypeName = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/ResourceType[" + (iResType + 1) + "]/word/text()"); 
    resourceTypeList.add(resourceTypeName); 
   } 
   Apply resourceTypesApply = factory.createResourceTypes(resourceTypeList); 
   conditionStartApply.getApply().add(resourceTypesApply); 
  } 
   
  //obligations 
   
  String obligation = inputHelper.getNodeValue("/rule-definition/rule-
statement/obligations/obligation/STRING/text()"); 
  if (obligation != null) { 
   Obligations obligations = factory.createObligationsWithId(obligation, rule.getEffect()); 
   policy.setObligations(obligations); 
  } 
   
  // prepare marshaling to xml 
  JAXBContext jaxbContext = JAXBContext.newInstance(Policy.class); 
  Marshaller jaxbMarshaller = jaxbContext.createMarshaller(); 
 
  // output pretty printed 
  jaxbMarshaller.setProperty(Marshaller.JAXB_FORMATTED_OUTPUT, true); 
 
  // write to file 
  File file = new File(convertedFile); 
  if (file.exists()) { //clear file 
   file.delete(); 
  } 
  jaxbMarshaller.marshal(policy, file); 
 
  // print to system.out as well 
  System.out.println("============ " + convertedFile + " ============="); 









 private void notifyNotImplemented(String message) { 
  throw new IllegalStateException("support for this case is not done yet: " + message); 
 } 
  
 private void assertTrue(boolean condition, String message) { 
  if (condition == false) { 
   throw new AssertionError(message); 




 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
  try { 
   XMLConverter converter = new XMLConverter(); 
   converter.convert("intermediate.xml", "policy.xml"); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 







Appendix 9: StickyPAD schema 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"  
  xmlns="tas3:to:be:decided:namespace" 
  targetNamespace="tas3:to:be:decided:namespace" 
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" 
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
  <!-- Use a schema on local file store as there seem to be problems with the  
ones available on the net. --> 
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-
xmldsig-core-20020212/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>   
<xs:element name="StickyPad" type="StickyPADType"/> 
<xs:complexType name="StickyPADType"> 
  <xs:annotation> 
    <xs:documentation> 
   This is the TAS3 Sticky Policy and Data/resource type definition. 
   Version 8. 2 December 2010. 
   The DataResource can be any data or resource which requires a sticky policy. 
   Resource Types holds the type(s) of resource that are contained 
   in the DataResource e.g. it could be a computer system or an email message  
   or some PII. 
   Any number of policies can be stuck to a DataResource. 
   The XML signature is optional because applications may choose to  
   secure the PAD using alternate means, e.g. SSL/TLS. 
    </xs:documentation> 
  </xs:annotation> 







     <xs:element ref="DataResource"/> 
     <xs:element ref="DataResourceRef"/> 
    </xs:choice> 
    <xs:element name="DataResourceType" type="ResourceTypes"/> 
    <xs:element ref="StickyPolicy" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    <xs:element ref="ds:Signature" minOccurs="0"/> 




  <xs:sequence> 
   <xs:element name="ResourceType" type="xs:anyURI" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>     
  </xs:sequence>   
</xs:complexType> 
 
<xs:element name="StickyPolicy" type="StickyPolicyType"/> 
<xs:complexType name="StickyPolicyType"> 
  <xs:annotation> 
    <xs:documentation> 
      The Policy ID specifies the globally unique ID of the policy. 
      The PolicyLanguage specifies the language the policy is written in. 
      The PolicyAuthor specifies attributes of the person who wrote the policy. 
      Time of Creation specifies when the policy was written. 
      Expiry time specifies after what time the policy should be ignored. Infinity is the default. 
      Resource Type specifies the type(s) of resource this policy refers to. 
      The PolicyContents contains the policy written in the language 
      specified in PolicyLanguage. 
      The PolicyType specifies what type of policy this is. 
    </xs:documentation> 
  </xs:annotation> 
  <xs:sequence> 
    <xs:element name="PolicyAuthor" type="PolicyAuthorType" form="qualified"/> 
    <xs:element name="PolicyResourceTypes" type="ResourceTypes" /> 
    <xs:element ref="PolicyContents"/>        
  </xs:sequence> 
  <xs:attribute name="PolicyID" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
  <xs:attribute name="PolicyLanguage" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
  <xs:attribute name="PolicyType" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
  <xs:attribute name="TimeOfCreation" type="xs:dateTime" use="required"/> 
  <xs:attribute name="ExpiryTime" type="xs:dateTime" use="optional"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
   
<xs:element name="PolicyContents" type="AnyXMLType"/> 
<xs:element name="DataResource" type="AnyXMLType"/>  
<xs:element name="DataResourceRef" type="xs:anyURI"/>  
  
<xs:complexType name="AnyXMLType" mixed="true"> 
  <xs:sequence> 
    <xs:any minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" namespace="##any" processContents="lax"> 
      <xs:annotation> 
        <xs:documentation> 
          Any xml content is allowed in this element. 
        </xs:documentation> 
      </xs:annotation> 
    </xs:any> 










  <xs:documentation> 
   The Author is identified by any number of Author Attributes. 
   AuthorType indicates the author's relationship to the Resource in this StickyPAD 
  </xs:documentation> 
 </xs:annotation> 
    <xs:sequence> 
     <xs:element name="AuthorAttribute" type="AuthorAttributeType" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
     <xs:element name="AuthorType" type="xs:anyURI"/> 




    <xs:attribute name="AttributeId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="Issuer" type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="IssueInstant" type="xs:dateTime" use="optional"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="Value" type="xs:string" use="required"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
 
</xs:schema> 
 
